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I 
THE COLONIAL IMPERATIVE AND 
INDIGENOUS PERSPECTIVES 
During Spain's colonial era ( 1689-1821) in the Southern Plains, Native 
Americans in the region encountered new material goods, religious 
ideas, political economies, and exposure to deadly diseases. If commu-
nities managed to survive the devastating effects of epidemics, then ac-
cess to utilitarian metal objects, :firearms, and horses became politically 
and economically critical to the continued stability of Native societies. 
Locations of trade routes, and colonial trading posts, as well as the po-
litical ability of Native peoples to navigate the colonial landscape, all 
played a dominant role in determining whether an indigenous nation 
successfully obtained those commodities necessary to its survival and 
prosperity. Two other important factors also affected access to trade 
goods: exposure to epidemics and the trading policies instituted in the 
region by colonial governments. 
Continual epidemics, particularly those associated with typhoid, 
smallpox, and measles, decimated entire indigenous populations 
(Thornton 1987: 44-45). For example, numerous Native nations lo-
cated along the lower Rio Grande and the upper coast of Texas suc-
cumbed to the relentless epidemics sweeping the region (Aten 1983; 
Campbell 1988; Schuetz 1980). Communities that survived did so 
by merging with other nations (Anderson 1999; Aten 1983; Carter 
1995; Gunnerson 1974; La Vere2000; Lee 1990; Perttula 1992; Smith 
1995) and/or migrating from the region (Gunnerson 1974; Ramenof-
sky 1985; Reff 1991; Robles 1938). In a number of cases, indigenous 
communities, particularly those associated with nomadic economies, 
managed to prosper during this often dangerous era (Anderson 1999; 
Hamalainen 2001). 
Of particular interest in this regard are the political and eco-
nomic strategies implemented by the nomadic Comanches and the 
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semisedentary Hasinais, the most populous of the southern branches 
of the Caddoan linguistic family, to survive Spain's tumultuous colo-
nial era. Both the Comanches and the Hasinais mitigated the effects 
of colonialism through reorganizing their patterns of settlement, eco-
nomic livelihoods, and political organizations. In the Comanches' case, 
mobility increased, their economy became more specialized, and, for 
a brief period, they adopted a more centralized political organization. 
Among the Hasinais, a number of villages merged and their political 
organization became not only more secular but also less hierarchical 
during Spain's colonial era. 
A number ofinternal as well as external factors contributed to the re-
organization of these two communities. One significant event entailed 
the emergence of colonially controlled markets in western Louisiana, 
in the Puebloan villages along the upper Rio Grande, and in popula-
tion centers in eastern and central Texas. Comanches migrated near 
these establishments in order to increase their access to trade items. As 
a result, the Comanches gained access to agricultural products, textiles, 
metal tools, and silver (Hamalainen 2001). 
In the Hasinais' territory, Spain initially limited its expansion to the 
establishment of Franciscan missions. Until France's retreat from the 
region in 1763, French nationals operated trading posts in the area. 
After France vacated the area, entrepreneurs supported by British and 
American businesses increased. A number of Spanish traders, often 
lacking government approval, also began operating in the region. 
Although Spanish missions offered few opportunities for trade, the 
French merchants exchanged firearms, textiles, jewelry, and metal utili-
tarian objects with the Hasinais (Bolton 1914; Flores 1985; Leutnegger 
1977). In addition, French traders opened small trading posts in many 
of the Hasinais' villages (Smith 1995). At these places, the Hasinais 
could legally buy firearms, have their guns repaired, and buy items on 
credit (Allain 1988). 
Even though Spain forbade the sale of firearms to Native peoples, 
both the Comanches and the Hasinais still participated in Spanish 
markets. No matter which colonial government sponsored the trad-
ing post, these two communities exchanged horses, bison, and other 
indigenous animals and their by-products for manufactured commodi-
ties (Albers 1991, 1992; Bamforth 1988; Hall 1989; Hamalainen 1998, 
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2001; Kavanagh 1996; Klein 1993). Unlike the French, British, and 
American traders, however, Spain banned the trade of firearms. 
In order to secure their role as suppliers of colonial commodities, 
the Comanches and the Hasinais negotiated trade and peace agree-
ments with the Spanish and the French {Hall 1989; Kavanagh 1996; 
La Vere 1998, 2000; Perttula 1992; Smith 1995). They also reor-
ganized their political economies, which increased their competitive 
edge in these emerging trade opportunities {Hamalainen 1998, 2001; 
Kavanagh 1996; La Vere 1998, 2000; Perttula 1992). 
Strategies implemented by the Comanches to remain competitive 
included raiding, territorial expansion, {often at the expense of local 
indigenous communities), more frequent migrations, and the negotia-
tion of numerous alliances and peace accords with the Spanish. Being 
semisedentary, the Hasinais had fewer options. They did, however, 
have access to firearms. In order to participate in the firearms trade, 
the Hasinais increased agricultural production to meet the growing 
demands of colonial settlers. In addition, they decentralized and sec-
ularized their once highly centralized theocracy. 
Ultimately, however, the Comanches became more effective traders 
than the Hasinais. Being nomadic, the Comanches developed a com-
plex and successful raiding system as well as a highly mobile military 
force (Albers 1991, 1992; Foster 1991; Hall 1989; Hamalainen 1998, 
2001; Kavanagh 1996;Mishkin 1940; Secoyl953). Each of these skills 
enabled the Comanches to raid Spanish ranchers and other Native 
communities with relative impunity. In addition, their military prowess 
permitted them to not only forestall colonization by the Spanish but 
also block the access of Native competitors to trading routes, orga-
nized markets, and habitats rich in bison and grazing lands (Albers 
1992; Alcocer 1958; Hamalainen 1998, 2001; Kavanagh 1996). 
Initially, the Hasinais played a critical role in the expansion ofFrench 
firearms (Smith 1995; Wyckoff and Baugh 1980). By increasing agri-
cultural production, the Hasinais not only fed colonists in the region 
but also emerged as middlemen in the firearms trade (Hickerson 1996, 
1997; La Vere 1998,2000; Perttula 1992; Smith 1995). Because of their 
horticultural economy, however, the Hasinais lacked the mobility of 
the Comanches. This, in turn, limited their capacity to participate in 
raiding ventures or military actions against potential competitors. It 
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also diminished their ability to garner large herds of horses or to gen-
erate surpluses of wild game by-products (Bolton 1914; Bridges and 
De Ville 1967; Griffith 1954; Kinnaird 1946; Morfi 1935). 
By the 1770s, the Comanches had begun to surpass the Hasinais' im-
portance within the emerging Southern Plains regional economy. For 
example, their expansion into central Texas permitted the Comanches 
to successfully bypass middlemen and instead trade directly with 
American, British, Spanish, and remnant French traders (Bolton 1914; 
Hamalainen 1998, 2001; Kavanagh 1996; Sibley 1922). An indication 
of the Comanches' power over events in the region's political econ-
omy is evidenced by their ability to intervene in the Hasinais' political 
negotiations with other indigenous communities. For example, the 
Comanches successfully terminated an economic treaty made between 
the Hasinais and the Lipan Apaches in the 1770s. 
After the 1763 Treaty of Paris-resulting in France's retreat from 
the area-the Comanches' dominance in the eastern portion of the 
Southern Plains accelerated. Using both force and diplomacy, the 
Comanches developed trading and military alliances with Native com-
munities located along strategic transportation routes (John 1975, 
1984). Some of these were short-term opportunistic endeavors, such 
as their brief alliance with the Utes. Others, however, such as their 
treaties with the Taovayas (later known as the Wichitas), the Kiowas, 
the Cheyennes, and eventually their past enemies, the increasingly 
powerful Osages, led to long-term and generally peaceful relations 
(Richardson 1929, 1933). 
Spain's role in the Comanches' growing importance in the region's 
political economy is difficult to assess. The initial antipathy of the 
Spanish toward the Comanches slowed the community's ability to gain 
a foothold in the upper Rio Grande region. After the Comanches had 
all but annihilated the Lipan Apaches, once the major indigenous eco-
nomic force in the Puebloan region, the Spanish aided the Comanches 
in their efforts to dislodge newly established settlements of the Lipans 
in central and northeastern Texas (Dunn 1911). In addition, colonial 
officials supported the Comanches' ban on the Hasinais' alliance with 
the Lipans. 
Unable to maintain a foothold in this expanding economy, the 
Hasinais became peripheral to the region. Lacking powerful allies, 
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decimated by disease, and feeling pressure from the expansion of 
colonists within their territory, this once powerful nation migrated 
from their homeland to Oklahoma in the 1830s. Unlike the Hasinais, 
the Comanches continued to persevere until weakened by the growing 
presence of American colonists and military personnel. By the 1870s, 
the Comanches' waning importance in the region compelled them to 
sign the Treaty of Medicine Lodge, thereby submitting to a reservation 
economy. 
Frequently, much is known about both the battles fought between 
Western nations competing for resources peripheral to their political 
economy as well as the policies instituted by these nations to negotiate 
with the nonstate communities already occupying these regions. Less 
well understood is the myriad of strategies implemented by nonstate 
societies attempting to retain sovereignty and maintain control over 
their relations with these encroaching colonial nations. Many recent 
Great Plains scholars have addressed these lacunae by focusing on the 
changing political and economic landscape of either the Comanches 
or the Hasinais. In the case of this book, though, these two nations are 
compared rather than discussed singularly. An advantage of this ap-
proach is that it exposes similarities and differences in the strategies 
used by two separate communities to negotiate with the same colo-
nial presence. Core to this venture are four areas of study. These in-
clude Spain's colonial trading policies as well as the changing alliances 
and settlement and political organizations of the Comanches and the 
Hasinais. 
The book explores these four variables within the context of three 
different theories. These theories include world systems perspectives, 
regional analysis, and social history. As Chapter 2 illustrates, each of 
these theories contributes to the development of a framework for un-
derstanding changes within the political economies of the Comanches 
and the Hasinais between 1689 and 1821. Through an analysis of ear-
lier anthropological approaches applied to the Great Plains, Chapter 2 
illustrates the potential of these three theories to gain greater insight 
into the activities of the Comanches and the Hasinais during Spain's 
colonial era. 
As Chapter 2 makes apparent, theoretical approaches prior to the 
emergence of these three theories lacked the ability to explain a 
6 THREE NATIONS, ONE PLACE 
Native community's political economy without relying on environ-
mental variables, internal social constraints, or the creative aspects of 
novel colonial trade goods. For example, warfare in the region tended 
to focus on a society's norms rather than regional events. Wallace and 
Hoebel describe it thus: 
The prosecution of warfare was very much a matter of individual dis-
cretion. Any Comanche was theoretically eligible to lead a war party, 
and there was no power to restrain him .... If his military reputation had 
been established in combat, if his "medicine" was powerful, and ifhe was 
known to be liberal in the division of the spoils, he seldom had difficulty 
securing a large following. (Wallau and Hoebel 1952: 216) 
Regional and global events tended to be perceived as mere epiphe-
nomena. Ignored in this type of descriptive account are the conditions 
responsible for the emergence of endemic warfare in the region. His-
tory cannot be dichotomized between the colonial and indigenous 
residents. 
Researchers who collapse the complexities of these shared histo-
ries into a descriptive account of specific events or actions often are 
trapped into giving too much emphasis to either colonial forces or local 
conditions. In the first category, colonialism becomes a monolithic en-
terprise with global proportions. For example, according to Karl Marx 
and Friedrich Engels: 
The cheap prices of its commodities are the heavy artillery with which it 
batters down all Chinese walls, with which it forces barbarians' obstinate 
hatred of foreigners to capitulate. It compels all nations, on threat of 
extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them 
to introduce what it calls civilization into their midst, i.e., it becomes 
bourgeois themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image. 
(Marx and Engels 1959: 11) 
The perception that colonial intrusion inexorably creates itself in 
temporally and spatially distant places leads to the marginalization of 
the policies, goals, and histories of the colonized. 
If, on the other hand, only the colonized are the focus, external con-
ditions imposed by colonialism may be ignored. Indigenous actions can 
then be perceived as autochthonous responses to a small and locally 
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generated spectrum of factors. Societies are then viewed as static except 
when faced by ecological change, epidemics, and/or novel commodi-
ties. Only by integrating theoretical perspectives that permit a closer 
study of global, regional, and local conditions can a more complete 
explanation of social change be explained. 
In order to more fully show the theoretical advantages of world sys-
tems perspectives, regional analysis, and social history, Chapter 3 pro-
vides an ethnohistorical account of the Comanches and the Hasinais. 
Specifically, the patterns of settlement, political, and economic organi-
zation of both of these communities are studied in detail. These theo-
ries are then applied to specific aspects of these changing patterns. This 
is due to the fact that each theory encompasses particular strengths. 
As a result, Chapter 4 uses world systems perspectives to more clearly 
understand the relationship between Spain's colonial trading policies 
and changes within the political economies of the Comanches and the 
Hasinais. 
Chapter 4 shows that Spain understood the strategic use of trade 
in the development of alliances. Because Spain's occupation of the 
Southern Plains stemmed from a mercantile economic philosophy, 
however, the government implemented restrictive .financial policies, 
which arrested the development of viable trade outlets, colonial in-
dustries, and Spanish emigration (McNeil 1985: 3). Lack of a strong 
economic base meant that settlers in the region had to rely on im-
ports in order to sustain their colonies. In addition, Spain, unlike their 
competitors the French, implemented restrictive trade practices that 
forbade the sale of .firearms to Native peoples. This made it necessary 
for the Comanches and the Hasinais to maintain colonial allies beyond 
the Spanish. 
Through a world systems perspective, a framework for understand-
ing the impetus for the expansion of the Spanish and the Comanches 
and the contraction of the Hasinais becomes clearer. In addition, this 
approach permits a closer study of the strategies used by the Spanish to 
incorporate the Comanches into the region's economy. It also aids in 
efforts to understand the strategies of the Comanches and the Hasinais 
to forestall incorporation. 
As Chapter 5 illustrates, regional analysis emphasizes the rela-
tionship between a community's political activities and the flow of 
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commodities. By focusing on the strategic need for the Comanches 
and the Hasinais to maintain access to firearms and horses, the reasons 
behind the development of alliances and the location of settlements 
become clearer. Because horses were the main items exchanged for 
firearms, the Comanches worked to maintain their own herds and to 
gain access to wild herds. Due to the pasturage needs of horses, the 
Comanches were highly mobile. In order to successfully trade their 
horses for needed commodities, the Comanches also developed al-
liances with strategically located communities. Through regional anal-
ysis, the expansion of Spanish markets into certain regions as well as the 
involvement of the Comanches and Hasinais in these trading centers 
becomes more apparent. 
Among the Hasinais, settlements became more concentrated and 
tended to relocate closer to sources of high-demand commodities 
(Smith 1995). After France left the region, alternative trading routes 
developed in eastern Texas. Located north of the Hasinais, these routes 
permitted other indigenous communities to act as middlemen in trade 
networks. This, in turn, weakened the Hasinais' political and eco-
nomic importance in the region. Migrating closer to potential sources 
of firearms and negotiating alliances with equally marginalized com-
munities, such as the Lipan Apaches, can be better understood through 
the use of regional analysis. 
To more fully explain strategies used by the Comanches and the 
Hasinais to participate in the region's political economy necessitates the 
inclusion oflocal social histories. An exploration oflocal histories aug-
ments explanations of indigenous involvement in colonial processes. 
As Chapter 6 shows, the use of localized histories permits a more 
transparent representation of the plural and particularized expressions 
of colonial encounters (Thomas 1994: ix-x). 
Changes in the political organization of the Comanches and 
the Hasinais provide a window into specific local change. In the 
Comanches' situation, political organization remained diffuse except 
for a brief period of forced centralization. A decentralized power struc-
ture diminished the control Spanish officials could exert over the 
community. Among the Hasinais, political control fluctuated between 
centralized and dispersed systems of power sharing. Having one leader 
proved useful as a broker between the competing French and Spanish 
governments. After France's retreat from the region, having one leader 
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became a liability, as Spain could sanction the entire community 
through the auspices of this one representative. 
Combining world systems, regional analysis, and social history al-
lows the study of different types of strategies implemented by Native 
communities. Consequently, Chapter 4 emphasizes colonial interac-
tions in relation to global and regional realities. Chapter 5 focuses 
more closely on the strategic use of alliances and settlement patterns 
in order for the Comanches and the Hasinais to remain competi-
tive in the region's political economy. Lastly, Chapter 6 explains local 
changes implemented within these two communities in order to main-
tain sovereignty. 
Political and Economic Processes During 
Spain's Colonial Era 
The southern Great Plains encompasses an area extending from the 
Arkansas River east to the Mississippi River, south to the Gulf of 
Mexico, and west to the upper Rio Grande. Spain's colonial efforts in 
the region began in 1680with the establishment of Franciscan missions 
in east Texas and ended with the completion of the Mexican Revolution 
in 1821. Throughout this period, Spain endeavored to increase its role 
in the global economy. This in turn affected colonial policies in the 
Southern Plains. 
Spanish colonialism did not follow a Cartesian plan in the Southern 
Plains. Rarely unified, Spanish colonial agents competed not only with 
other Euroamerican colonies but also with the Church and each other. 
This led to frequent changes in the focus of local policies, strategies, 
and actions. Adding to the unpredictability of colonial mandates was 
Spain's overseas meddling in the region. Blanket legislation would be 
passed that had little to do with the realities of the Southern Plains. 
Probably the two most egregious of these were the restriction of firearm 
sales to Native peoples and the prohibition on settlers trading with 
colonies backed by other foreign nationals. These two bans led to 
endemic smuggling and the increased importance of France to indige-
nous people residing in the area. 
Actions in one regional locality often bore little resemblance to 
those in another. Consequently, Spain's attempts to establish political 
and economic links with Native communities varied both spatially 
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and temporally. Studying shifts in alliance and settlement patterns 
of the Comanches and the Hasinais can show this. For example, the 
Comanches utilized their relations with colonial agents to expand their 
territory. On the other hand, Spain's policies caused the Hasinais to 
experience a diminishment of their importance in trade networks. 
Neither global nor regional political economies entirely controlled 
the means by which the Comanches and the Hasinais participated 
in the colonial landscape. An added dimension involves each society's 
own history. Although both of these communities experienced colonial 
encounters, their involvement with colonialism differed both tempo-
rally and spatially. In the Comanches' case, production became more 
specialized, mobility increased, and bison hunting probably decreased 
as more opportunities for exchange developed. Among the Hasinais, 
agricultural production and bison hunting increased but opportunities 
for exchange decreased. 
By studying archival and published documents, it becomes apparent 
that the changing circumstances of the Comanches and the Hasinais 
stemmed from a mixture of local, regional, and global processes. Ap-
plying world systems, regional analysis, and social history approaches 
to focus on specific actions, such as alliances, Spanish trading policies, 
and patterns of settlement and political organization permits the de-
velopment of a more comprehensive understanding of social change 
among the Comanches and the Hasinais during Spain's colonial era. 
2 
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE 
COMANCHES AND THE HASINAIS 
PRIOR TO THE RESERVATION ERA 
Throughout the twentieth century anthropological researchers have 
applied numerous models to better understand the histories of Native 
peoples residing in the Great Plains. Scholars have frequently focused 
on questions concerning the origins, political economies, kinship sys-
tems, and material cultures of the indigenous peoples residing in the 
region prior to the reservation era in order to explain similarities and 
differences between them. Four main approaches have been used to 
discuss these topics. These included Boasian historicism as well as 
ecological, functional, and economic models. Although each of these 
efforts added to the knowledge of the area, none of them alone had 
sufficient breadth to account for the diversity and complexity of the 
histories of Native inhabitants. 
Starting in the 1980s, anthropologists began adapting three new 
theories to Native American studies. These included world systems 
perspectives, regional analysis, and social history. Each of these ap-
proaches contributed a more in-depth understanding of the complex 
histories of colonial encounters. This can be illustrated by focusing on 
the Comanches and Hasinais during Spain's colonial era. In order to 
illustrate the contributions each of these models has made to a better 
understanding of the Comanches and Hasinais, they will be discussed 
in a historical context. 
Boasian Historicism 
The work of early anthropologists frequently perpetuated the romantic 
myths initially constructed by Euroamerican interpretations of Native 
American actions. As a result, many articles and books written during 
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the early decades of the twentieth century focused on the descriptive 
aspects of tobacco societies (Lowie 1920), Sun Dances (Grinnell 1910; 
Kroeber 1907; Spier 1921), military societies (Lowie 1916; Richardson 
1933; Wissler 1907), and folklore (Lowie 1956). Each of these broad 
topics became an archetype for all Native communities residing in the 
Great Plains. 
Working from a historicist viewpoint, Boasian researchers related 
social change to a community's own internal developmental structure. 
By rejecting the evolutionary models proposed by Morgan (1877), 
Spencer (1896), Tylor (1889), and others, the Boasian model limited 
itself to a 
detailed study of customs in their relation to the total culture of the tribe 
practicing them, in connection with an investigation of their geographical 
distribution among neighboring tribes, [which] affords us almost always 
a means of determining with considerable accuracy the historical causes 
that led to the formation of the customs in question and to the psycholog-
ical processes that were at work in their development. (Boas 1896: 905) 
Boasian ethnographers derived their interpretations from two sep-
arate assumptions. First of all, many of these researchers visualized 
Plains communities as distinct bounded societies characterized by in-
ternal homogeneity. As a result, these ethnographers believed in the 
possibility of reconstructing the true essence of Native peoples. Sec-
ond, by tracing similar traits present in separate communities, Boasian 
scholars tried to attribute the origins of specific behaviors to a particular 
Native community (Grinnell 1923; Wissler 1914, 1922). 
In order to pursue these two themes, fieldworkers interviewed nu-
merous tribal elders about pre-reservation-era activities. The fallacy of 
this approach stemmed from the permeability of indigenous popula-
tions as well as the reality that "contamination" from Euroamericans 
had been occurring since the sixteenth century. By ignoring these facts, 
a timeless, almost mythic past became the currency of many of these 
studies. Grinnell ( 1923 ), Richardson (1933 ), and Wissler ( 1914, 1922) 
typified this method, focusing their studies on either the militant as-
pects of Native communities or the functional necessity of various 
cultural traits. For example, explanations of military activities adhered 
to the colonial notion that the underlying basis of nomadic warfare 
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involved highly individualized motives that ultimately originated from 
a military ethos. Generally, these accounts abstained from studying the 
economic roots of military actions (Foster 1992: v). Consequently, in-
digenous warfare became interpreted as honorable forays that provided 
a brief respite from the lure of the bison hunt and sacred, though pic-
turesque, ceremonial activities. 
The romanticizing of Plains warfare not only obfuscated Euro-
american perception ofindigenous behaviors, but also salved American 
guilt surrounding the Indian wars of the nineteenth century (Berkhofer 
1978). This invented history gained symbolic resonance in the public 
sphere through the publication of studies written in the ethnographic 
present. As they mined the memories of elders, rarely did fieldworkers 
address the impingment of colonial policies such as allotment, loss of 
religious freedoms, and forced education. As Trouillot commented, 
"Once revealed, the harsh realities of neocolonialism take such grand 
dimension that little else seems to matter" (1984: 181). 
While ignoring external social relations, not only with Euro-
americans but also other Native communities, many researchers 
focused on the functional aspects of indigenous actions. Because 
idealized traditions had already been created, the essentialist functions 
of all actions were interpreted as maintaining a community's social 
order. 
While it is true that cultures are rooted in nature, and can therefore never 
be completely understood except in reference to that piece of nature in 
which they occur ... the immediate cause of cultural phenomena are other 
cultural phenomena. (Kroeber 1939: 11) 
No mention was made that a society is a heterogeneous population 
with differing views of what constitutes social order. Dismissing dis-
cordant actions within a population resulted in the homogenization 
of the entire Great Plains region. It was conjectured that similarities 
between separate Native societies arose from their functional equiv-
alence. Therefore, all Plains populations could be lumped together 
into the same analytical category. As a result, scholars such as Kroeber 
(1907, 1939), Lowie (1909, 1916, 1954, 1956), Richardson (1933), 
and Wissler ( 1907) essentialized distinctive features of Plains Indians. 
An example of this practice can be found in Lowie's assertion that 
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the introduction of horses into the Great Plains elaborated an already 
existing cultural pattern: 
Though the horse became integrated with daily life, it did not evoke much 
originality except in a minor way ... the economic utility of horses ... lay 
in enabling riders to kill large numbers of big game animals more rapidly 
and efficiently than was otherwise possible and in facilitating transport. 
(Lowie 1954: 42-43) 
In a similar vein, James Mooney (1898: 161) perceived the horse as 
a means to more efficient hunting that in turn not only permitted more 
time for military engagements but also expanded the range in which 
soldiers could engage in battles. No mention of the external factors 
contributing to warfare was offered. This perception of stasis among 
peoples of the region allowed anthropologists to easily document traits 
considered immutable and thus able to act as identifiers of Plains 
Indians. In retrospect, the rei:fication of these traits led "to an ex-
aggerated and even false sense of difference" between the colonizers 
and the colonized (Carrier 1992: 71). 
Through these representations, scholars sanitized the realities of 
colonial encounters and ignored the contextual emergence of indige-
nous actions. Explanations of Great Plains history centered on local 
conditions and failed to explore linkages to regional and global political 
economies. Whether ecologically or culturally derived, interpretations 
ofNative peoples assumed that indigenous actions could be understood 
by solely focusing on local histories. 
Ecology and the Culture Area Concept 
Predictably, the development of Boasian historicism coincided with 
the emergence of the culture area concept. Steeped in the idea of a true 
Plains essence, this concept stressed the perceived homogeneity of the 
Plains social and material landscape. Accepting the notion that similar 
habitats caused analogous constraints and possibilities, subsistence was 
portrayed as the key mediator between habitats and cultures (Eggan 
1937: 82; 1952: 39; Mooney 1898: 161; Powell 1898: lxvii-lxix; Wissler 
1914: 12; 1926: 216-17). 
Political and economic variables were treated as epiphenom-
ena in these early and sometimes mechanistic schemes. Frequently, 
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researchers conceived of changes in the political economy of indige-
nous populations as a material expression of the local environment. 
With ease, differences in the cultural traits of Native peoples were at-
tributed to environmental variations. Instead, the focus of the research 
remained centered on local intrasocietal events. 
Inevitably, the Plains cultural area became the embodiment of a 
bounded universe that remained static. Bypassing these issues, Wissler 
concentrated on the origins of an invented Plains culture. He concluded 
that 
no one group of people on the Plains can as yet be set down as the 
originators of Plains culture. There seems to have been a constant giving 
and taking until · the whole area reached a general level of uniformity, 
bearing important differences ... but differences that seem to be normal 
tribal variations rather than distinctive characteristics. (Wissler 1907: 49) 
Following his lead, other anthropologists studied the origins of 
Plains traits. Like Wissler, many of these individuals assumed that 
social and cultural changes within the Great Plains region stemmed 
from internal sources, and as a result, significant breaks with the sta-
tus quo related to interactions between local indigenous communities. 
Lowie (1916: 948) and Lehmer (1954: 154) typified this perception 
by concluding that the traits used to demarcate the Plains culture area 
originated with Plains village groups. 
The simple explanation is that many essential aspects of Plains culture 
were pre-existent in the "Eastern Maize Axea," not dependent on horse 
breeding and came to be imported into the Plains by migration either of 
peoples or of ideas from the woodlands. (Lowie 1982: 200) 
Not until the rejection of environmental determinism by Steward 
(1955) and White (1959) did more complex ecological models of the 
Great Plains region emerge. 
Systems Approach to Ecology 
Both Steward and White rejected unilineal determinism and strived to 
incorporate a larger array of variables into their environmental modes. 
Each of these researchers rejected the notion of static communities 
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and instead addressed social change. In their case, resource utilization 
became the main focus of analysis. Special attention was paid to the 
processes associated with the production and consumption of subsis-
tence items. Still, internal factors such as demographic pressures, past 
traditions, and available resources organized these processes (Eggan 
1966; Hoebel 1940, 1954; Oliver 1962). Novel resources, such as the 
horse and firearms, acted as the catalyst for changes in production and 
subsistence. Invariably, these changes resulted in greater homogeneity 
or increased stratification (Blakeslee 1975; Moran 1982: 235; Oliver 
1962: 12). 
When Native communities failed to meet the criteria used to define 
the Plains culture area, researchers pointed to their divergent pasts as 
an explanation. For example, according to Oliver (1962: 3), Native 
communities stemming from a horticultural origin tended to be more 
politically complex than those derived from a hunting and gathering 
ongm. 
Although an improvement over earlier ecological studies, these new 
paradigms regarded the analysis of a specific cultural community as 
qualitatively different from one directed toward the interactions be-
tween culturally different populations. Ultimately, this led to the po-
larization of production and exchange. Production was treated as the 
primary element within a supposedly bounded unit, while exchange 
was viewed as basic to intersocietal relations (Rowlands, Larsen, and 
Kristiansen 1987: 3). 
Divorcing production from exchange once again led to the interpre-
tation that local communities represented timeless entities, cloistered 
within their own bounded universes. Rooted in local conditions, the 
structural order of production provided the framework for understand-
ing exchange. As an adjunct to production, exchange differed little 
from Lowie's explanation of the horse's role in social change: "though 
[exchange] became integrated with daily life, it did not evoke much 
originality in a minor way" (Lowie 1954: 42). 
In the 1960s the systems approach to ecology arose as a means to end 
the dichotomy between exchange and production. It also introduced 
the idea that "similarity of social organization is not necessarily an 
indicator of similar histories or evolutionary trajectories" (Hall 1989: 
11). Key to the systems approach were the adaptations and interactions 
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of a population. Culture became redefined as the "extrasomatic means 
of adaptation ... an extrasomatic adaptive system that is employed in 
the integration of a society with its environment and other sociocultural 
systems" (White 1959: 8). 
Using this scenario, culture acts as the dominant mechanism for 
exchanging matter, energy, and information within the environment. 
Mapping the flow of matter, energy, and information across space 
permitted researchers to develop concepts such as carrying capacity, 
limiting cycles, predator-prey models, and the impact of patchy en-
vironments. Circumventing the potential tautology if adaptation is 
equated with an end state rather than a continual process, numerous 
ideas associated with biological evolution have been incorporated into 
the systems approach. Concepts such as specialization, adaptive radi-
ation, laws of cultural dominance, and evolutionary potential inform 
much of the literature associated with this theory (Baugh 1982; Hass 
1990; Reher 1974; Spielman 1983). Rarely do researchers relying on 
this approach fall into the trap of describing actions as adaptive simply 
because they exist. It also ended the assumption of bounded ahistor-
ical societies. As a result, ecologically oriented scholarship continues 
to flourish. 
Currently, the ecosystem approach dominates the archeological lit-
erature. The circulation of matter, energy, and information are easily 
translated into the study of goods, services, and trade (Paynter 1982: 
13). In addition, many of the biological concepts have proven invalu-
able to an understanding oflocal constraints and possibilities. Ignored 
in these accounts, however, is the factor that "transforms problems 
of ecological limitations into decisions of a political economy" (Cole 
and Wolf 1974: 285). Like earlier models, the ecosystem approach has 
the propensity to ignore the organizational capacity of the economy. 
When this occurs, the flow of matter, energy, and information remains 
the template used by some scholars to explain the essence of social life. 
Economic Models of Social Change 
Prevalent in the early ethnographic literature was the idea that trade 
between indigenous groups operated under a different social con-
struct than exchange networks concurrently utilized by Euroamericans 
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(Blakeslee 1975; Wood 1972, 1973, 1980). This conception may have 
its origins in the Weberian notion that the development of capitalism 
introduced novel attributes such as trade for profit rather than social 
status, and therefore capitalist systems could not be compared with 
precapitalist systems (Weber 1976). 
Beginning in the 1940s, anthropologists began developing more so-
phisticated economic models. Stimulating the development of these 
approaches was the publication of a corpus of classic ethnographies 
by scholars such as Redfield (1940), Leach (1954), and Barth (1969). 
Rivaling the dominant ecological models of social change, each of 
these scholars subscribed to a common critique of prior anthropologi-
cal analyses. This critique argued that human communities should not 
be conceptualized as autonomous entities existing in historical isola-
tion. Through the contextualization of a region's spatial, temporal, and 
social data, these scholars promoted the idea that the scale of social 
processes encompassed more than one cultural group. Usually these 
processes are described as regional in scale, but they have also been 
characterized as global. By emphasizing the importance of interac-
tion, it became possible to develop more sophisticated techniques for 
studying populations within a historical framework. 
A number of Great Plains specialists such as Ewers (1955), 
Goldfrank (1945), Jablow (1950), Lesser (1933), Lewis (1942), 
Mishkin (1940), Secoy (1953), and Richardson (1940) utilized this 
approach by exploring the economic and political consequences of 
Euroamerican penetration into the area. Invariably, though, many of 
these researchers perceived change within indigenous structures as re-
actions to Euroamerican actions rather than as a more complex inter-
face between external and internal realities. Thus, according to Secoy, 
a Plains culture arose from 
a phase of cultural creativity that was based upon the Southwestern Plains 
center, and that flowered into the superstructure of elements and com-
plexes which distinguished Wissler's most characteristic Plains tribes of 
the late 19th century. (Secoy 1953: 90) 
Ignored in this account is the development of Euroamerican mar-
kets and the commodification of local products, such as horses and 
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bison. Scholars such as Ewers (1955),Jablow(1950), and Lewis (1942) 
endeavored to rectify this deficiency. Reacting to epistemological cri-
tiques of the culture area concept, each of these researchers attempted 
to provide a more contextual understanding of sociocultural change 
in the region. Eschewing the vague language of independent inven-
tion and subsequent diffusion, these writers aspired to explicate the 
interconnections between differing populations. Thus, they replaced 
earlier models of sociocultural change with one that explained regional 
similarities through a shared economy. 
These scholars rarely systematically address the linkages between 
local, regional, and global political economies, however. By ignoring 
the unitary effects of these three levels of analysis on social action, in-
stead focusing primarily on just the regional economy, these researchers 
often provided a one-dimensional analysis of the creation and modifi-
cation of structural arrangements. Though their regional level of anal-
ysis moved beyond diffusion, social change was regularly portrayed as 
reactive. Economic forces were treated as impinging on a community 
and structuring the acquisition of critical resources, such as firearms 
and horses. As necessary as water, these two items were described as 
the new catalysts of social change. 
Within the framework of this trading economy there existed cultures of 
different basic subsistence types (which might be viewed as technologies 
exploiting different aspects of a similar environment), whose production 
was geared to the requirements of trade. (Jablow 1950: 88) 
Through conceptualizing trade "as a set of mechanisms designed 
to challenge local adaptations and reallocate resources ways unique at 
the local level" (Cole and Wolf 1974: 285), these authors lacked the 
methodologies to clearly illustrate the connections between the local, 
regional, and global economies. 
In an attempt to redress this problem, a number of scholars have 
incorporated the theoretical concerns of a world systems approach into 
their research (Albers 1991, 1993; Hall 1989; Klein 1993). Like earlier 
economic models, these individuals recognized that shared economies 
created linkages between populations. Invariably, the organization of 
this regional economy was attributed to global forces. Mercantilism 
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and, later, capitalism became the means for understanding Native 
American production and/or political organization. The dynamism 
of local activities became subsumed under this larger force. 
Only by combining the models developed for local, regional, and 
global political economies is it possible to provide a clearer understand-
ing of the relations between indigenous and colonial populations in the 
Southern Plains. By integrating these three levels of analysis, the rela-
tionship between internal arrangements of cultural communities and 
their external linkages to regional and global political economies be-
comes clearer. 
Integrating the Global, Regional, and Local 
The utility of research that links the local, regional, and global political 
economies became apparent after the groundbreaking work done by 
Steward and his followers (Steward 1955; Wolf 1955, 1957, 1959; 
Wolf and Mintz 1957). Through their research, anthropologists began 
to emerge from the Boasian legacy of historicism. Shattering the idea 
of internally derived and organized worldviews, they explored culture 
as "open fields" of interaction. Consequently, each of these scholars 
focused on the actual linkages or articulating structures connecting 
communities. 
For example, Mintz (1972) explored the relationship between sugar 
consumption and the history of Caribbean communities. Wolf (1969) 
discussed the connection between the organization of peasant commu-
nities and the emergence of commercial capitalism. In both of these 
cases, however, local history was understood within the broader social 
and economic landscape. More recently, Hall (1989, 2000) and Klein 
( 1993) applied the theoretical aspects of world systems to regional 
economies and local change within the Great Plains. 
World Systems Theory 
A world systems approach focuses on the penetration of a global econ-
omy into regional political economies. The theory provides a unified 
explanation for varying degrees of social complexity across spatial and 
temporal divisions. In this model, differences in social complexity are 
all part of a single spatiotemporal process defined within a regional or 
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an interregional scope. Relationships between different communities 
form the key to world systems theories. Arguments abound among 
theorists utilizing this type of approach. Generally, these controver-
sies center on the emergence of capitalism and its importance as an 
outside agent of intrasocietal transformation (Ekholm and Friedman 
1982; Friedman 1993; Schneider 1977). 
The more traditional of these approaches focuses on the impact 
of capitalism on regional economies. Building on Adam Smith's ideas 
presented in The Wealth of Nations, political economists argue that once 
capitalism became the means for producing wealth, it overshadowed 
the power of the government and became the dominant institution or-
ganizing society. Andre Gunder Frank (1966, 1969) and Immanuel 
Wallerstein (1974, 1979) developed one of the most sophisticated 
models of this aspect of political economies. Frank's suggestion that 
capitalist penetration caused the perpetuation of underdevelopment led 
researchers away from the idea that the underdevelopment of regions 
resulted from their own internal and archaic social structures. Embed-
ded entirely within the structure of capitalism, marginal economies 
were destined to remain impoverished and dependent upon centers of 
capitalist accumulation. 
Delving deeper into the global economic structure, Wallerstein con-
ceptualizes the world's regions as organized into cores, peripheries, 
and semiperipheries. The relative position held by an area within the 
global economy is based on its control of resources, labor, production, 
and exchange. In addition, their division oflabor ultimately structures 
the internal organization and external relations of each of these. Since 
Wallerstein (1974) equates capitalism with the advent of production 
for exchange, he views the division of labor as the critical linkage be-
tween social units. His approach is analogous to Durkheim's (1915) 
use of observable social data to unearth the hidden realities of social or-
ganization. As Roseberry (1991: 151) notes, followers of Wallerstein's 
methods perceive the capitalist system as the fundamental unit of anal-
ysis and the needs of the core as the driving force. 
While many theorists recognize the heuristic utility of Frank's and 
Wallerstein's model of a global economic system, there is considerable 
debate over the causative factors responsible for a region's structure at 
any particular point in time. Significant differences center on issues 
such as the organizational primacy attributed to capitalism, the actual 
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nature of exchange, and the reasons for local variations within an ex-
panding economic system. Many scholars argue that capitalism is not 
the only economic system able to unify and dominate a region. Rather, 
similarities in processes of economic domination give rise to parallel 
developments across time and space. Crucial to this viewpoint is the 
notion that other arrangements, based on a variety of production types, 
are equally able to articulate large areas. Essential to these critics is the 
idea that economic domination ultimately results from social relations 
based on unequal access to wealth and power. Scholars such as Ekholm 
and Friedman (1982), Friedman (1992, 1993), Schneider (1977), and 
Schneider and Rapp (1995) suggest that the accumulation of capital 
rather than an economic system based on capitalism causes structural 
changes within a peripheral society's economic and political organiza-
tions. Levels of access continue to be structured and linked through an 
extrasocietal economy, however. 
Disputes over the nature of exchange continue to absorb the at-
tention of many scholars and critics of world systems theory. Major 
disagreements have erupted over Wallerstein's assertion that capitalism 
is the only economy to orient production toward exchange, which is 
often asymmetrical. As ethnographers and archeologists have discov-
ered, production for the purpose of exchange exists under numerous 
economic systems. In addition, the exchange that occurs is often one-
sided. For example, systems of prestige and bridewealth as well as 
other types of kinship and tribute organizations can create produc-
tion for exchange (Amin 1989; Godelier 1972; Schneider 1977, 1978; 
Smith 1976, 1985). Each of these formations causes specific kinds of 
exchange relations that unify an area in a particular way. Furthermore, 
variations in the types of linkages between global and peripheral sys-
tems determined a community's ultimate pattern of capital absorption 
and distribution. 
In contrast to Frank and Wallerstein, current world systems theo-
rists stress that the social organization of a community is more than 
a mere reflection of the global economy. According to Friedman, the 
global or regional economy stems from the articulation of numerous 
local and regional processes: "It is not, as often represented, an overlay 
that descends from above onto the sum total localities in the world" 
(1993: 210). The political and social processes of a local unit are more 
than a reflexive response to the requirements of capital accumulation in 
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the core. Consequently, the effects of incorporation and resistance to 
incorporation by populations being engulfed into an expanding econ-
omy are major topics to be explored. 
Critical to recent proponents of world systems theories is the de-
gree of control a peripheral group exerts over its penetration by an 
external economic system (Hall 1989). Prior to these more sophisti-
cated works, earlier writings intimated that the global market led to 
the impoverishment of peripheral regions. Across time and space, the 
intersection of this type of economy with one based on different prin-
ciples such as barter and ritualized exchange is said to have led to the 
coercion of labor, technological stagnation, increased warfare, expro-
priation of resources, and the disappearance ofindigenous processes of 
production, reproduction, and distribution (Faiman-Silva 1997). The 
insatiable needs of the core and the strategies used to exploit peripheral 
areas unleashed these negative factors. Peripheral groups might resist, 
but the destruction of their own political and economic structures was 
predestined. 
Keeping this caveat in mind, a world systems perspective remains 
a powerful tool for understanding the complexities of colonial con-
tact. For example, by exploring the connections between the global 
economy, Spain's occupation of the Southern Plains, and its colonial 
economy, the structuring of the region's political economy becomes 
more transparent. Paying attention to colonial structures, such as mis-
sions, presidios, settlements, and markets, permits a window into the 
nature of the linkages between the economies of indigenous com-
munities and global and regional forces. Another component critical 
to a better understanding of social change in the region involves the 
commodification of horses and firearms. Both of these items illustrate 
incipient forms of capital accumulation in the region. By focusing on 
the nomadic Comanches and the more sedentary Hasinais, greater 
insight into the linkage of the Southern Great Plains with the wider 
economic arena can be explored. 
Regional Analysis 
Individuals such as Christaller (1966), Haggett, Cuff, and Frey ( 1977), 
Skinner (1964), and Von Thiinen (1966) developed regional analy-
sis as a methodology for elucidating the mechanics through which a 
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local community is linked to others, forming a larger organization. 
Researchers who adopt this technique of analysis often conceptualize 
regional analysis as a method that illustrated and explained the sys-
temic interrelationships between the spatial organization of a region's 
social units and the dialectical actions of local and, possibly, global 
forces. 
Although complementary to world systems theories, regional anal-
ysis derived its data from the spatial flow of commodities. Ignoring the 
presence or absence of a global economy, it stressed those variables that 
contribute to this flow. Key factors were found in a region's modes of 
transportation, distances between exchange loci, topographical factors, 
types of resources transferred, and mediating structures of social orga-
nization. The spatial organization of activities within the area studied 
was assumed to be associated with economic and political conditions. 
Structures perceived as important mediators within or between a local 
community, region, or cluster of communities and the global economy 
included alliances and kinship networks, state and political institutions, 
forms of production and distribution, and class systems (Smith 1985: 
84). As social organization and the structure of space were interrelated, 
each could be used to gain insights into peripheral populations. 
Ascertaining how space is structured requires studying the move-
ments of people, information, goods, and services. The circulation 
of these resources is thought to follow distinctive patterns. Explaining 
why these patterns arise in a specific place at a particular time forms the 
theoretical crux of regional analysis. Generally, variations experienced 
in the spatial integration of a region are assumed to reflect disparities 
in that region's systems of distribution, production, and consumption. 
Economic conditions leading to these disparities often are perceived 
to center on a region or community's degree of commercialization. Re-
gions can be grouped into three categories: uncommercialized, where 
distribution is predicated on direct or nonmarket exchanges; partially 
commercialized, in which distribution is based on noncompetitive or 
controlled market exchange; and fully commercialized, where compet-
itive market exchange exists (Smith 1976: 314). In market economies, 
resources are generally concentrated in central places that are hier-
archically organized and interrelated in systematic ways (Christaller 
1972: 608). There are, however, other types of centralizing structures 
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that can coexist with marketplaces or in areas with weakly developed 
market economies and which function in similar ways to market cen-
ters. Generally, this involves enduring activities that sustain a linkage 
between at least two separate communities. Undertakings associated 
with religious sites, trade fairs, and alliances could serve this func-
tion. For example, in the Southern Plains religious activities _regularly 
occurred on the Brazos River, where a large meteorite had hit (Flores 
1985: 61, 68). In addition, trade fairs occurred at the headwaters of the 
Guadalupe River (Espinosa 17 46: 437). Alliances were also sustained 
through regular trade (Smith 1976: 72). 
Political factors affecting a region's systems of distribution, produc-
tion, and consumption are tied to an area's degree of commercialization. 
This association can be most clearly seen by studying a region's dis-
tribution system. For example, in poorly integrated regions, extended 
network systems prevail. Thus, even though several locations are re-
lated through trade, flow is horizontally organized between equivalent 
centers,leadingto poorly organized trade (Smith 1976: 314). This type 
of economic system is generally found in peripheral regions. Accord-
ing to Rappaport (1968: 109), in communities with extended network 
systems production is determined not by demand for the commodity 
produced, but by the demand for the commodity for which it is ex-
changed. In the Southern Plains, local production often related to the 
purchase of firearms, metal tools, and horses. 
Bounded network systems can also arise in partially commercialized 
areas. Often associated with "big man" or patron-client relationships, 
bounded network distribution systems occur with specialized produc-
tion and greater control over trade routes (Bonacich 1973). Accord-
ing to Hamalainen's (2001) model, this might be the case with the 
Comanches. Their expansion resulted from a need to control access to 
Euroamerican markets. 
If, however, colonial administrators monopolize these trade routes, 
bounded network systems may be transformed into solar or central-
place networks. Generally, solar networks support colonial elites at the 
expense of the colonized (Smith 1985: 86). In the Southern Plains, 
Spanish populations never achieved a high enough threshold to de-
velop this type of system. Each of these distribution systems is associ-
ated with specific settlement and political patterns. 
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A key variable in the emergence of the distribution systems is the 
exchange value given to a resource. Clearly, not all resources are equal 
in terms of economic exchange. Instead, a resource's exchange value is 
perceived as being both culturally specific and particular to capitalism. 
The most control a polity exerts over the circulation of a high-value 
item, the more political power that polity will experience. 
In the Southern Plains, with the advent of colonialism Native in-
habitants modified existing patterns of production, consumption, and 
distribution and created new ones. This led to variations in a commu-
nity's level of integration with the regional economy and changes in 
that unit's political position. This can be more clearly illustrated by 
studying alliance structures among Comanches and Caddoans in the 
region during Spain's colonial era. During this period, horses and guns 
became highly valued exchange items (Jablow 1950; Secoy 1953). In 
order to control the distribution of these commodities, a community 
had to develop and sustain strategic alliances. A combination of fac-
tors determined the success of these alliances. These included a com-
munity's location, political economy, and relationship with colonial 
inhabitants. Temporal and spatial variations in the alliance structures 
found among the Comanches and Hasinais reflected shifts in mar-
kets, colonial policies, and political organizations. Changes in any of 
these sectors reverberated throughout the linkages structuring the al-
liances of the Comanches and Hasinais. This, in turn, transformed 
local-level institutions. Through this level of analysis, it is possible 
to illustrate ways in which the Comanches and Hasinais transformed 
Spain's colonial venture in the Southern Plains. It needs to be empha-
sized, however, that changes within local structures were constructed 
along their own internally generated system of cultural logic. 
Social History 
Different approaches that can be grouped together under the rubric of 
social history focus on a community's culturally mediated responses to 
externally induced change. Attempting to overcome the bankruptcy of 
ethnohistorical accounts that privilege the actions and aims of the col-
onizers, researchers associated with this approach have focused instead 
on the actual interactions occurring within contact encounters. 
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If we are concerned to deal more adequately with the presence of "the 
colonized" in colonialism, with the autonomy of their enunciations and 
strategies, we need to adopt a theoretical perspective that accords more 
importance to competence without lapsing into an uncritical, subject-
centered humanism. (Thomas 1994: 58) 
Thomas's suggestion that more weight be given to competence is 
a rejection of rei:fied modes, such as structuralism and ecological or 
economic determinism. Competence, as a concept, focuses on the cre-
ative force of a community's actions. Consequently, the actions of the 
Comanches or the Hasinais are analyzed as strategies, not as structural 
poses determined and generated by internal or external events. 
Following the lead of Bourdieu (1977, 1984), Thomas-like 
many other scholars interested in colonial encounters-argues against 
normative social theories that suppressed the complex and transfor-
mational nature of action. 
The language of rules and models, which seems tolerable when applied 
to "alien" practices, ceases to convince as soon as one considers the prac-
tical mastery of the symbolism of social interaction-tact, dexterity, or 
savoir-faire-presupposed by the most everyday games of sociability and 
accompanied by the application of a spontaneous semiology, i.e. a mass 
of precepts, formulae, and codified cues. (Bourdieu 1977: 10) 
With varying degrees of success, scholars such as Bhabha (1986), 
Comaroff and Comaroff (1992), Sahlins (1993), and Todorov (1984) 
have attempted to deal with indigenous societies as more than passive 
instruments of colonialism. Critical to their approach is what Sahlins 
called the "structure of conjuncture," a term that references the event 
in its historical entirety. By drawing in varying degrees on the works 
of not only Bourdieu but also Braudel, Foucault, Marx, and Saussure, 
authors associated with this approach tried to illustrate the ways in 
which colonial encounters occurred within a total historical context. 
In this scheme, history is interpreted as a series of events that can 
be understood only through the local, regional, and global context 
of a community's cultural categories. Key variables in this type of re-
search include the historical context of an event, the cultural categories 
bounding an event, and the motivations of specific actors involved in 
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the event. An event gains its historical efficacy through the local cul-
tural interpretation ofit. Understanding and exposing those indigenous 
meanings involves the explication of intercultural points of contact. 
Political and economic practices are viewed as the most fruitful 
avenues of exploration, since they are the two observable regions in 
which intracultural and intercultural differences are made explicit. In 
particular, this is the realm in which a society's importation of colonial 
elements acquired novel local accents. Utilizing Saussure's idea that 
signs are given value through their relations with other, necessarily 
contrastive signs, Sahlins argues that indigenous communities mediate 
the absorption of colonialism through their own cultural categories 
(Sahlins 1993: 13; 1985: xv). Thus, according to Sahlins (1993: 12), 
novel accents associated with colonial encounters can be interpreted 
as positional values whose differential relations to other categories of 
the indigenous scheme constitute the logic of the structural effects of 
intrusive forces. 
Through the possibility of re-creating the systematic logic of a so-
cial unit's structure seems premature, it is possible to construct a more 
balanced representation of colonial encounters using this approach, 
particularly since each community has its own cultural system that 
incorporates colonial realities in its own unique way. This can be ac-
complished by studying an indigenous community's use of foreign 
commodities, since these items often enrich native self-conceptions. 
According to Sahlins ( 1993: 17), "they turn foreign goods to the service 
of domestic ideas, to the objectification of their own relations and no-
tions of the good life." It is assumed that through culture a population 
can absorb alien conceptions, commodities, and people within its own 
logical system of order. Therefore, a community's use of commodities 
should provide a window into that particular society's unique cultural 
order. 
Exploring the ways in which the Comanches and Hasinais inte-
grated horses and firearms into their political and economic structures 
provides a better understanding of the active role these communities 







Ever since contact, interest in the Comanches and Hasinais has been 
continuous. Spanish diplomats, missionaries, traders, and military 
sources collected information about these two communities' polit-
ical organizations, demographics, religious beliefs, subsistence, and 
locations. Using the same methods for gathering intelligence, early 
American and French forays into the region continued to gather data 
regarding the internal organizations of the Comanches and Hasinais. 
Not until the development of anthropology as a discipline, however, 
did this past information as well as newly learned data concerning these 
populations become more systematized. 
Early anthropological accounts tended to emphasize subjects sur-
rounding the origins, linguistic affiliations, and material objects of 
these two communities. Using Mason's (1896: 646) culture area con-
cept as a theoretical base, these early scholars discussed the Comanches 
and Hasinais as bounded, hermetically sealed societies. As the disci-
pline matured, accounts of these two societies became less descriptive 
and more involved with their relations with the local environment, 
regional economy, and colonial powers. 
Through all of these efforts, a fairly comprehensive picture of the 
Comanches and Hasinais emerged. Disagreements concerning the in-
terpretation of specific aspects of these two societies occurred as well. 
Most of these focused on issues concerning the ways these popula-
tions organized themselves politically. Particularly contentious have 
been the varying views on the degree of autonomy leaders held in their 
external dealings with other nations. By reviewing the data collected 
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on each of these communities separately, some of these differences in 
interpretations may become less problematic. 
Descriptive Accounts of the Comanches 
Like many other Native communities residing in the Great Plains dur-
ing the 1700s, Comanches migrated into the region from elsewhere. 
According to an oral tradition among the Shoshones, the Comanches 
separated from the Shoshones in the Great Basin due to an argument 
over the division of game (Grinnell 1920: 260). In 1706, the :first writ-
ten account of the Comanches residing in the Great Plains appeared 
in a letter sent by a Spanish military commander to the governor of 
New Mexico (Thomas 1935: 16). 
Beginning in the early 1900s, many anthropologists characterized 
the Comanches as a "true" Plains community. As nomads, they used 
horses, resided in tipis, and exploited bison. Unlike other "typical" no-
madic communities in the region, however, the Comanches eschewed 
the Sun Dance, military societies, and a centralized political system. 
Conceptualizing the Comanches as a series of traits associated with 
the Great Plains culture area, early anthropologists debated the reasons 
why this community differed from others in the Plains (Oliver 1962; 
Shimkin 1940; Wright 1977). These scholars offered numerous expla-
nations of the "Comanche anomaly" (Foster 1991: 52-54). Generally, 
these discussions focused on the Shoshone origin of the Comanches 
(Hoebel 1954; Oliver 1962; Zingg 1939) or on the ecological condi-
tions unique to the Comanches (Bamforth 1988; Colson 1954; Tefft 
1964). 
In the former case, the Comanches' close linguistic relationship 
to the Uto-Aztecan-speaking Shoshones in the Great Basin was ex-
panded to include perceived similarities in social organization (Oliver 
1962; Opler 1943; Wallace and Hoebel 1952; Zingg 1939). For exam-
ple, Wallace and Hoebel explained that 
the Comanche band was strikingly similar in organization to the aborig-
inal Shoshonean groups of the Great Basin in the days preceding white 
contact. It ranged in size from a single family alone to the small camp of 
related individuals ... to large groups of several hundred people. (Wallace 
and Hoebel 1952: 22-23) 
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Among the Comanches, the family, often composed of extended 
kin, acted as the basic social unit (Wallace and Hoebel 1952: 23). 
Each of these families linked with a few others in order to form loosely 
organized bands. According to Curtis (1926: 187), "At the climax of 
their existence the Comanches were apparently divided into ten or 
more bands, but through tribal disintegration this band organization 
is almost lost." 
Internal organization of these bands seems to have been kin-based 
structures led by a charismatic leader who exhibited military prowess 
and sustained regular access to spiritual forces (Kavanagh 1996: 42-
43 ). Wallace and Hoebel described band leadership as kin-based: 
The family headman-and there was at least one for each group-were 
the peace, or civil chiefs. When the large band was functioning as a unit, 
contained several peace chiefs, one of whom was recognized as the head 
chief of the band. The rest formed an advisory council to the leader and 
at the same time maintained their positions as family headmen. (Wallace 
and Hoebel 1952: 24) 
Presently, no consensus exists concerning the degree of control that 
leaders of bands maintained over their followers. Using examples from 
Spanish and ethnohistorical sources, Kavanagh (1996: 37-38), con-
cluded that these leaders exhibited "the culturally defined ability to in-
fluence the behavior of others." Alternately, Foster ( 1991: 68), Hoebel 
(1940: 47), and Wallace and Hoebel (1952: 124-25) surmised that 
these leaders could not have exercised coercive force over their follow-
ers, nor negotiated unilaterally binding agreements with other related 
bands. Richardson (1929: 65) noted, for example, that "the nomadic 
habits of the Indians and the resultant divisions and subdivisions of 
the bands into small parties away from responsible leaders made it 
impossible for the chiefs to control their own men." 
Some scholars attributed the absence of a political organization 
emanating from a number of powerful leaders to the Comanches' 
recent separation from the egalitarian, peaceful, and family-oriented 
Shoshones (Wallace and Hoebel 1952: 22). In this model, the influ-
ence of their Shoshone heritage weakened when they migrated into 
the Southern Plains. Forces diffusing from other indigenous nations, 
as well as the Plains environment, filled the resultant vacuum. Lacking 
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enough time for the Sun Dance or full-blown military societies to 
emerge, the Comanches only developed attenuated Plains traits. Most 
notably, they placed a high value on successful raiding, warfare, and 
individual valor (Richardson 1933; Wallace and Hoebel 1952). 
Reacting against heritage models of explanations, some ecologically 
oriented anthropologists stressed the importance of environmental fac-
tors as an explanation for the absence of a number of Plains traits 
among the Comanches (Bamforth 1988; Brown 1987; Colson 1954). 
The constraints and limitations of the local environment formed the 
basis of these scholars' argument. Regardless of whether the researcher 
interpreted the Comanches' territory as resource-rich (Colson 1954) 
or resource-poor (Bamforth 1988; Brown 1987), the availability of nu-
trients was reflected in the community's organization. As a result, the 
Comanches' demography, minimal government, and nomadic lifestyle 
formed a closed system with local environmental conditions. 
More recently, Hamalainen has merged ecological and economic 
models to discuss the decentralized organization of bands among the 
Comanches. According to Hamalainen (2001: 206), soon after the 
Comanches migrated to the Plains, they developed increasingly smaller 
bands due to their reliance on bison. As the community became more 
involved in regional trade networks, these bands became even more 
dispersed due to the Comanches' role as "large-scale livestock traders" 
(Hamalainen 2001: 207). 
Recognizing the decentralized nature of the Comanches' bands, a 
number of scholars have tried to identify the mechanisms used by the 
community to link its disparate bands in order to maintain coherence 
as a political entity ( Gelo 1986, 1987, 2000; Kavanagh 1996; Thurman 
1980, 1987). Gelo and Thurman perceived the presence of overlooked 
centralizing structures, such as religion (Gelo 1987) or emergent mil-
itary societies (Thurman 1987). Focusing on the rituals and symbols 
of the Comanches, Gelo (1987: 553, 557) noted that these served as 
material expressions of unifying religious beliefs. Values placed on in-
dividualism, militarism, and generosity all stemmed from this religious 
source. Through these shared beliefs, the relations between separate 
groups of Comanches were structured and maintained (Gelo 1986: 38). 
Thurman's (1987: 578-79) research identified the presence of 
nascent military societies among the Comanches. Basing his interpre-
tations on a variety of sources, Thurman argued that these societies 
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aided the Comanches' efforts to unify the community by crosscutting 
band membership (1980: 52). Following Thurman's lead, Kavanagh 
also discusses the importance oflocal societies as a means to retain the 
political coherence of the Comanches: 
Sodalities-political support groups, small-scale medicine societies, and 
large-scale military societies-and the scale of the units and sodalities 
increased with the level of integration. The Spaniards and Mexicans 
generally recognized those levels; Anglo-Americans generally did not. 
(Kavanagh 1996: 41) 
Periodically, various bands would merge into larger organizations 
referred to as divisions by anthropologists (Foster 1991). During the 
late 17 40s, the Spanish commented on the presence of two unnamed 
divisions of Comanches that engaged in activities near New Mexico 
(Kavanagh 1996: 48). By the latter half of the 1700s, three major 
divisions existed (Kavanagh 1996: 4). These included the Cuchanecs, 
also referred to as the Kotsotekas, the Jupes, and lastly the Yamparicas. 
Current researchers studying the political history of the Comanches 
continue to grapple with the internal political organization of these 
divisions. 
According to Foster, "Comanche social structure is best understood 
as the strategic movement and organization of personnel among dif-
ferent social groups, regulated by means of periodic multigroup gath-
erings" (Foster 1991: 70). In his view, division leaders lacked any real 
power, as "they dealt with Euro-Americans on specific matters relating 
to Comanche-Euro-American interactions and were not 'paramount' 
or 'principal' leaders in the way that we usually employ those terms" 
(Foster 1991: 68). 
Kavanagh (1996: 52) describes divisions as "political organizations 
composed of local residential bands linked by kinship and sodality 
ties and recognizing a commonality of interest in group affairs, war, 
peace, and trade." Unlike Foster, Kavanagh (1996: 53-54) perceives 
the leaders of divisions as having the ability to employ coercive force 
and to negotiate for the community as a whole. 
The frequent movements of these divisions and the lack of infor-
mation concerning their internal organizational structure will continue 
to plague attempts by researchers to more fully understand the role of 
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leaders within these structures. As is the case today, the political strate-
gies of the divisions remain hidden from view. 
Since Hall's (1989) seminal work on the regional economy of the 
Southern Plains during Spain's colonial era, many researchers have fo-
cused their work on the linkages between the Comanches and other 
nations as an explanation for the community's political organization 
(Anderson 1999; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Foster 1991; Hall 1989; 
Hamalainen 2001; Kavanagh 1996; La Vere 2000). The work of 
Chase-Dunn and Hall focused on the importance of frontiers as a 
region in flux. 
Viewed from a global perspective, the frontier is relatively narrow and 
sharp. Viewed more closely, it is a broad zone with considerable internal 
differentiation, both spatially and temporally. At either level, different 
types of expanding systems have different types of boundary membranes, 
each varying in the types and degrees of permeability to flows across or 
through them. (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997: 70) 
Spain's northern frontier exhibited a high degree of permeability 
for some indigenous populations (Thomas 1932). This was particu-
larly true in the case of the Comanches, who crossed the frontier with 
alacrity (Kavanagh 1996). The Comanches' ability to ignore Spain's 
borders provides concrete evidence that local colonial officials lacked 
the necessary military, political, and economic power to limit the move-
ments of this population. Spain's weaknesses permitted the Comanches 
to develop their own policies toward other indigenous communities as 
well as to play an important role in determining the contents of trade 
agreements and peace accords developed by colonial administrators. 
As Hamalainen's (2001) research illustrates, Spain's inability to con-
trol the Comanches' movements across the Southern Plains resulted 
in the nation's successful expansion of its territory and an increase in 
its capacity to affect the flow of trade goods. 
After entering the Southern Plains, the Comanches immediately 
expanded their territory from the upper Arkansas south to the Llano 
Estacado (Hamalainen 2001: 40). During the 1730s, the Comanches 
increased their territory north to the Platte River (Hackett 1941, 
3:348). In less than a decade, during the 1760s, the Comanches had ex-
panded their territory across Texas (Hamalainen 2001: 52). According 
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to Hamalainen (2001: 53-55), the vast area utilized by the Comanches 
aided their efforts to maintain control of the horse trade. 
Anderson ( 1999: 228) points out that the large horse herds owned by 
the Comanches became a major commodity in the political economy 
of the Plains. Due to the strategic locations of the Comanches, they 
also had access to vast bison herds. Consequently, they managed to 
supply not only horses but also bison meat, hides, and tallow to markets 
and individual traders (Anderson 1999: 230). The importance of this 
trade can be gauged by the fact that in 1786, the Comanches traded 
six hundred bison hides and numerous pounds of meat to one of the 
pueblos in New Mexico {Thomas 1932: 306). 
In addition to the trade in horses and bison, the Comanches also 
played a critical role in the selling of slaves. Until formally outlawed in 
17 69, the Comanches provided slaves to the Spanish, French, and other 
Native communities (Anderson 1999: 120-21). Once the slave trade 
became illegal, captives were still taken in order not only to increase 
the Comanches' population but also to negotiate ransom payments for 
the prisoners (Anderson 1999: 122). 
Without a centralized political organization, the Comanches' bands 
and divisions managed to forestall incorporation into Spain's colo-
nial regional economy. Unlike many other Native communities in the 
Southern Plains, the Comanches negotiated favorable treaties and 
trade agreements with the Spanish. They also successfully incorpo-
rated territory rich in bison and horses. This, in turn, permitted them 
to engage in lucrative trade networks involving the exchange of horses, 
bison, and slaves for firearms and other manufactured commodities. 
Descriptive Accounts of the Hasinais 
Until recently, archeological concerns dominated research on the 
Hasinais. Generally, published accounts addressed the origins, local 
development, and cultural classification of the Hasinais (Davis 1961; 
Krieger 1946; Wyckoff 1970). Based on these types of studies, Prewitt 
described the Hasinais as 
a large population represented by many small settlements scattered 
within particular resource areas; a reliance upon horticulture as one of 
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the primary means of subsistence; differentiated and undifferentiated 
mound/habitation sites with structurally differentiated mound classes 
(producing an apparently hierarchic division of places on the landscape); 
differential treatment of the dead reflective of a system of ranking; in-
dications of long-term cooperation in disposal of the dead by groups 
represented by some of the archaeological units. (Prewitt 1974: 76) 
Archeologists have been riveted by the Hasinais' preferential treat-
ment of the dead and evidence of a centralized political system. Each 
of these traits is assumed to relate the Hasinais to an earlier relation-
ship with Mississippian cultures (Krieger 1946; Newell and Krieger 
1949). According to Griffin (1967: 189), the Hasinais' reliance on 
corn, beans, squash, gourds, sunflowers, and pumpkins permitted their 
regional variant of the Mississippian pattern to emerge. 
The Mississippian aspect of the Hasinais is often conceptualized as a 
baseline representation of the "true Hasinais." As a result, the Hasinais' 
divergence from the construction of mounds and the special care of the 
dead are often interpreted as evidence of cultural disruptions due to 
epidemics as well as the contaminating influence of Euroamericans 
(Perttula 1992: 78). 
More recent archeological research focuses on the ecological adap-
tations of the Hasinais to environmental factors or Euroamerican en-
counters (Chafe 1983; Fritz 1989; Gregory 1986; Story et al. 1990; 
Sabo 1987; Trubowitz 1987). 
Certain patterns, established by the 1400s, were still functional in the 
eighteenth century .... This paper has attempted to remodel the eigh-
teenth century data in such a manner that these continuities are reflected 
in the interpretations and so the various Caddoan enclaves can be seen 
in a systemic way .... Consequently, the "changes" in Caddoan culture so 
often attributed to European influence merely reflect the adaptability of 
tradition economic strategies. (Gregory 1973: 293-94) 
Historical linguists have also expressed an interest in the origins of 
and relations between various Caddoan communities. Relying on lin-
guistic data, these researchers classify the Caddoans into two language 
families, each of which is split into smaller language communities. 
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Pawnee, Wichita, and Kitsai are in relations to each other, about equally 
divergent, save that Kitsai in phonetic structure and some forms is prob-
ably closer to Pawnee than Wichita is to Pawnee. All three, however, 
are mutually unintelligible. Caddo is the most divergent of the four lan-
guages. (Lesser and Wellfish 1932: 2) 
The Caddo linguistic division includes the Hasinais and Caddos 
proper, referred to as the Kadohadachos. These linguistic divisions are 
equated with political social units, often termed "confederacies" in the 
literature (Swanton 1952: 7). The Kadohadachos resided along the 
Red River, while the Hasinais maintained their villages on the banks 
of the Neches and Angelina Rivers. 
Dense woodlands surrounded the Hasinais' villages, which provided 
protection from predatory neighbors (Hickerson 1997: 40). In 1686, a 
priest associated with La Salle's disastrous expedition into the region 
observed that the Hasinai area 
is one of the largest and most populous that I have seen in America. It is 
at least twenty leagues long, not that it is evenly inhabited, but in hamlets 
of ten or twelve cabins, forming cantons, each with a different name. 
(Cavelier 1922: 232) 
The number of villages associated with the Hasinais varied through 
time. In 1691, a Spanish missionary counted nine villages (Swanton 
1942: 246). A quarter of a century later, the Hasinais supported ten 
villages (Bolton 1987: 9). According to Hickerson (1997: 35), the 
Hasinais reached a maximum of twelve settlements during the early 
1700s. As Perttula ( 1992: 179) explains, however, "there was continued 
fragmentation, there were changes in location and intergroup alliances, 
or there were possibly some groups that simply disappeared from the 
ethnohistorical and historical records." 
The reduction of villages during the 1700s has been attributed to 
epidemics (Smith 1995), the growing involvement of the Hasinais in 
the slave trade (Hickerson 1997), and pragmatic decisions made by 
the Hasinais to increase their accessibility to Euroamerican commodi-
ties (Carter 1995; La Vere 1998; Perttula 1992; Wyckoff and Baugh 
1980). 
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Ethnographic accounts of the eastern Caddos have been sporadic 
and frequently descriptive. 
The little field work that has been published (Mooney, 1896; Dorsey, 
1905a, 1905b; Parsons, 1941; Swanton, 1931, 1942; Spier, 1924) is based 
generally on brief visits and few informants. It also tended to be narrowly 
focused, emphasizing only certain aspects of cultural behavior, such as 
folk tales (Dorsey, 1905a) or participation in the Ghost Dance (Mooney, 
1896). Sadly, there is no detailed well-balanced ethnology derived from 
intensive, firsthand observation and interview by a trained professional. 
(Story 1986: 49) 
Through the use of evidence gleaned from archeological excavations 
and or historical documents, researchers (Gregory 1973; Hickerson 
1997; La Vere 1998, 2000; Perttula 1992; Sabo 1987; Smith 1995; 
Wyckoff and Baugh 1980) overcame this problem by forgoing the no-
tion of a "true Caddo" base and instead centered their research on the 
shared histories of the Hasinais and Euroamericans. These scholars 
have noted that the Hasinais vested political power within their re-
ligious leaders. The three key positions included those of the xinesi, 
caddi, and canahas (Wyckoff and Baugh 1980: 234-35). Each of these 
positions seems to be matrilineally inherited (Carter 1995; Newkumet 
and Meredith 1988: 56-57). Until the 17 40s, the xinesi functioned as a 
religious and political leader. Subordinate to this leader were the caddi 
and canahas. The caddi served as the village leader, and the canahas 
functioned as the assistant to this village leader (Newkumet and 
Meredith 1988: 56-57). 
During the 1700s, alterations within the community's political 
structure led to several important changes. These included the sec-
ularization of a centralizing position that had merged political and 
religious functions, the expansion of political obligations practiced by 
the main leader residing within each village, and, until the 1780s, the 
elevation of one of these village leaders to the role of chief for the entire 
community of Hasinais. 
Secularizing a hierarchical organization backed by religious pro-
scriptions was a common event in Native North America after con-
tact with the mercantile econmies of European colonists. Accord-
ing to Dunaway (1994: 222-25), the Cherokees shifted from leaders 
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supported by religious sanctions to ones supported by secular econo-
mies. A similar transformation occurred among the Choctaws during 
the late eighteenth century (Faiman-Silva 1997: 26; White 1983: 112). 
In both of these cases, the secularization ofleadership roles is attributed 
to the democratizing effect of manufactured commodities. 
A parallel change occurred among the Hasinais during the 17 40s. 
In their situation, the political organization became more decentral-
ized, with the replacement of a religiously based central authority by 
a leader whose power emanated from secular concerns. Village chiefs, 
once beholden to a central religious leader, became political competi-
tors after the secularization of the position of xinesi. From the 1720s 
until the 1780s, one community leader always emerged to represent the 
Hasinais' interests in negotiations with Euroamericans and other ex-
ternal populations. After the 1780s, however, individual village leaders 
no longer submitted to one authority. Instead, each town became au-
tonomous and through their local leader negotiated their own relations 
with external powers. 
Unlike the Comanches, the Hasinais supported a centralized gov-
ernment. Prior to the usurption of the position of xinesi by the caddi, 
the xinesis represented the entire community of Hasinais. In this po-
litical capacity, the xinesis acted as mediators between the sacred and 
secular realms of the Hasinais' experience (Griffith 1954: 62; Hatcher 
1927: 288; Smith 1995: 10). Thexinesis' religious power also extended 
to the well-being of the Hasinais' subsistence cycle. Their blessings 
were necessary aspects of ceremonies celebrating planting, harvesting, 
and the welcoming of first fruits (Griffith 1954: 63; Smith 1995: 9). 
As Casanas points out: 
_ The important political decisions for the chiefdom, such as those de-
terming peace and war, also fell to the xinesis. They also assembled the 
leaders of individual communities of their chiefdom to demand trib-
utes, oaths, and promises in order to appease the gods. Through their 
moral authority, the xinesis controlled much of the labor of their subjects. 
(Casanas, quoted in La Vere 1998: 14-15) 
When Euroamerican commodities first entered the trade sphere of 
the Hasinais, items such as firearms were given to the xinesi to circulate 
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among his citizens (Sabo 1987: 38-39). Forrestal (1935: 46-47) noted 
that the last mention of a xinesi occurred in 1721. Possibly, devastat-
ing epidemics during the early years of contact with Euroamericans 
initiated an ideological rebellion among the populace. Sabo {1987: 35) 
contended that high mortality rates from introduced diseases weak-
ened the religious beliefs to such an extent that the connection between 
religious authority and cosmological notions ruptured. As a result, the 
distribution of surplus no longer rested on a religious foundation. Lack-
ing the religious authority to continue monopolizing imports may have 
contributed to the disappearance of the xinesi (La Vere 1998: 109). 
As the position of the xinesi disappeared, less powerful religious 
leaders, referred to as connas, became leaders of the Hasinais' resis-
tance against Spanish encroachments. Each village supported a number 
of connas. Recognizing the connas' antipathy toward the evangelical 
activities of the Spanish, the missionaries invariably reported on the 
"negative" influence of these individuals. The typical missionary view-
point can be gleaned from a quote written by Fray Espinosa. 
In short, these medicine men are the greatest obstacles to the conversion 
of many who would receive holy baptism, if they were not afraid of their 
threats. They persuade the patients that life is destroyed by holy baptism; 
and when, in spite of them, certain persons have been baptized, the 
medicine men usually abandon them under the pretense that the waters 
of baptism have caused the disease to take such a form that all their skill 
can not avail to cure it. (Espinosa 1927: 165-68) 
Spanish envoys attempted to weaken the connas' power by granting 
greater support to the xinesis {Smith 1995: 30). Apparently, however, 
this strategy served only to exacerbate a preexisting schism between 
the connas and xinesis. Jameson (1981: 269-71) noted that all com-
munities have structural contradictions that are masked by strategies of 
containment. When these strategies begin to fail, a legitimization crisis 
can develop {Peregrine 1999: 49). In the Hasinais' case, the introduc-
tion of Christianity, trade, and political meddling by the missionaries 
weakened the containment ofintemal oppositions between the connas 
and the xinesis. More than likely, this contributed to the disappearance 
of the xinesis and the proliferation of the connas. 
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Until the disappearance of the xinesis, the caddi ruled only over his 
village. He organized village councils, hosted important visitors, and 
acted as the mediator of justice (Espinosa 1927: 235). ln addition, "on 
most matters of importance, the caddi consulted a council of elders, 
which was made up of heads of lineages" (La Vere 1998: 153). Be-
cause of the caddis' greater access and control over the distribution of 
Euroamerican commodities, they managed to usurp the importance of 
the xinesis. During the 1750s, Franciscan missionaries observed that 
the Caddis' ability as leaders permitted them to gain regular access to 
French commodities (Solis 1931: 70). Without a doubt, 
some imported items are employed as "political currency," that is, their 
distribution forges the loyal ties of clients which ultimately translate into 
a chief's ability to mobilize labor, encourage surplus production, and call 
up defensive forces. (Kipp and Schortman 1989: 370) 
Until the 1780s, one caddi represented the entire nation of Hasinais. 
After the 1780s, though, no caddi held sovereignty over the other vil-
lages. Instead, each community became an autonomous polity with the 
ability to negotiate its own terms of engagement with external gov-
ernments. Strategically, the decentralization of the Hasinais' political 
organization lessened Spain's capacity to manipulate the nation's in-
ternal political structure. No longer could Spain sanction the entire 
nation of Hasinais through the auspices of one leader. 
Similar to the Comanches' case, the Hasinais' decentralized political 
structure acted as a strategy of survival. The trend toward decentraliza-
tion continued throughout the Hasinais' contact with Euroamericans. 
After the disappearance of a centralizing caddi, each village negotiated 
its own relations with colonial governments, with caddis maintaining 
positions of authority in their now autonomous villages. This politi-
cal transformation allowed the caddis to gain access to much-needed 
commodities, form alliances with useful nations such as the Lipans, 
and continue their participation in illicit trade with French merchants. 
Explaining the ways in which the local, regional, and global 
economies were integrated during Spain's colonial occupation of the 
Southern Plains involves the merging of world systems analysis, 
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regional analysis, and social history. Using these approaches to identify 
the distribution patterns associated with alliances, exchange networks, 
markets, and settlement locations permits a clearer understanding of 
social change among the Comanches and the Hasinais. 
During the 1700s and early 1800s, patterns of distribution as well 
as the actual objects circulated were continually transformed. Because 
the value given to exchange was mediated through culture, every popu-
lation exhibited different internal and external patterns of interaction. 
Variations in the circulation and production of commodities can be 
correlated with distinct social settings (Adams 1970, 1974; Friedman 
1992; Schneider 1977). This can be clearly illustrated by studying the 
circulation of :firearms and horses. Obtaining a secure source of :firearms 
acted as means for a community to increase its political role in a region's 
economy. Through the trade of surplus horses, Native traders gained 
access to :firearms. Aiding a nation's success in its endeavor to increase 
its political role in the area's trade networks involved the establishment 
of alliance networks, the ability to participate in nascent trade fairs, 
and the ability to secure favorable trade terms with the Spanish and 
other Euroamerican powers. 
As future chapters illustrate, the Comanches and Hasinais success-
fully avoided becoming "victims and silent witnesses" of their own 
subjugation (Wolf 1982: x). Rather, they chose to transform their po-
litical economies in order to participate fully in the emerging political 
economy while also maintaining their sovereignty and avoiding be-
coming victims of an expanding colonial economy. 
4 
WORLD SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE 
Applying a world systems perspective to colonial encounters provides a 
useful device for illustrating the intricacies of a region's political econ-
omy. In particular, it aids efforts to understand a regional economy's 
articulations with an expanding colonial economy. According to theo-
ries associated with world systems analysis, the development of markets 
acts as the critical link between different economies. If this linkage, 
perceived as a conduit that structures the flow of commodities, results 
in unequal exchange, then the core often develops while impoverishing 
the peripheral economy (Hall 2000: 5). Invariably, the emergence of 
economic activities geared toward commodity production transforms 
the subsistence patterns and political organizations of participating 
local economies (Faiman-Silva 1997: 4). 
In a number of cases, such as those presented by the Comanches and 
the Hasinais, changes in their subsistence and political organizations 
forestalled their economic submission. Many scholars used economic 
models to analyze postcontact changes among the region's Native com-
munities (Albers 1991, 1993; Jablow 19 50; Lewis 1942; Mishkin 1940; 
Moore 1987; Secoy 1953; Spielman 1983). Specific emphasis gen-
erally focused on interactions between Puebloan, nomadic, Spanish, 
and American populations (Albers 1993;Jablow 1950; Mishkin 1940; 
Spielman 1983 ). Through their work, not only have regional trade net-
works been identified but also the importance of various commodities 
to local systems of power has been documented. 
During the last two decades, world systems perspectives have added 
significantly to an understanding of the interactions between the col-
onizers and the colonized (Anderson 1999; Baugh 1984; Hall 1987, 
1989, 1994, 1999, 2000; Klein 1993). A critical aspect of this research 
concerns the impact of expanding markets on indigenous social or-
ganizations. Frequently, these studies highlight intersocietal relations, 
such as ones based on warfare, trade, and/or diplomacy (Albers 1991, 
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1993; Baugh 1984; Klein 1993; Hall 1999). These efforts commonly 
reject the notion that a particular society's internal history controlled 
local structural changes. This is not to suggest these authors failed 
to recognize the existence of a community's own history or structure; 
however, they tended to subsume the trajectories oflocal histories into 
a regional or global process. 
As Thomas Hall's application of a world systems perspective to 
the Southern Plains illustrates, the qualitatively different nature of 
European-derived political economies acted as a stimulus for change. 
Because neither Spain nor indigenous communities represented mono-
lithic entities, Hall's research analyzed the "continuum of peripherality" 
within a region composed of numerous independent polities. As Hall 
notes, the European system of production and exchange did not com-
pletely absorb and transform local economies (1998). As a result, "more 
detailed local studies which attend peripheral actors and their attempts 
to control, shape, and resist the encroaching world-system" are neces-
sary in order to understand how some indigenous communities man-
aged to forestall annihilation or forced incorporation (Hall 1999: 10). 
An initial step toward the application of this type of analysis to 
Spain's colonial era in the Southern Plains necessitates four levels of 
investigation. These include an examination of Spain's position in the 
world economy, Spain's colonial occupation of the Southern Plains, 
Spain's use of trade goods to articulate the trade networks used by 
the Hasinais and Comanches, and strategic political changes imple-
mented by these two communities to negotiate the labyrinth of Spanish 
policies. Concentrating on these four areas gives a clearer view of the 
ways in which the linkages between colonial and peripheral political 
economies developed and varied. Through this analysis, it becomes 
evident that the Comanches and Hasinais articulated more closely 
with the developing regional economy as the flow of commodities be-
came more predictable. This in turn led to greater stability in the trade 
networks. 
Spain's Position in the Global Economy 
Spain's financial commitment to colonial activities overseas stemmed 
from a mercantile philosophy that assumed a finite availability of 
global wealth and income-generating resources (McNeill 1985: 3, 47). 
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Adherence to this tenet led to the conclusion that any economic gains 
came at the expense of another nation. Consequently, the main goals 
of Spain's colonial expansion involved the discovery of sources of raw 
materials as well as the development of markets for trade goods. Be-
cause of Spain's desire to protect its territory from the incursion of 
competing nations, particularly France, the Southern Plains also acted 
as a buffer zone. In general, however, the economic policies imple-
mented by Spain attempted to control trade and production in the 
Southern Plains. Ideally, these policies aided Spain's economic sector 
by stressing a colony's role in providing raw materials and markets for 
Spain's domestic manufactures. Theoretically, these policies ensured 
the creation of more exports than imports. This, in turn, would grant 
Spain's independence from foreign markets and, thus, greater revenue 
for its coffers (McNeill 1985: 3). Spain's optimism about the benefits 
of conquering North America illustrates the government's belief in 
mercantilism: 
[In] the conquest of the New World, the crown saw its opportunity to 
escape the limitations ofinternal Spanish policies ... a fifth of all gold and 
silver mined in the New World would be the king's to finance a new royal 
army, navy, and officialdom, to build the bases of absolutist power upon 
institutions wholly independent of nobility, middle classes, or peasant 
cultivators ... The New World would not have to grow piecemeal, in the 
shadows of ancient complexities: it would be a planned world, projected 
into reality by the royal will and its executioners. Thus utopia would 
become law, and law utopia. (Wolf 1959: 162-63) 
Alas, Spain's political economy during the seventeenth century pre-
cluded the self-sufficiency of royal power. Rather than controlling ex-
penditures by ignoring the citizenry's demand for consumer goods, 
Spain exported its metal wealth in return for luxury imports. One 
Spanish citizen's observations during the 1600s exemplify this lack of 
foresight. 
That London should manufacture the finestwoolens, Holland her fabrics, 
Florence her cloth, Indian hides, Milan its brocades, Italy and Flanders 
linens ... for our capital to enjoy; this indeed only proves that all nations 
produce for Madrid and that she is the queen of cities for all serve her 
and she serves no one. (Pellicani 1994: 195 n. 83) 
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The crown's dream of independence ended as its wealth dissipated. 
Instead it became necessary to more closely ally with an increasingly 
powerful merchant class (Wolf 1950: 9). Though this merger pro-
vided the necessary funds for Spain's colonial expansion, it also led 
to conflicts between the goals of the crown and the aims of the en-
trepreneurs. Dissension between these two groups frequently erupted 
over which policies to enact when responding to France's expansion 
into the Southern Plains. 
After a period of exploration, France and Spain began to colonize the 
Southern Plains in the late seventeenth century. Though the impetus 
for these nations' expansion into the Southern Plains stemmed from 
a variety of reasons, both competed for the economic and political 
domination of the area. As both France and Spain lacked money in 
their royal treasuries, neither country could afford to fund colonial 
expansion unless it strategically benefited from such moves. Mindful 
of this, colonial entrepreneurs typically justified expansion into the 
Southern Plains by stressing the predatory nature of foreign interests 
in the region (Allain 1988: 50, 51). 
In France's case, promoters of expansion argued their case by allud-
ing to Spain's silver mines and the potential for hijacking this wealth 
once French-controlled ports were constructed somewhere along the 
Gulf of Mexico (Allain 1988: 44; Folmer 1953: 135; Usner 1992: 14). 
An added incentive for occupying the region related to the revocation 
of the Edict of Nantes in 1684. Prior to being revoked, the edict kept 
the Huguenots from emigrating to North America. After 1684, French 
officials became increasingly alarmed by the Huguenots' diaspora into 
North America. France's fear of these emigrants originated from the 
Huguenots' policy of actively missionizing Native Americans. Because 
of their historically acrimonious relationship in France, the Huguenots 
favored the English over the French. As a result, the French worried 
that the Huguenots might convince Native peoples into allying with 
the British rather than the French. 
In addition to these anxieties, the French also worried about the 
rapid expansion of England's colonial population. By 1714, British of-
ficials enumerated over 250,000 colonists in America (Priestly 1939: 
155). To counteract the Huguenots, English settlers, and Spanish 
interests in the lower Mississippi Valley, France began to pursue a 
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more active policy in the region. In 1684, France granted funding for 
La Salle's short-lived colony on the Texas coast. After this failure, 
France, continually short of money, sold titles to the aristocracy and 
gave trading monopolies to private investors in order to accelerate set-
tlement in the region (Priestly 1939: 145). 
The government also financed the construction and maintenance of 
colonial settlements. Although trade had been entrusted to monopo-
lies, lack of markets and high import-export costs negated any benefits 
they may have given to their holders. In addition, French policy dis-
couraged colonial trade with foreign nations. Not wanting to risk their 
own capital, few merchants financed colonial ventures. Instead, they 
invested in the more lucrative trade occurring in the Levant (Allain 
1988: 12). This was particularly true after the collapse of the Canadian 
fur trade in the 1690s. Because of changes in European hat styles, the 
price of beaver pelts plunged. Within a three-year period, traders had 
stockpiled 850,185 pounds of beaver, which would take ten years to 
absorb into the reduced European market (Innis 1973: 74). 
As in Spain's case, the French government wanted the colonial areas 
to absorb French manufactures while exporting surplus local products. 
Ultimately, French economists, like the Spanish, hoped to stimulate 
enough trade with its colonies so that France could gain independence 
from foreign products. 
Spanish colonization of the Southern Plains centered on four goals: 
protecting the region from French incursions, establishing a limited 
number of settlements, gaining the allegiance of Native communities, 
and accomplishing these three aims as cheaply as possible. Prior to 
the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1763, Spain's colonial efforts 
in the Southern Plains competed with French activities in the lower 
Mississippi Valley. For example, until knowledge of La Salle's coastal 
colony in Texas had filtered back to the Spanish, the government's 
commitment to the region had been less than enthusiastic. But La 
Salle's colonial endeavor succeeded in finally forcing Spain to defend 
its territorial claims. 
Spain's restrictive trade laws, promulgated by the House of Trade 
and the Merchant's Guild in Seville, hindered these goals, however. 
Since these associations' desire to protect their own industries comple-
mented Spain's mercantile interests, Spanish policies rarely permitted 
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overseas colonies to legally import or export items from foreign nations 
during the first half of the eighteenth century. 
Unable to secure nearby French and British markets for their prod-
ucts, the Spanish colonists had little incentive to increase domestic 
production. Unless colonists engaged in smuggling and bought neces-
sities at a cheaper rate from France's nearby colonies, they had to rely 
upon prohibitively expensive imports from Veracruz or Saltillo. The 
high transportation cost and excessive taxation of items from these 
two towns dissuaded most colonists from purchasing imports and led 
to periodic scarcities in the colonies (Hall 1989; Thomas 1935). 
Spain's lack of financial investment and political commitment 
slowed the region's colonization and incorporation into a larger more 
global economy. In addition, Spain's protectionist policies limited the 
ability of colonialists to negotiate trade agreements with Native peo-
ples. France's more liberal view ofintercolonial trade gave French set-
tlers far more leverage to negotiate alliances with Native Americans. 
This in turn gave France an edge in its political and economic impact of 
Native Americans. As a matter of fact, France managed to undercut the 
cost of Spanish imports, and as a result French commodities became 
critical not only to the political economies of indigenous communities 
but also to those of local Spanish colonies. 
Until the 1763 signing of the Treaty of Paris, France continued to 
be viewed by Spain as a threat in the Southern Plains. The signing of 
the treaty, however, 
closed a cycle of struggle for worldwide domination between the winner, 
England, and the losers, the French and the Spanish; it is the beginning 
of a long descending phase in the world economic cycle, which on the 
economic place brought with it the upsets that permitted and gave impulse 
to the beginning of the industrial revolution. In the politicaVeconomic 
area this economic decline would generate the independence of the United 
States, the French Revolution, as well as the change of Spanish policy 
toward the colonies known as economic liberalism within enlightened 
authoritarianism. (Braudel 1984: 107-8) 
The demise of France's colonial ambitions and the liberalization of 
Spain's economy caused Native populations to ally more closely with 
the Spanish. Having fewer enemies in the region enabled Spain to 
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stabilize its colonial position through the establishment of more settle-
ments, the development of more predictable markets, and the ability 
to better meet the consumer demands of residents in the Southern 
Plains. 
Spain's Colonial Occupation of 
the Southern Plains 
Spain's occupation of the Southern Plains entailed the establishment 
of missions, presidios (also referred to as army garrisons), ranches, and 
towns. Because of financial limitations and the region's marginality to 
Spain's interests elsewhere in North America, the Spanish limited its 
initial settlements to Franciscan missions and small military garrisons. 
In order to defray the costs of these outposts, Spain bestowed large 
land grants to ranchers and farmers willing to settle the region and 
help support the missions. Generally, areas deemed useful for bolster-
ing Spanish claims to contested territories determined a settlement's 
location. Predictably, the government's worries concerning the inten-
tions of the French had the greatest impact on the placement of these 
early sites. 
Spain legitimized its occupation, conquest, and appropriation of 
resources in an already inhabited region through the claim that all 
wars conducted in the interest of the Holy Church were just (Jennings 
1976: 4). Any usurpation ofNative American sovereignty was morally 
absolved if attempts were made to convert indigenous populations to 
Catholicism. Consequently, with a minimum of financial effort, Spain's 
colonial expansion invariably occurred in association with missionary 
activities. Religious colonialism held the promise of advancing Spain's 
claim over territory through incorporating local inhabitants. Spanish 
administrators assumed that territory could be effectively and cheaply 
secured through the conversion of Native inhabitants into Christian 
allies. Bolton points out that 
the value of the missionaries as frontier agents was ... clearly recognized, 
and their services were thus consciously utilized by the government. In 
the first place, they were often the most useful explorers and diplomatic 
agents. The unattended missionary could sometimes go unmolested, and 
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without arousing suspicion and hostility, into districts where the soldier 
was not welcome, while by their education and their trained habits of 
thought they were the class best fitted to record what they saw and to 
report what should be done. (Bolton 1917: 110) 
Spanish administrators gained key information about the Native 
peoples through the initial use of religion as a mode of colonialism. As 
Said ( 1989: 6) notes, "Eurocentric culture relentlessly codified and ob-
served everything about the non-European or presumably peripheral 
world, in so thorough and detailed a manner as to leave no item un-
touched, no culture unstudied." This classificatory discourse permitted 
the missionaries to construct a standardized means ofinteracting with 
Native peoples. 
The Spanish missionaries in the New World thought it not only neces-
sary but possible ... to transform the Indians into replicas of Spaniards-
Spanish peasants to be more precise, and a highly idealized peasantry at 
that ... The Spanish missionaries, with the full support of the Crown, 
interpreted the duty broadly as a mandate to supervise every aspect of the 
Indians' lives from birth to death and to modify them when necessary in 
accordance with the church's teachings. (Farriss 1984: 91) 
Armed with this type of knowledge, the missionaries opened the 
door for the development of enduring alliances with indigenous 
communities. 
Colonial settlements in Spain's three Texan provinces, east Texas, 
central Texas, and the Nueces Triangle, involved the construction of 
missions, the emigration of Franciscan missionaries, and Spanish em-
igrants. Responding to French expansion west of the Mississippi, in 
1689 Spain established six Franciscan missions in the vicinity of the 
Neches River. To facilitate this effort, Spain gave land grants and some 
subsidies to the Franciscans to aid in the construction and management 
of these missions. Fifty soldiers, fourteen friars, and seven brethren 
took part in this effort (Morfi 1935: 152). Initially, the eight to eleven 
Hasinai villages in the region welcomed this colonial effort (Griffith 
1954: 58; Tanner 1974: 16). At the onset, Franciscan missions, with 
their large land grants and herds of livestock, dominated early trad-
ing relations with the Hasinais. Generally, the missionaries offered 
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training in techniques of ranching, blacksmithing, pottery production, 
and weaving (Spicer 1962). Even with these inducements, local mis-
sions attracted few occupants. In a period of a little less than five years, 
these settlers failed to secure allies or converts. A devastating epidemic 
in 1691, continual crop failures, and lack of converts caused the mis-
sionaries to abandon the region in 1693 {Ewers 1973). 
After this failure, Spain permitted the missions to secure :financial 
sponsors from the private sector. The viceroy passed a regulation re-
quiring emigrant communities to contribute to the construction oflocal 
missions and to support the necessary missionary personnel. Although 
reestablished in 1714 with an array of soldiers, farmers, ranchers, and 
the help of church funds and private benefactors, missionaries again 
abandoned the region in 1719. Circumstances responsible for this lat-
est desertion related to the missionaries' fears about Spain's war with 
France. To alleviate the concerns of the missionaries and other settlers, 
Spain funded the construction of army garrisons in order protect the 
missions, settlers, and supply routes from Native raiders, the French, 
and, later, British and American nationals. 
In the 1720s, alarmed at the expense, corruption, and general malaise 
of these garrisons, cost-conscious administrators reduced the salaries 
and number of soldiers serving in eastern Texas (Chipman 1992: 283 
n. 13; Murphy 193 7: 125). Chronically underfunded and understaffed, 
the presidios provided little protection against foreign encroachments, 
marauding nomads, or fleeing apostates. Ignoring the protests of mis-
sionaries, soldiers, and settlers, colonial officials decided to retreat from 
east Texas and relocate these settlers to central Texas in 1731 {Folmer 
1953). 
Although Spain forced the relocation of government-sponsored set-
tlements in the region, many Spanish citizens remained in east Texas 
along the tributaries and river valleys of the Angelina and Sabine 
Rivers. When Spain liberalized its colonial economies in 1789, a num-
ber of these towns began to prosper {Haggard 1945: 70-73). For ex-
ample, Nacogdoches superceded Natchitoches as the regional market 
center in the late 1700s. 
Unlike east Texas, central Texas's Spanish population increased con-
tinually during the 1700s. This occurred as a result of the relocation 
of east Texas communities into the region, the government's funding 
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of new missions, and Spain's forced emigration of farmers from the 
Canary Islands into the area of current-day San Antonio. Settlements 
in the region prospered as colonial policies became less concerned 
with the French and more geared toward the activities of nomadic 
groups. Spain's shift in policy proved particularly important as the 
Lipan Apaches, who generally raided west Texas settlements, moved 
closer to the central Texan colonies. 
The Lipans organized themselves into numerous small and au-
tonomous communities, referred to as rancherfas by the Spanish 
(Gunnerson 1974: 255; Opler 1983: 372; Thomas 1940: 197). Be-
ginning with the migration of some Lipans into central Texas in the 
1680s and their virtual extinction by the 1770s, this group continually 
oscillated between peace and war with the Spanish. Various governors 
of Texas had led or ordered expeditions against the Li pans during the 
first half of the 1700s. Most of these campaigns supposedly arose in 
response to the raiding activities of the Lipans. According to one mis-
sionary, however, a campaign waged in the 17 40s was "little more than 
a slave-hunting expedition" (Dunn 1911: 251-52). By engaging in a 
series of campaigns against the Lipans, colonial administrators pro-
tected the lives and property of settlers residing in central Texas. With 
additional funding for the construction of missions and presidios in ar-
eas slated for colonization, more Spanish settlers migrated into central 
Texas. This also attracted Native refugees from the lower courses of the 
San Antonio River, the Rio Grande, and the Nueces River (Campbell 
1988: 91). Like missions in east Texas, those in central Texas failed 
to attract many converts (Leutnegger 1977: 128). From 1790 until 
1810 the region "enjoyed considerable respite from hostilities and an 
opportunity to develop economically" (Moorhead 1968: 289). 
During the 1740s and 1750s, ranchers began to settle Spain's third 
Texan province, the Nueces Triangle. Watered by the Rio Grande 
and the Nueces River, grasslands dominated this region. A number 
of events occurring in northern Mexico stimulated this area's pop-
ulation growth. These included the passage of legislation restricting 
ranching, the discovery and development of more silver mines, and a 
series of financial and agrarian crises (Meyers 1967: 87; Robles 1938; 
Tjarks 197 4: 294 ). Sizeable land grants, a landscape conducive to cattle 
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ranching, and an initial absence of hostile Native Americans attracted a 
steady migration of settlers into the region. During this era, towns, pre-
sidios, and missions as well as numerous ranches were founded. Towns 
constructed during this period of colonial development included 
Camargo (1749), Dolores (1750), Laredo (1755), Mier (1752), 
Revilla (1750), and Reynosa (1740). Roads and ferries connecting the 
region to San Antonio in central Texas, Saltillo in northern Mexico, 
and the port at Galveston Bay facilitated the development of these 
towns. 
The area's growing stability was short-lived, however. Raiding ac-
tivities of the Lipans, along with those of a number of other Apache 
groups, led to the abandonment of 116 homesteads and ranches in the 
area (Hoya and McLean 1964: 311). Not until after Spain's colonial 
involvement in the region end did reoccupation of the Nueces Triangle 
occur. 
For a number of reasons, missions failed to facilitate Spain's expan-
sion into Texas. Lack of commercial inducements and the mission's 
restrictive rules and regulations probably dissuaded potential converts 
(Alcocer 1958). In addition, France's establishment of local trading 
posts and its support of independent traders meant that Native com-
munities did not depend on the missions for European goods (Perttula 
1992: 34). Unable to set its own Indian policy through negotiations 
or trade, a mission offered little beyond refuge to ravaged Native 
American communities. To protect the refugees as well as the wealth 
of the missions, the missionaries relied upon the presidios. Even the 
presence of presidios offered little risk to converts bent on fleeing the 
missions or nomadic groups intent upon raiding the institution's ranch 
stock. 
Because of the haphazard location of the presidios and the general 
disarray of their personnel, colonial administrators once again con-
solidated Spain's military presence in the Southern Plains (Moorhead 
1961; Simmons 1968: 6). By the early 1770s, eight presidios had been 
closed and most of the remaining fifteen had been relocated (Hall 1989: 
138). Without a larger military force, the missionaries could not re-
trieve runaways, guard against raiders, or guarantee the compliance of 
their workers. By 1772, Spain had secularized most missions in Texas. 
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Spain's Commercial Relations with the 
Hasinais and the Comanches 
Spain's financial interest in the Southern Plains remained centered on 
the region's economic potential. As a result, the political capital of 
indigenous populations ultimately depended on European perceptions 
of their ability to further this colonial aim. One critical function of 
Native Americans was their ability to provide valuable commodities 
for Spain's domestic sector while importing manufactured goods. At 
the local level, colonial merchants exchanged manufactured items for 
horses, slaves, bison products, and other types of hides. The prices 
paid in goods to Native Americans varied according to the supply and 
demand in Europe and North America. 
Colonial administrators recognized that the consumer demands of 
Native Americans were more economically important than the ex-
ternal demands for North American products. As ethnohistorians 
have pointed out, the demand for trade goods by Native Americans 
was initially limited to a narrow range of items (Sahlins 1972: 313; 
White 1983: 57). Among indigenous populations in the Southern 
Plains, social constraints against hoarding limited purchases to those 
used primarily to meet immediate needs. As social capital within 
and between communities became tied to the ability to accumulate 
Euroamerican goods, demand increased. The most critical of these 
items included horses and firearms. The rapid spread of these com-
modities across the Southern Plains was phenomenal. Forbes (1959: 
208) stated that "by 1680 the Indians of all of Texas and New Mexico 
were mounted ... and horses were being spread to even more northerly 
regions by the Plains Apaches and Utes." Though less ubiquitous than 
horses, French firearms were already in the hands of Apaches residing 
in the vicinity of New Mexico by 1706 (Thomas 1935: 74). 
World systems perspectives note that one major impact of colo-
nialism follows from its ability to create dependent communities that 
then become incorporated into the dominant society. According to 
Hall (1989: 24), Spain's control over the influx of Euroamerican 
commodities into the Southern Plains opened the door to the re-
gion's dependency. The introduction of novel goods led numerous in-
digenous communities to align themselves with colonial powers; the 
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introduction of horses, guns, and other metal products of a more util-
itarian nature presumably added to the urgency of this strategy. 
Well aware of the strategic advantage of controlling the flow of 
trade goods, colonial officials attempted to develop client populations 
by tying the distribution of commodities to alliances. For example, 
Viceroy Bernardo de Galvez claimed that Native peoples "should be 
made accustomed to the use of our foods, drinks, arms, and clothing, 
and they should become greedy for the possession ofland" (Worcester 
1951: 42). As the following quote illustrates, Governor Nava of New 
Mexico understood the advantages of endemic warfare in Spain's desire 
to create allies as well as a dependent population. 
One of the maxims that should always be observed on our part, with 
respect to the nations of Indians, is to allow them to make reciprocal 
war on each other in order in this way to bring about a diminution of 
their forces, to energize their mutual hatred, and to avoid their union and 
alliance; we should, however, take the lead in keeping them constantly in 
our friendship and in our debt. (Nava, quoted in Faulk 1964: 68) 
Although many colonial officials recognized methods for develop-
ing client or dependent populations, they faced continuous problems 
in their attempts to do so. A major impediment involved Spain's in-
adequate financial and military commitment to the Southern Plains. 
Throughout Spain's regime the region suffered from poorly developed 
transport networks, a shortage of Euroamerican commodities, and the 
lack of a sizeable colonial population with disposable incomes. This 
lack of aid delayed the region's commercial development. Spain's re-
strictive trading regulations further constrained the region's economic 
prospects. 
Since 1536, the crown had restricted the flow of firearms to colo-
nized populations in North America. Spain's legislation allowed only 
those Indians licensed by the viceroy or local governor to carry arms 
(Secoy 1953). Though merchants continually tried to overturn this 
ruling, this policy persisted and was regularly reiterated during the 
country's colonial occupation of the Southern Plains. Under duress 
from the viceroy, the governor of New Mexico in the early 1700s 
"prohibited the sale of arms to the tribes of the Plains or foreigners 
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under heavy penalties" (Haines 1891: 115). Penalties included fines 
for Spanish nationals and lashings as well as imprisonment for Native 
peoples (Haines 1891: 115). Spain justified the restriction of gun sales 
on the grounds that conquest could not occur iflocal Spanish soldiers 
had to fight vastly larger and well-armed native resisters (Bolton 1914, 
1:278-79). 
Spain's refusal to legally trade firearms increased the importance of 
French traders. Unlike the Spanish, French administrators expressed 
no desire to restrict their trade in firearms. Although cycles ofinflation 
in the lower Mississippi Valley caused French commodities to be too 
expensive for most colonists, the government generously subsidized the 
Natives' ability to obtain trade goods (Giraud 1974: 17). Consequently, 
French firearms quickly spread to the Hasinais as well as other Native 
communities. 
The volume of firearms circulating among the Hasinais increased as 
more French traders moved into the area. By 1726, France had estab-
lished ten trading companies in N atchitoches alone (La Vere 1993: 62). 
French traders further solidified their importance to the Hasinais by 
establishing semipermanent residents in many local villages (Perttula 
1992: 21). As early as 1719, the governor of New Mexico intercepted 
more than one thousand Apaches who were fleeing from armed French, 
Pawnees, and Jumanos (Thomas 1935: 31). One refugee, suffering 
from a gunshot wound, told the governor that the French had "built 
two towns, each as large as Taos. There they lived with the Pawnee and 
Jumano Indians whom they have given many guns and have taught 
them to shoot" (Thomas 1935: 31). A Spanish inspector traveling 
through Hasinai territory in 1727 observed that they were "armed 
with French fuciles [muskets], with flask of powder and pouches of 
bullets, like most expert troops" (Thomas 1935: 32). 
Spain's methods for negating inroads made by foreign nations in the 
Southern Plains included sponsoring missionary activities, seasonal 
markets for allies, as well as giving gifts to secure more Native allies. In 
order for colonial officials to create dependent polities while facing a 
shortage of the requisite commodities, they had to strategically control 
the flow of available trade goods. Faced with this conundrum, the 
Spanish began limiting the distribution of commodities to favored 
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indigenous communities. They also established scheduled markets for 
strategic allies. 
Granting access to Euroamerican trade goods became an important 
bargaining tool during Spain's colonial occupation of the Southern 
Plains. Spain attempted to regulate the disbursement of commodi-
ties to strategic gift-giving events and seasonal markets for favored 
allies. Spain financed gift giving through two separate funds: the fund 
for allies and the fund of gratification (Simmons 1968: 143). Though 
colonial officials maintained some discretion in the administration of 
these funds, Spain determined the funds' political role. For example, 
in 1772 the newly appointed viceroy of the Provincias Internas stren-
uously objected to gift giving as a payment for peace (Bolton 1914, 
1:271). Instead, he demanded that annual gifts be given only to those 
Native Americans who had demonstrated loyalty and devotion to the 
king (Bolton 1914, 1:271). Even with this cost cutting, 40 percent of 
Spain's colonial budget was earmarked for gift distributions in 1776 
(Bolton 1914, 1:273). 
Predictably, the giving of gifts became increasingly expensive dur-
ing periods of intercolonial rivalry. Until 1763, competition with the 
French over allies absorbed these gifts. After the Louisiana Purchase 
in 1803, Spain's gift expenses rose again in order to maintain al-
liances with the Comanches and Hasinais in the face of American 
competition. 
In addition to gifts, colonial administrators also developed neu-
tral frontier trading sites for their allies. These markets were an 
initial stage of regional integration. Lacking a requisite threshold pop-
ulation in a concentrated area, however, Spanish colonists could not 
sustain stationary marketplaces. Instead, seasonal markets with prices 
and participation controlled by colonial administrators emerged. In or-
der for the government to monopolize these events, laws were passed 
that forbade independent Spanish citizens from trading with Native 
Americans outside of the seasonal fairs (Twitchell 1914, 2:205). 
By providing commodities in a controlled period of time, Spanish 
officials hoped not only to circumvent raiding but also to prevent lower-
ranking competitors, such as French entrepreneurs and Spanish set-
tlers, from undercutting Spanish trade policies (Hodges 1982). Spain's 
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shortsighted policies concerning the trade in firearms as well as the 
availability of horses from a multitude of alternative sources limited 
Spain's ability to constrain the flow of commodities and increase its 
influence over the Caddoans and Comanches. 
Access to horses, unlike firearms, did not necessitate a European 
source. Favorable climatic conditions and the development of Spanish 
ranching guaranteed a steady supply of domesticated and feral horses. 
St. Denis, an early French administrator, commented in 1713 that 
"cattle, which in the interval of the absence of the Spaniards [from east 
Texas missions] have increased to thousands of cows, bulls, horses, 
and mares with which the whole country is covered" (Hackett 1931, 
1:526). By 1805, a missionary observed that "great herds of horses and 
mares [are] found close to roads in herds of four to six thousand head" 
(Bensen 1947: 32). 
In an exercise repeated regularly by many nomadic communities in 
the region, the raiding of horses resulted in wide circulation of this 
needed commodity. As a matter of fact, ranchers from the Nueces 
Triangle speculated that the dispersal of feral horses related entirely 
to raiding activities of Native peoples (Jackson 1986: 36-37). Native 
traders met the growing demand of horses among indigenous peoples, 
the French, and later the Americans (Kress and Hatcher 1931: 67). In 
1749, the Comanches maintained so many horses that the community 
was "dispersed, with their large droves of horses, for which reason they 
could not live together, having to seek sufficient pasturage and water 
for their horses" (Hackett 1941, 3:317). The Comanches' importance 
in regional trade networks is supported by the fact that Spanish settlers 
shifted the word for independent trader, viagero, to the word comanchero 
(John 1984: 346). 
According to Klein (1993: 137), colonialism's creation ofinequali-
ties in the distribution of capital predicated a community's degree of 
dependency. As Hall explains: 
The degree of incorporation may range from weak through strong. At 
the strong pole of the continuum essential goods are exchanged. These 
regions experience full scale "development of underdevelopment," and 
are important to core development. Influence flows both directions, 
but net product and capital flows are to the core .... When such pres-
sures are sufficiently strong, and of sufficient duration, the structure of 
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local groups will be changed .... If the transformations are sufficiently 
drastic ... approaching the full-blown periphery pole of the continuum, 
loosening of incorporation becomes increasingly difficult. (Hall 1989: 
19, 21) 
Impediments to Spain's Incorporation of the 
Comanches and the Caddoans 
A number of factors impeded or even prohibited the local integration 
of Comanches and Hasinais into dependent relations with the Spanish. 
The introduction and subsequent disbursement of these items revolu-
tionized Native relations with each other as well as with colonial powers 
(Albers 1993; Hall 1989; Kavanagh 1996; Milloy 1988; Mishkin 1940; 
Secoy 1953). Hostilities became more deadly and frequent between 
Native communities (Mishkin 1940; Secoy 1953). 
During this era, a community's survival depended on gaining and 
maintaining access to horses and firearms. Both of these items permit-
ted the sedentary Hasianis to protect their access to hunting regions 
{Espinosa 1746: 422). Like the Hasinais, the Comanches also became 
more militarized. In 1723, New Mexico's governor wrote that 
captains of the heathen Apache nation ... represented to me that the 
heathens of the Comanche nation, their enemies, had attacked them 
with a large number in their rancherias in such a manner that they could 
not make use of weapons for their defense. They launched themselves 
with such daring and resolution that they killed many men, carrying off 
their women and children as captives. (Thomas 1935: 194) 
More populous sedentary villages tied to a seasonal horticultural 
schedule remained easy prey for nomadic groups. For example, the 
Comanches scheduled their attacks on the Lipans and other Apaches 
during the summer months, while the Apaches were engaged in hor-
ticultural activities (Secoy 1953: 31). 
Controlling the distribution of firearms and horses held the key to 
a polity's position of power in the Southern Plains. Spain's restrictive 
trade laws, the presence of foreign traders such as the French, and 
the self-propagation of horses precluded Spain's monopoly over the 
distribution of these resources. Instead, nomadic communities, such 
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as the Comanches, controlled the supply of horses, while sedentary 
villages allied with the French, such as the Hasinais, tried to control 
the trade in firearms. 
Spanish Strategies to Incorporate the Hasinais 
and the Comanches 
During Spain's occupation of the Southern Plains, local administrators 
tried a myriad of strategies to gain greater control over the Hasinais and 
the Comanches. Although each of these communities supported dif-
fering types of political organizations and subsistence practices, Spain 
implemented similar policies for both communities. Another major 
difficulty Spain encountered in its desire to incorporate these two pop-
ulations involved the role of France in the Hasinais' local economy and 
the decentralized political organization of the Comanches. Infight-
ing between missionaries, settlers, and government administrators not 
only contributed to the decline of the mission's suzerainty but also 
aided the Hasinias' ability to protect their sovereignty. France's policy 
of providing traders in the Native villages ensured the Hasinais inde-
pendence from Spain's governmental control. Unable to support a large 
military force, the Spanish failed to disrupt smuggling routes used by 
the Hasinais to trade with the French and the Wichitas (Bolton 1905: 
105; Bolton 1913: 348; Bolton 1914, 2:104). 
Not until Spain instituted less restrictive trade laws did the Hasinais 
begin to lose their pivotal role as middlemen in east Texas trade 
routes. Because of these more liberal policies, other groups, such as the 
Comanches and Wichitas, began to bypass the trading routes estab-
lished by the Hasinais. A series of devastating epidemics in the 1700s 
also contributed to the Hasinais' lessening importance to regional trade. 
The diminishing importance of the Hasinais in regional trade net-
works is mirrored in shifts in their political organization. Until the early 
1700s, the Hasinais supported a hereditary male leader, referred to as 
a xinesi by the Spanish. This individual played both a spiritual and po-
litical role as a distributor of surplus domesticated and undomesticated 
products (Sabo 1987: 29). The xinesi's primary role in redistribution 
rather than production failed to adapt to the nature of firearms and 
horses. Neither one of these items could be monopolized; instead, 
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they appear to have caused the democratization of local distribution 
networks (Wyckoff and Baugh 1980). Rather than providing the xinesi 
with surplus products, as in the past, individuals accumulated items in 
order to exchange them with the French for firearms, metal tools, and 
textiles (Sabo 1987; Griffith 1954: 138). 
Like other Native communities, the Hasinais developed standard-
ized methods for negotiating with colonial administrators. With the 
disappearance of the xinesis in the early 1700s, village leaders, referred 
to as caddis by the Spanish, began negotiating with colonial officials 
(Woodall 1969: 36). By the 1730s, one caddi emerged as the secular 
leader of the entire nation of Hasinais. During the 1770s, however, 
this position became less centralized, and the Hasinais returned to a 
system in which each village leader autonomously negotiated with the 
Spanish (Smith 1995: 40). Various ideas have been proffered to explain 
this political transformation (Perttula 1992; Smith 1995: 85; Wyckoff 
and Baugh 1980). These theories range from the impact of disease to 
endemic warfare. Although each of these contributed to the political 
reorganization of the Hasinais, an additional explanation includes the 
advantages of a leader acting as broker between competing nations. 
Presumably, one leader negotiating with separate colonial regimes 
could not be penalized by either of these political powers, particularly 
since a leader's problems with one government could be circumvented 
by simply allying more closely with a competing colonial power. With 
the loss of French allies, the Hasinais became more vulnerable to colo-
nial sanctions promulgated by the Spanish. If they maintained one 
tribal leader as the main negotiator, the Spanish could transfer their 
colonial monopoly over the Hasinais from this individual to the tribe as 
a whole. Adapting to this changing political and economic landscape, 
the Hasinais regrouped into smaller communities, allied more closely 
with their nomadic neighbors, and lessened the control leaders exerted 
over the entire nation. 
When the Comanches arrived in the Southern Plains at the be-
ginning of the eighteenth century, Spanish officials reevaluated their 
involvement with the Comanches' primary enemies, the Lipans (Faulk 
1964: 64-70). Ignoring the Apaches' pleas for a trade alliance, the gov-
ernor of New Mexico established an exclusive trade fair between the 
residents ofTaos and the Comanches (Kavanagh 1996: 102). Wanting 
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more trading opportunities with the Puebloan area, the Comanches 
forced the issue by using French guns to kill 150 residents at Pecos 
between 1740 and 1749 (Twitchell 1914, 2:212). 
Spanish officials complained bitterly about the independence and 
wealth of the Comanches. During the 1750s, Colonel Diego Ortiz 
Parilla noted, "The heathen of the north are populous and rich. They 
enjoy the protection and commerce of the French; they dress well, raise 
horses and use firearms with the greatest skill" (Parilla 1758 in Thomas 
1940: 83). A portion of this wealth stemmed from the success of the 
Comanches' strategic alliance with the Taovaya branch of the Wichitas 
in the late 17 40s or early 1750s (Morris 1970: 80). Through this rela-
tionship, the Comanches secured a stable outlet for their surplus horses 
and a steady source of firearms. 
When Spanish negotiators successfully mediated a treaty with 
the Taovayas in 1771, they inadvertently increased the power of the 
Comanches' trade network. According to the treaty's terms, the 
Taovayas agreed to stop raiding the Spanish and to desist from trading 
with other Euroamericans. In return, the Spanish guaranteed to pay 
them artificially high prices for their surplus products (Bolton 1914, 
2:126). 
A Franciscan inspector noted that the Taovayas raised an abundance 
of corn, beans, watermelon, and tobacco (Castaneda 1935: 9). This 
intensification in agricultural production probably relates to the high 
prices offered by Spanish traders. The more the Spanish gave, the more 
the Taovayas could offer the Comanches. 
By the 1770s, one Spanish official complained that the Comanches 
have everything at the hands of the Spaniards. In a few years we would see 
in their country the procreation of horses in the same abundance as that 
of deer and buffalo, and then not needing these animals, the acquisition 
of firearms in barter for hides and herds would be less difficult for them. 
(Thomas 1941: 112-13) 
Spanish retaliation against the Comanches' aggression in 1779 along 
with the southern expansion of the Osages and Pawnees pressured the 
Comanches into an alliance with the Spanish in 1786 {Thomas 1932: 
294-321 ). After receiving gifts and numerous colonial emissaries, three 
Comanche leaders signed the 1786 peace accord with New Mexico's 
governor, Bautista de Anza. The Spanish made only four demands in 
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the treaty, each of which was buffered by economic diplomacy. Ac-
cording to the document's contents, the Comanches agreed to desist 
from hostile actions against the Spanish and their allies residing in 
New Mexico, to ransom Spanish captives only to Spanish authorities, 
to relinquish any involvement in foreign trade, and to share the same 
allies and enemies as Spain. In return, the Comanches would receive 
full-time traders and annual gifts for the chiefs and principal tribal 
members (Faulk 1964: 65). 
During the late 1780s, Spanish officials in New Mexico and cen-
tral Texas attempted to increase their influence over the Comanches 
through the disbursement of gifts and the scheduling of seasonal mar-
kets. Spanish colonialists dramatically increased their contact with 
the Comanches after 1786. In 1787, Taos held seven fairs, Picuris 
sponsored another, and Pecos maintained its huge annual rendezvous 
(Kessell 1979: 408). In addition, San Antonio provided Comanches 
with a few scheduled trading fairs a year. 
Predictably, the Comanches' involvement with the colonial trade in 
horses deepened as exchange opportunities increased. Throughout the 
Spanish era in the Southern Plains, the Comanches expanded their 
territory, increased their importance in trade networks, and developed 
alliances with a myriad of groups. Rather than creating a client nation, 
the Spanish provided the Comanches with the necessary conditions to 
increase their influence in the region. 
The Comanches' political organization aided their ability to re-
tain sovereignty. Comanche leaders acted as brokers or buffers be-
tween colonial authorities and the local community (Foster 1991: 74; 
Kavanagh 1996: 15). Because of colonial conceptions of government, 
the Comanche individuals termed chiefs or leaders by the Spanish be-
came critical to intersocietal relations. This interstitial space between 
the local and regional was stabilized through the role ofleader. Though 
perspectives on what defines a leader vary, the interactions between 
colonists and colonized was standardized through these individuals. 
Indigenous Interactions with Colonial 
Authorities as Evidence oflndependence 
As the Comanches and Hasinais illustrate, they remained involved 
in trade networks during Spain's occupation of the Southern Plains. 
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In part, this resulted from the distribution patterns of high-demand 
commodities such as firearms and horses. Restrictive trade regulations 
kept the Spanish from controlling the distribution of firearms. Ad-
ditionally, the propagation of horses occurred outside the purview of 
colonial structures. Augmenting these facts were the political strategies 
used by the Comanches and Hasinais to mediate and structure their 
own interactions with colonial authorities. 
Until 1763, France's continual involvement in the Southern Plains 
exchange routes precluded Spain's dominance over the regional econ-
omy. French traders situated among the Hasinais periodically traveled 
west or utilized nomadic groups as middlemen to trade firearms di-
rectly to the Comanches and Taovayas primarily for horses, not bi-
son products. This allowed the Hasinais to remain independent of 
Spanish commodity sources and maintain some control over the flow 
of firearms. 
Even after France's retreat from the area, Spanish control remained 
weak. Chronically underfunded and unable to replicate the quantity 
or quality of trade goods offered by other nations, Spanish colonists 
attracted the animus of Native groups. Except for a few brief periods 
of peace, the Comanches continuously raided Spanish settlements for 
livestock. 
Vicissitudes in the structure of prices, intercolonial trade, and 
governmental policies kept the Spanish colonies in the region from 
developing their own independent economic base. Consequently, 
throughout this period colonial economies depended on Native 
American groups as conduits for expansion. As indigenous peoples 
could more easily transport items across international boundaries, 
Spanish colonists found themselves particularly dependent on Native 
routes of exchange. In addition, a continuallackoffunding and perso-
nnel in the colonial sector permitted Native American communities to 
maintain a high level of autonomy in their relations with colonists. The 
presence of competing Euroamerican powers further ensured the in-
dependence ofNative Americans. If indigenous groups became dissat-
isfied with one country's policies, they allied themselves with another. 
Unless the impetus for and strategies of colonialism are understood, 
it is difficult to understand the emergence and structuring of inter-
actions between the colonizers and the colonized. In world systems 
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theories the market provides the critical link between different social 
units. This linkage forms a conduit for the flow of commodities. The 
structuring of this conduit occurs through the actions of all its partici-
pants. Invariably, these actions are strategic means for obtaining critical 
products. As world systems theories illustrate, strategies change over 
time in response to the exigencies of the local, regional, and world 
economies. 
Spain initiated its colonial occupation of the Southern Plains with 
the establishment of missions. Agents of missionization collected crit-
ical information about the locations, governments, population sizes, 
strengths, and weaknesses of indigenous communities (Bolton 1917: 
10). Armed with this information, Spain began a program of colo-
nization. Missions, settlements, and army garrisons were established 
in east, central, and southern Texas. Lacking financial support from 
Spain, however, these colonial settlements had to negotiate stable in-
teractions with local communities. The currency of these interactions 
was the exchange of critical commodities. Colonial settlements needed 
food products and horses, while indigenous communities required 
firearms and horses. Colonial administrators attempted to regulate 
these exchanges through government-sponsored trade fairs and sanc-
tioned gift-giving events. Trade fairs were never held in east Texas, 
though, because of France's colonial activities in the lower Mississippi 
Valley. Unable to compete with the quality and quantity of French 
merchandise, the Spanish residing in east Texas relied upon the giving 
of gifts to negotiate stable relations with local communities. Because 
of Spain's refusal to fund large amounts of resources for this activity, 
gift giving failed to secure allies for the colonies. 
In addition, restrictive trade laws precluded Spanish citizens from 
trading :firearms to local communities. Because French traders were not 
constrained by similar regulations, their importance in local trading ac-
tivities grew. Locating their trading bases near or in the Hasinais' com-
munities enhanced the role of these villages in local exchange networks. 
In east Texas, the Hasinais dominated local exchanges. Their ability 
to trade with both the French and the Spanish precluded the Hasinais' 
dependence on either colonial power. Organized under the auspices of 
one leader, this community continued to thrive until France's retreat 
from Louisiana. 
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When Spain gained greater control of the Hasinais' territory, the 
position of tribal leader became less important. Spanish gift-giving 
events became more critical, however. During this period, there were 
many reports ofHasinais visiting Spanish settlements. Lacking a cen-
tralized leader may have democratized the giving of gifts. Definitely, 
though, the absence of a tribal representative kept the Spanish from 
increasing their hegemony over the Hasinais' communities. 
The Comanches' dispersed settlement pattern and frequent migra-
tions allowed them to play an important role in the supply side of 
the horse trade. In this capacity, the Comanches maintained a se-
ries ofinteraction strategies with the Spanish. These included raiding, 
alliances through peace negotiations, and the emergence of intersti-
tial brokers. By displacing Apache competitors, the Comanches reg-
ularized their participation in New Mexico's government-sponsored 
trade fairs. Through their raiding proclivities, the Comanches accessed 
needed commodities for these exchanges. They also used raiding as a 
means of securing regulated exchanges at specific pueblos. By allying 
with the Taovayas, the Comanches obtained French weaponry. 
As the experience of the Comanches and Hasinais illustrates, 
Europeans did not entirely control the direction or structure of colonial 
encounters. Clearly, patterns of exchange did not rise sui generis from 
the expansion of European colonialism. Rather, local communities de-
fined their own strategies for connecting with colonial powers. 
s 
REGIONAL ANALYSIS 
Initially, the methodological techniques and theoretical constructs of 
regional analysis precluded its application to areas lacking a developed 
commercial sector. Early models developed by geographers such as Von 
Thiinen (1966), Chisholm (1962), and Christaller (1966) emphasized 
not only the role markets played in structuring space but also the 
ways markets conditioned their participants to maximize profits and 
minimize supply and demand costs (Hodges 1988: 17). Typically, these 
theorists stressed the ways in which the spatial relationships between 
market locations and supporting suppliers, consumers, and producers 
illustrated the most profitable pattern of landscape use. According to 
this perspective, two factors led to variations in spatial arrangements: 
the kinds of commodities circulating and the types of transportation 
available. 
For years, anthropologists studying the economic activities of so-
cial communities (Clarke 1977; Dalton 1969; Godelier 1972, 1977; 
LeClair and Schneider 1968; Polanyi 1957; Wolf 1955) have chal-
lenged the assumption that "producers not only wish to maximize 
output, but are in the position to do so" (Hodges 1988: 17). 
A society cannot expend in the process of exploiting nature more en-
ergy and material than it extracts, nor waste in distribution more than 
it has gained in production-or else it succumbs, sooner or later .... the 
procedure of maximization, economizing admits only one solution to 
any problem of resource allocation: "the one best way." But survival is 
any way that works. Success is ecologically established from a minimum 
point-the minimum required of a cultural system to meet the selective 
pressures that would decompose it. (Sahlins 1972: 314) 
Within any society, social factors intervene and determine a culture's 
perception of maximized profits and minimized costs. In addition, the 
process of colonialism frequently caused structured inequalities in the 
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allocation of resources regardless of the actions of the participants. 
Cognizant of this issue, geographers began to correlate spatial pat-
terns with the degree of control exchange participants exerted over the 
distribution of resources (Casagrande, Thompson, and Young 1964; 
Kelley 1976; Lewis 1976; Smith 1976). Analyzing the deployment of 
political power over the extraction, circulation, and consumption of 
resources became critical to this type of research: 
Fully elaborating this relation would eventually point out how different 
stratified political economies, such as archaic and nation-states (Service 
1975), or feudal, Asiatic, ancient, capitalist and socialist social forma-
tions (e.g., Hindess and Hirst 1975) affect settlement variations. (Paynter 
1982: 31) 
Through this shift in emphasis, researchers could apply models of 
regional analysis to areas not yet articulated into a market economy. 
In cases of weakly developed or nonexistent market economies, these 
scholars concentrated on other kinds of social structures that mediated 
political and economic relations between local communities. In order 
to maintain the spatial component of regional analysis, these structures 
had to not only be enduring but also form the nexus or nodal point of 
intersocietal linkages. For example, structures of alliances, systems of 
kinship, social hierarchies, and even religious activities occurred on a 
continuous or at least predictable basis and could thus be analyzed as 
mediating structures (Hodges 1988; Irwin and Kasarda 1994; Paynter 
1982; Smith 1985; Verdery 1976). 
Because initial colonial encounters often lacked developed markets, 
the identification and analysis of stable formations prove particularly 
useful for studying the interactions between the colonizer and the 
colonized. In the Southern Plains, the Comanches and the Hasinais 
constructed numerous alliances in order to secure access to the distri-
bution of firearms and horses. These alliances can be correlated with 
shifts in the locations of markets and/or supplies. Through an exam-
ination of alliances as a mediating structure dealing with colonialism, 
it is possible to gain a better understanding of the settlement locations 
and the strategies used by the Comanches and Hasinais to maintain 
access to critical commodities. 
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By itself, regional analysis is not a panacea for explicating the entire 
dialectic among local, regional, and global forces. It is, however, an ex-
cellent tool for illustrating and interpreting the systematic relationships 
between a social group's overt actions and its access to critical com-
modities. For example, this type of analysis illustrates the strategies 
used by the Comanches and Hasinais to increase their involvement 
in the circulation of high-demand commodities such as horses and 
firearms during Spain's occupation of the Southern Plains. 
Throughout this period, the accessibility of high-demand com-
modities remained competitive. Consequently, significant differences 
occurred in the level of access communities maintained over these com-
modities. Both the Comanches and Hasinais relied on alliances, spatial 
locations, and force to ensure themselves not only access but also in-
creasing control over the distribution of firearms and horses. Acting 
as conduits for the flow of commodities, alliances of the Comanches 
and the Hasinais linked territorially distinct communities, regions, and 
nations across space into exchange relations (Irwin and Kasarda 1994: 
342). Strategic changes in the locations of these two communities as 
well as the composition of their alliances correlated with the distribu-
tion of high-demand commodities. 
Previous Studies oflndigenous 
Exchanges, Settlements, and Alliances 
in the Southern Plains 
Numerous researchers have studied the factors controlling the social 
flow of resources between historic indigenous groups inhabiting the 
Plains. Until the publication of studies by Gold.frank (1945), Jablow 
(1950), Lewis (1942), and Secoy (1953), ecological paradigms pre-
vailed, and as a result, the environmental structuring of Native ex-
changes, alliances, and communities was emphasized (Lowie 1916, 
1954; Oliver 1962; Roe 1955; Spielman 1983). In a number of cases, 
critical commodities, such as firearms and horses, were represented 
as novel trade goods that benefited subsistence and elaborated earlier 
patterns of warfare and exchange (Lowie 1954; Oliver 1962). 
Jablow(1950), Secoy(1953), and Albers (1991, 1993) placed greater 
emphasis on the relationship between Euroamerican commodities 
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and the activities of historic Plains populations. Secoy centers his 
research on the political and economic importance historical com-
munities placed on high-demand goods, such as firearms and horses. 
According to Secoy (1953: 95), the successful attainment and incor-
poration of these two items transformed social activities within and 
between these communities. Secoy's recognition that Plains commu-
nities were not hermetically sealed artifacts led him to argue that 
the culture pattern approach is an ineffective tool for the investigation of 
those aspects of a given culture, which like the military technique pattern, 
actually have their most potent connections with the similar aspects of a 
number of other cultures, thus forming a multi-cultural system. (Secoy 
1953:95) 
Jablow adds to Secoy's research by discussing the actual strategies 
used by the Cheyennes between 1795 and 1840 to gain access to and 
control over guns and horses. In his approach, modified and elaborated 
later by Moore {1987), Jablow illustrates the ways in which a social 
group orients itself around a trading economy. As Foster notes in his 
introduction to Jablow's book: 
Intertribal and Indian-Euroamerican trade on the Plains was the dom-
inant context within which Native social organizations were ordered, 
enabling production, and exchange, alliance and warfare, centralized au-
thority and individual enterprise, in short all of the classic features that 
Euroamerican texts have reified as traditional Plains life or culture. (Foster 
1994: vi) 
Although Jablow's ability to explain the Cheyennes' internaliza-
tion ofEuroamerican contact revolutionized Plains scholarship, Albers 
{ 1991, 1993) pushed this research further by illustrating the systematic 
relationship between intersocietal relations and a community's produc-
tion needs. In particular, this market-based production institutional-
ized and structures the types of linkages between and within Native 
communities. 
According to Albers (1993: 102), "the specialized and surplus pro-
duction of goods for mercantile markets set into motion a chain 
of effects which had far-reaching repercussions on native political 
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economies." Albers claims that alliances "were based on a fundamen-
tal interdependence in the appropriation oflabor, land, and resources" 
(1993: 97). Production needs, which were based on the colonial econ-
omy, determined the structuring of these linkages. These alliances 
mediated through the establishment of kinship ties centered on either 
cooperation or symbiotic relations. Warfare and raiding occurred when 
two communities experienced competitive production needs. Conse-
quently, "war was a condition of total competition, and raiding was its 
principal exchange strategy" {Albers 1993: 122). 
Equating linkages with social strategies used by communities to gain 
access and control over land, labor, and high demand resources, Albers 
suggests: 
On one end were relations based on war where groups divided and com-
peted with one another over access to land, labor, and other resources. 
At the opposite end were relationships of merger where groups joined 
together and cooperated in the use of a shared resource base. Towards the 
middle were relationships built on symbiosis. Here groups were separated, 
but they maintained interdependence through a specialized division of 
labor and/or functionally differentiated positions in a wider circulation of 
commodities. (Albers 1993: 98) 
A local community's mode of production acted as the catalyst for the 
organization of these emergent connective formations. Consequently, 
the degree to which communities articulated with one another de-
pended on their level of competition. Social ties such as kinship, mil-
itary sodalities, or shared ritual practices served as the articulating 
medium. Albers manages to capture the dialectic between local and 
regional actions and to resist categorizing diverse modes of produc-
tion "into timeless essences, which are then allowed to ... 'articulate' 
with one another without reference to historical time or circumstance" 
(Wolf 1982: 401). 
According to Hall {1989: 99), the Comanches' displacement of 
the Apaches disrupted "inter-group relations and intensified fighting 
among all groups." In addition, Spanish demands for captives, as well 
as their retaliatory attacks against raiders, contributed to the increase in 
warfare. This occurred because "retaliations for the actions of a partic-
ular band were directed at entire 'nations,' ensuring further vengeance 
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raids" (Hall 1989: 99). A contributing factor was that "the trade in 
captives not only ensured further vengeance raids, but augmented the 
state policy of encouraging war among the "heathen nations" (Hall 
1989: 100-1). As a result, "The intensification of conflict increased 
the dependence of nomadic groups on European goods. This depen-
dence, in turn encouraged nomads to produce more buffalo products 
(primarily hides) and captives to trade for the now necessary goods" 
(Hall 1989: 95). 
More recently, Hamalainen (2001) explores the ways in which the 
Comanches manipulated the context in which intersocietal connec-
tions occurred. In particular, he illustrates the linkages between the 
Comanches' trade networks and their increasing movement into the 
hide and silver trade. Building on the works of these earlier scholars, 
this chapter illustrates the ways local groups reify their own internal 
transformations through shifts in alliances, locations, and the strategic 
use of force. 
To more clearly show the relationship between these variables, the 
Comanches and Hasinais are studied during three colonial periods. 
The first era begins with the construction of six Franciscan missions 
in east Texas in 1690 and ends with Spain's acquisition of Louisiana 
from the French in 1763. The period 1764 through 1810 marks the 
era of Spanish consolidation of power in the region. The last stage, 
1810-1821, begins with the Mexican Revolution and terminates with 
Mexico's independence from Spain. During this period, a reordering 
of established economic and political relations transpired. 
Alliances and Settlement Locations 
of the Comanches and the Hasinais 
From the beginning of the eighteenth century through independence 
of Mexico from Spain in 1821, Euroamerican populations in the 
Southern Plains remained small. Being distant from colonial centers 
of power, they were unable to fully replicate their countries' systems of 
production and distribution. In addition, a continual lack of funding 
and personnel in the colonial sector permitted the Comanches and the 
Hasinais to maintain a high level of autonomy in their relations with 
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the colonists. The presence of competitive Euroamerican powers in 
the region further ensured the sovereignty of these two communities. 
Comanches and Hasinais exploited these colonial weaknesses and 
became critical to the distribution of high-demand commodities. In-
creases in exchange opportunities during Spain's occupation of the 
Southern Plains not only affected the settlement patterns of the 
Comanches and the Hasinais but also conditioned the development of 
strategic alliances with neighboring polities. 
Through a series of alliances with Puebloan, colonial Spanish, and 
later the Taovayas, a Wichita community, the Comanches increased 
their level of access to and degree of control over high-demand commo-
dities. The Comanches' growing importance in the region's economic 
and political arena led various Apache groups to relocate elsewhere in 
the Southern Plains. The diaspora of Apache competitors aided the 
Comanches' continual expansion across the Southern Plains. 
For a number of reasons, the Hasinais could not compete with the 
Comanches' growing importance in the region's political economy. 
First of all, Spain and France's occupation of the eastern portion of 
the Southern Plains formed a wedge between the once unbroken ter-
ritories linking the Hasinais with their Kadohadacho relatives to the 
north. Second, the Hasinais' reliance on agriculture as a means of gen-
erating trade surpluses limited their participation in the increasingly 
important horse trade. Third, France's retreat from the area weakened 
the Hasinais' middleman status. Last, their devastation by epidemics 
and hostile neighbors caused them to retreat from the territory. Each 
of these factors contributed to the Hasinais' eventual marginalization 
in the region's political economy. 
Alliances and Locations of the Comanches, 
1690-1763 
Spanish officials in New Mexico first noted the existence of Comanches 
in the northwestern portion of the Southern Plains in 1706. Obser-
vations at this time suggest that the Comanches' movement into the 
region related to the presence ofEuroamerican commodities. Accord-
ing to the governor of New Mexico at that time, the Comanches, 
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in alliance with the Utes, were threatening Apaches north of New 
Mexico and residents of Taos Pueblo (Thomas 1935: 16, 61, 76; 
Hackett 1941, 3:382). 
Ignoring the fact that Taos served as a major center of exchange 
for the Apaches, the Utes and Comanches attempted to negotiate 
their own trade terms with the village's inhabitants between 1710 
and 1712 (Twitchell 1914, 2:269). Unable to reach an agreement, the 
Comanches and Utes began forcing the issue by raiding Taos and the 
surrounding settlements. Worried residents reported that these raiders 
regularly looked for weaknesses in the villages' defenses (Kavanagh 
1996: 63). Initially, Spanish leaders determined that 
war [should] be made against the Ute and Comanche because it is evident 
that for more than seven or eight years they have come to steal horses and 
rob herds and run away with the goods in the trade which this kingdom 
has with the Apaches of El Cuartelejo. Since they have committed three 
murders, the present is very opportune to make war upon them. (Thomas 
1935: 107) 
Retaliatory forays against the Comanches and Utes proved inef-
fectual, however. Invariably, the Spanish encountered abandoned en-
campments associated with these indigenous allies (Thomas 1935). 
As nomadic communities, the Comanches and the Utes could easily 
move when necessary. A French trader captured by the Spanish in 
17 40 noted that he had observed fifty or sixty villages of Comanches 
that were "scattered about caring for the many horses which they get 
from New Mexico" (Hackett 1941, 3:348). Two years later, another 
French captive of the Spanish mentioned that the Comanches resided 
in "many rancherias in different places, which according to the seasons, 
are moved from time to time in search of pasturage, wood, water, and 
buffalos" (Hackett 1941, 3:323). 
Comanches escalated their war against the Spanish between 17 40 
and 1750. During that decade, the Comanches killed over 150 residents 
at the pueblos of Pecos and Galisteo (Kessell 1979: 380; Lummis 
1898: 77, 127). By the 1740s, the Spanish noted that both hostile and 
peaceful factions of Comanches resided near Spanish settlements in 
New Mexico. Apparently, Comanches residing east of the settlements 
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at Pecos and Galisteo were hostile, while the ones located northeast of 
Taos engaged in peaceful trade {Kessell 1979: 380; Lummis 1898: 77, 
127). This is not necessarily a political separation. Rather, it reflects 
different Spanish relations with geographically dispersed Comanches. 
As Albers noted {1993: 108, 122), raiding served as an economic 
mechanism to distribute scarce resources. It also acted as mechanism 
of terrorism against recalcitrant communities reluctant to engaged in 
exchanges. Raiding worked for the Comanches. For example, during 
the 1720s, colonial administrators officially sanctioned trade fairs be-
tween the Comanches and the residents ofTaos, San Juan, and Pecos 
(Kavanagh 1996 ). Colonial leaders attempted to control these fairs 
by punishing traders who engaged in exchanges with the Comanches 
"before the time set for the regular trade" (Kavanagh 1996). Adminis-
trators also tried to gain a semblance of control over the merchandise 
traded at the fairs. In 1737, officials mandated that New Mexico's cit-
izens obtain government permission before ransoming non-Christian 
Natives from the Comanches (Olavide y Michelena 1737 in Kavanagh 
1996: 68). During the decade of violence between 17 40 and 1750, res-
idents ofTaos were threatened with the death penalty if they engaged 
in trade with the Comanches (Kessell 1979: 381). 
None of these sanctions worked, though. In 17 46, the Comanches 
were observed traveling in a large battle formation of no less than 
fifteen hundred individuals who were bent on making war on all na-
tions (Robles 1946: 78-79). According to one Spanish source, the 
Comanches received visits from the Jumanos (probably relatives of the 
Wichitas), the French, and even German traders, each of whom ex-
changed muskets, hatchets, glass beads, swords, and ammunition for 
bison hides, horses, and slaves (Hackett 1941, 3:323-24). Apparently 
the Comanches' peace negotiations with the Jumanos in the 1730s 
gained them access to the French (Hackett 1941, 3:303). It also may 
have resulted in the deep enmity that developed between the Utes and 
the Comanches. 
Spanish officials first recorded a breach between the Utes and the 
Comanches in the 1730s (Kavanagh 1996: 68). Though some Utes 
joined the Comanches in a small raid on Pecos Pueblo in 1750, by 
1761 Utes served as auxiliary troops during Spanish campaigns against 
the Comanches (Adams 1953: 218). The relationship between these 
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two communities remained hostile throughout the rest of the Spain's 
colonial era. 
Through murder and theft, the Comanches and the Utes succes-
sfully dislodged the Apaches from a favorable trade relationship with 
the Spanish. In addition to their persistent encroachment on the 
Apaches' trading relations with Taos, the Comanches and Utes also 
supplanted the Apaches in their settlements along the western portions 
of the Canadian and Arkansas Rivers (Thomas 1935: 128). Sixty years 
after the event, New Mexico's governor related that in the early 1720s 
the Comanches fought and won a nine-day battle with Apaches some-
where in northwestern Texas (Hackett 1934, 2:213). Soon after this 
battle, the Comanches, probably in concert with the Utes, successfully 
ejected the entire nation of Apaches residing along the Arkansas and 
Canadian Rivers. 
Admonished to keep alive the Comanches' hatred of the Apaches, 
lest the two form an alliance, the Spanish failed to intervene on behalf 
of the Apaches (Hackett 1934, 2:213-14; Wheat 1957, 1:94-116). 
Consequently, Mescalero and Lipan Apaches residing in eastern New 
Mexico fought a losing battle against the Comanches' territorial en-
croachments (Hackett 1934, 2:213-14). By 17 45, the Mescaleros, who 
once utilized the entire upper Rio Grande, had to finally withdraw to 
the southern extent of their range, near the mouth of the Pecos (Dunn 
1911 ). The Apaches' displacement allowed the Comanches to monop-
olize the headwaters of major rivers in the western Southern Plains. 
By occupying the headwaters, the Comanches constrained the level of 
access other communities maintained with the Pueblos. 
As soon as the Apaches began to retreat from their homelands, 
the Comanches expanded their territory. By 1743, officials in central 
Texas noted a substantial presence of Comanches in the area (Morfi 
1935, 2:294). Apparently this communityofComanches, as well as the 
groups residing in New Mexico, received firearms on a regular basis 
from French and Jumano traders (Thomas 1940: 14). According to 
New Mexico's governor in 1750, 
the trade that the French are developing with the Comanches by means 
of the Jumanes [sic], which in time will result in most serious injury to 
this province. Although the Cumanche [sic] nation carries on a like trade 
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with us, coming to the pueblo ofTaos, where they hold their fairs and 
trade in furs and in Indian slaves whom they take from various nations in 
their wars, and in horses, mares, mules, knives, large knives [belduques], 
and other trifles, always, whenever the occasion offers for stealing horses 
or attacking the pueblos of Pecos and Galisteo they do not fail to take 
advantage ofit. (Hackett 1941, 3:328) 
Critical to the success of the Comanches in displacing the Apaches 
and negotiating favorable trade terms with the Spanish includes 
the emergence of externally peaceful and hostile factions among the 
Comanches. Spanish authorities first mentioned hostile Comanches 
in Texas in 1757. During that year, the Comanches in concert with 
the eastern Caddoans and bands associated with the Taovayas de-
stroyed the San Saba mission (Castaneda 1936, 190; Weddle 1964: 
199). According to eyewitness accounts of the attack, firearms were so 
prevalent that "not one arrow was seen among the Indians" (Chipman 
1992: 161). 
Numerous items associated with the attackers were left at the scene 
(Weddle 1964: 199). Presumably, the public destruction of San Saba 
related to the fact that the mission was constructed for Lipan Apaches. 
In all probability, the Comanches involved in the raid were associated 
with the Cuchanec division of Comanches. During the 1780s, Spanish 
documents regularly mention the Cuchanecs (Kavanagh 1996 ). 
Whether Comanches in New Mexico engaged in trading activities with 
their relatives in Texas is unknown at this time, but there are some tan-
talizing hints that suggest this may have been the case. For example, 
within a year of the attack on the mission, officials in New Mexico 
mistakenly identified Caddoan groups as polities associated with 
the Comanches (Kavanagh 1996). According to the governor of 
New Mexico in the 1750s, the "Comanches traded buffalo hides to 
the French through the Taovayas for guns, powder, ammunition, and 
offensive weapons" (Marin 1758 in Thomas 1940: 83). 
Since the Comanches in New Mexico and Texas shared a common 
ally among the Taovayas, they probably engaged in reciprocal trades 
during the 1750s. A trading alliance between the western and east-
ern factions of the Comanches would be beneficial not only to the 
Comanches but in some cases to the Spanish as well. This is due to 
the fact that the Spanish instituted trade barriers in the Southern 
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Plains that necessitated incredibly circuitous routes to transport sup-
plies between colonies in Texas and New Mexico. For example, in 
order to travel from Santa Fe to San Antonio, a colonist had to me-
ander through Saltillo, Chihuahua, and El Paso, Texas, a distance of 
seventeen hundred miles. Comanches trading across space through 
the territory of their common Taovaya allies could conceivably cut this 
distance by seven hundred miles {Loomis and Nasatir 1967: 262). 
Even after the Osages displaced the settlements of the Taovayas 
from the Arkansas River in the 1750s, the Taovayas remained pivotal 
to the Comanches' trading patterns. Relocated on the Red River, these 
communities continued to serve as a trading connection for the eastern 
and western Comanches. Spanish officials regularly reported on the 
large volume of goods flowing through the settlements ofTaovayas on 
the Red River {Bolton 1914, 2:201-4). 
The concentration of commercial activities in the Taovayas' re-
gion served as an excellent area of neutral exchange (Burghardt 1971; 
John 1975). These villages also acted as the westernmost depot for 
French traders. During the next few decades, however, changes in 
Spanish policy and the Comanches' political organization permitted 
the Comanches to circumvent the Taovayas. 
Alliances and Locations of the Comanches, 
1764-1810 
After France's retreat from Louisiana in 1763, the Comanches' trading 
and raiding activities in New Mexico and Texas intensified. New mar-
ket outlets developed north of the Arkansas River, and communities 
in Louisiana continued to import livestock. In 1768, the British may 
have traded seventeen horseloads of firearms to Comanches visiting the 
Taovayas (Kavanagh 1996: 79). A year later, well-armed Comanches 
raided the· pueblos of Picuris and Pecos (Adams and Chavez 1956: 
92). In 1773, Comanches committed a series of devastating raids on 
Spanish-controlled villages in the upper Rio Grande region. During 
that year, the Comanches orchestrated a large attack on Pecos and 
Albuquerque, five smaller raids on Picuris, and four others on Galisteo 
(Thomas 1940: 44). By 1775, Spanish authorities bitterly complained 
that the colonies no longer owned enough horses to pursue the raiders 
(Thomas 1940: 180-84). 
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During this same period in Texas, Comanches, often in alliance with 
the Taovayas, constantly raided ranches, missions, and even presidios. 
In the meantime, other communities of Comanches peacefully ex-
changed captives, horses, salt, and hide with residents at Taos (Thomas 
1940: 169-72). One missionary observed in 1776 that "when the 
Comanches are at peace and come to trade, they bring a thousand or 
more animals" (Adams and Chavez 1956: 111; Kavanagh 1996: 127). 
The intensification of the Comanches' raiding during this period 
probably related to the end of French sovereignty in Louisiana. Spain's 
unwillingness to stabilize the area with an infusion of financial aid al-
lowed the influx of numerous British traders. It also permitted remnant 
French merchants to increase their smuggling activities with impunity. 
This period is replete with court cases against individuals involved in 
smuggling (Hall 1989; Kavanagh 1996). 
At this time the Spanish knew little about the Comanches. Officials 
estimated that the fifteen hundred Comanches residing in the vicinity 
of New Mexico were organized into three communities: Yamparicas, 
Jupes, and Cuchanecs (Thomas 1940: 201). Less was known about 
the Comanches in Texas. One official commented that approximately 
five thousand Comanches resided north of San Antonio (Kavanagh 
1996). Texan leaders also observed the Comanches were "the most 
populous, modest, and valiant" of the tribes on the borders, but their 
"great propensity to steal" masked those virtues (Kavanagh 1996: 91). 
In 1773, Texas colonists attempted to regulate their relationship 
with the Comanches through a treaty. For this purpose, they hired 
a French former trader, who tried to establish contact with the 
Comanches residing on the Red River. Recognizing the danger of 
this treaty to their own position, the Taovayas would not let the en-
voy travel beyond their villages. Though ultimately unsuccessful, the 
French diplomat managed to convey Spain's desire for peace to a num-
ber of Comanches visiting the Taovayas. It was also documented that 
the Comanches lived equidistant from Santa Fe and the Taovayas, 
somewhere near Palo Duro Canyon on the Red River (Bolton 1914, 
2:94-95). At this time, the Spanish recognized four divisions of 
Comanches (Bolton 1914, 2:94-95): 
theJupes and Yamparicas extending from the Rio Napestle [Arkansas] to 
the north a little beyond the Sierra de Almagre ... The Cuchanecs extend 
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from the cited river south as far as the Colorado which is distant a few 
days from New Mexico. Both are separated on the east ... from another 
group of Cuchanecs living in the direction of the Jumanos or Taguayaces 
[Taovayas]. (Governor Anza, quoted in Thomas 1932: 295) . 
Apparently the last group of Cuchanecs mentioned resided above the 
Red River and the head of the Brazos River (Kavanagh 1996: 108). 
During the 1770s, the Comanches' alliance with the Taovayas, as 
well as other Caddoan communities further east, began to unravel 
(Bolton 1914, 1:210). This may have resulted from the Taovayas' di-
minishing importance to Spanish diplomacy. Weakened by an epi-
demic in 1777, the Taovayas could no longer protect themselves from 
the Osages' debilitating attacks {Bolton 1914, 2:203, 231 ). Though the 
Taovayas' trade in agricultural products continued, after 1780 they 
no longer received artifically high prices promised in the treaty of 
1771 (Kinnaird 1946, 2:390-91). Consequently, the Comanches' terms 
for trade became less and less favorable. As a matter of fact, by the 
1780s, the Taovayas were beseeching the Spanish to help protect 
them from the predatory Comanches (Cabello 1785). Presumably the 
Comanches' animus toward the Taovayas related to the latter commu-
nity's proclivity to garner guns from New Orleans, Illinois, and various 
western Apaches. 
Apparently the Yamparica division took control of the middleman 
role once held by the Taovayas. According to one colonial official: 
The trade and interest that some rancherias have with others is that 
the Eastern Comanche take horses which they acquire in their wars and 
rapines to the rancherias of the Western Comanches who are known by 
the name ofYamberika [sic], who barter for guns, powder, balls, lances, 
cloth, jars, knives, etc, which the Western Indians acquire .... Intervening 
also is the trade in buffalo hides with and without hair, which benefits 
them and they prepare very well. (Kavanagh 1996: 107) 
As the most powerful indigenous community in the Southern Plains 
during Spain's colonial era, the Comanches were always being asked 
by the Spanish to formalize diplomatic relations with them. In 1787, 
the Spanish offered a peace treaty to the Comanches that required 
few concessions on the signatories' part. Basically, the Spanish wanted 
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to integrate the Comanches' trading network into the region. This 
must have seemed presumptuous to the Comanches, as they had a far 
more extensive trade network than the Spanish. According to a report 
written in 1785: 
The Eastern Comanches have as friends the Taovayas and Wichitas, and 
are also found among the Tawakonis, Yscanis [eastern Caddoans], and 
Flechazos, but not so much among the others .... Their arms are arrows, 
lances, and some guns and ammunition provided by the Taovayas and 
Wichitas, who also provide them to the Yambericas [sic], who also get 
them from the nations known as Kansas, Guaxes, and Guitavoiratas who 
are situated north, and who in turn are provided by the traders who come 
from New Orleans and Illinois, and who are installed along the Missouri 
River. (Vial and Chavez 1785 in Loomis and Nasatir 1967: 83). 
Trading opportunities with merchants from New Orleans and 
Illinois increased dramatically during the latter half of the eighteenth 
century. During the 1770s, administrators in Louisiana commented on 
the region's desperate need for horses as a means of transport {Hackett 
1941, 3:466-6 7). Apparently the yearly need to transport lumber and 
eighty thousand sugar casks to Havana led to this request. As one 
observer in Louisiana noted: 
a spirit of foreign intercourse was diffused among all classes of people; 
exertions were made to prepare raw materials for the West India and 
other markets ... The articles of export were sugar, cotton, indigo, rice, 
furs, and peltry, lumber, tar, pitch, cattle, horses, lead, flour, beef and port. 
(Stoddard 1812: 295-96} 
Louisiana's expanding European, African, and Native populations 
during the latter half of the 1700s also increased the region's demand 
for horses. Between 1769 and 1798, the area's population increased by 
14,500 individuals (Martin 1822: 206,240, 300). Eastern Caddoans 
complained that "there was a well worn trail leading from the 
Comanches to Natchitoches" (Hatcher 1919: 52). In addition, the 
Kadohadachos angrily noted "that the traffic between the Comanches 
and traders from the interior continues without interruption, and that 
arms, munitions, and other war supplies are being brought in" (Hackett 
1941, 3:239). 
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Trade with communities north of the Arkansas River also steadily 
increased in importance throughout the eighteenth century. By 1785, 
enough horses had been traded north that the governor of Louisiana 
was able to state that "all the wealth of the Indians on the Missouri 
consists in having many horses" (Bolton 1905: 104). The Comanches' 
patterns of alliance and settlements shifted as trade in the area in-
creased. 
New opportunities in New Orleans, as well as north of the Arkansas 
River, precipitated the Comanches' movement east. Throughout this 
period, Yamparica and eastern Cuchanec communities controlled the 
headwaters of the Canadian, Red, and Brazos Rivers (Kavanagh 1996: 
136-37). Increasing their involvement in these exchanges led to the 
Comanches' peace agreement with the Kiowas and the Yamparicas' 
relocation to the Colorado River's confluence with the Concho River 
between 1790 and 1806 (Mooney 1898: 164; Battey 1968: 90; 
Kavanagh 1996: 145). 
Spanish authorities in the Southern Plains lacked the necessary 
resources to combat the Comanches' growing involvement in the re-
gions political economy. Spain's weakened economic role in Europe 
contributed to the colonies' lack of quality imports and the necessary 
finances to develop local industries, much less protect them. In addi-
tion, after the United States took possession of Louisiana in 1803, for-
eign merchants immediately established trading posts in eastern Texas. 
Horses became critical to these settlements. As one trader commented, 
"The trade of this nation [Comanches] is Horses, Mules, dress'd buf-
falo skins and Silver ore .... They [ Comanches] seem indifferent about 
those common articles of finery" (Abel 1922: 76-82). 
As trading opportunities increased, the eastern Cuchanecs and the 
Yamparicas fine-tuned their raiding and trading strategies. Cuchanec 
communities professed their friendship with the Spanish, while 
Yamparicas engaged in "little robberies and extortions" (Cordero 
1806). Throughout Mexico's war with Spain, the Yamparicas con-
tinuously raided Spanish settlements and ranches in Texas and north-
ern Mexico. According to Spanish sources, the Yamparicas robbed 
from the Spanish in order "to trade with the Americans, who were 
established on the Colorado" (Kavanagh 1996: 155). One American 
merchant based at Natchitoches during this era commented that the 
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Yamparicas lived at the headwaters of the Colorado but extended their 
range to the tributary streams of the Rio Grande (Wallace 1954: 123). 
This individual also stated that the "Yamparacks [sic] are most honest 
and punctilious in their dealings, and much less addicted to thievery" 
(Wallace 1954: 123). 
The Yamparicas' political and economic distancing from the Spanish 
during Mexico's fight for independence allowed them to maneuver 
into a trading niche with the Americans. Their political astuteness 
concerning the benefits of an American alliance rather than a Spanish 
one allowed them to maintain an important role in the trade networks 
in the Southern Plains during the nineteenth century. 
Hasinai Alliances and Settlements, 1689-17 63 
The already developed exchange systems among the Hasinais flour-
ished during Spain and France's colonial presence in the region. 
Wedged between two competing nations, the Hasinais played a pivotal 
role in colonial trading ventures. Residing in dispersed agricultural vil-
lages, these settlements maintained loose connections with each other 
through their political system. With an estimated population of 4,500 
in the early 1700s, the Hasinais formed the largest eastern Caddoan 
group (Swanton 1942: 12). They encompassed all of the villages along 
the upper reaches of the Neches and Angelina Rivers. According to an 
early missionary in east Texas, Hasinai territory "extends for a distance 
of more than one hundred leagues in each of the principal directions. 
To the northward it reaches as far as the bands of the Missouri River 
which flows into the River of the Palisades [Mississippi]" (Tanner 
1974: 20). 
Because the Hasinais resided in Spain's colonial territory, they faced 
continual pressures to live in missions and desist from participation in 
intercolonial trade. Neither of these policies proved successful, how-
ever. Spain's first wave of missions lost credibility as epidemics flour-
ished (Gilmore 1973: 58). Spain's failure to concentrate the Hasinais 
into missions was matched by the government's inability to control 
smuggling in the area. Aided by their proximity to overland routes be-
tween colonial and indigenous settlements in French and Spanish ter-
ritories, the Hasinais maintained an important role in early smuggling 
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activities. By provisioning the French with corn, horses, mules, and 
slaves, they received firearms, metal tools, and textiles (Bridges and 
De Ville 1967: 255; Perttula 1992: 221). 
Every fall the Hasinais sponsored a large trading fair near the head-
waters of the Guadalupe River (Hackett 1931, 1:138-39). This annual 
event acted as a conduit for Spanish horses flowing east and French 
weaponry, textiles, and nonessentials moving west (Bolton 1987: 125, 
126-27). Eyewitness accounts of a fair held in the late 1600s noted 
the exchange of numerous items, including horses, red ochre, deer 
skins, Osage orange, salt, and European commodities (Wyckoff and 
Baugh 1980: 229; Bolton 1987: 127). Apparently the Hasinais im-
ported horses, slaves, and mules from the Bidais, a Caddoan com-
munity that resided on the lower Trinity River (John 1975: 279). 
According to a French trader from that era, the Hasinais traded guns 
to the Bidais, who in turn supplied the Apaches. Using these firearms, 
the Apaches raided horses and mules from Spanish concerns (Bolton 
1914, 2:128, 305). 
Alliances with nomadic communities permitted the more sedentary 
Hasinais to participate in the horse trade without interrupting their 
agricultural cycle. The most successful and enduring alliances of this 
type occurred between closely related groups. Consequently, except for 
periodic alliances with the Lipan Apaches, the Hasinais maintained 
their strongest connections with Caddoan relatives to the north, south, 
and west. 
Competition over the flow of European commodities led the 
Hasinais into combat against the Tawakonis and Kichais in 1715 
(Penicault 1953:153-57). At the same time, the Hasinais were con-
stantly battling with the Lipan Apaches over bison hunting grounds 
(Bolton 1987: 103). Because of the Hasinais' access to French guns, 
they won these skirmishes. 
Spanish officials attempted to stop smuggling in the area by relo-
cating coastal populations into missions as well as patrolling the lower 
reaches of rivers in east Texas. Lacking the necessary funds or personnel 
to protect their borders, however, these efforts proved ineffective. In 
17 46, one Spanish official noted that all the adult male Hasinais owned 
guns, which they had received from the French (Kinnaird 1949, 3:281). 
By the late 17 40s, the French noted that the Hasinais "would join them 
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in a moment and serve them constantly and faithfully" (Smith 1995: 
52). 
In 1750, irritated by Spain's refusal to trade firearms, the Hasinais 
told Spanish authorities that they were "ready to take up arms against 
the Spaniards in favor of the French" (Folmer 1953: 245-46). Out-
numbered and outgunned, the Spanish governor assured the Hasinais 
that their trade with the French would not be disrupted (Elam 1971: 
98-104). In addition, the governor licensed two Spanish settlers to 
import French firearms for the Hasinais. 
Though colonial concessions by the governor ruined his career, the 
Hasinais might have decimated local Spanish settlements had he re-
fused (John 1975: 379). Essentially, the Spanish occupied east Texas at 
the pleasure of the Hasinais and their French allies (Griffith 1954: 139). 
As a matter of fact, during the 1750s, French diplomats proposed that 
the Hasinais ally with the Apaches and encircle the Spanish (Griffith 
1954: 141). 
After France's retreat from Louisiana, the Hasinais' political and 
economic importance in the region diminished. Though smuggling 
still remained important, changes in the location of established trade 
routes shifted them away from the Hasinais' territories. 
Alliances and Locations of the Hasinais, 
1764-1821 
British and American traders expanded their trading activities in 
Louisiana after France's retreat from the region. Though some of these 
entrepreneurs operated on a sporadic basis from the Texas Gulf Coast, 
most chose to locate closer to the Kadohadachos. This northern shift 
in trade routes diminished the Hasinais' access to Euroamerican com-
modities. Predictably, the Hasinais tried to ally themselves more closely 
with the Spanish. 
As part of the strategy, the Hasinais, in competition with the 
Kadohadachos, attempted to negotiate a peace between the Spanish 
and the Wichitas in 1770. Within a year, Bigotes, the Hasinais' leader 
during these negotiations, presented the Spanish at Natchitoches with 
evidence of his success. For that purpose, the Wichitas and Kichais, 
both past trading partners of the Hasinais, gave Bigotes two bison 
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hides: a white one to signify that the roads were open and free from 
blood and one with four crosses painted on it to designate the number 
of tribes ready to make peace (Bolton 1914, 1:264-65). The grateful 
Spanish responded by recognizing Bigotes as the head chief of the 
Hasinais and renaming him Sauto (Smith 1995: 70). 
Beyond providing Bigotes with a royal medal, the Spanish did little 
else. Chronically underfunded, the Spanish could offer only limited 
help to indigenous communities. Consequently, the Hasinais no longer 
imported enough trade goods to supply their allies, the Bidais. At the 
instigation of the Bidais, the Hasinais negotiated an alliance with the 
Lipan Apaches in 1771 (Bolton 1914, 1:265-67). Presumably this 
would provide them with a secure source of livestock, which could 
then be bartered for firearms from traders in Louisiana and further 
north. 
Spanish administrators responded to this event with deadly swift-
ness. Basically, colonial officials threatened to tell the Comanches that 
their enemies, the Lipan Apaches, were receiving firearms from the 
Hasinais. Fearing the Comanches more than the Lipans, the Hasinais 
rejected an alliance with the Lipans. Instead, Bigotes murdered four 
of the seven Apaches attending the ceremony celebrating the alliance's 
ratification (Bolton 1914, 1:269-70). 
With the Lipans vowing revenge, the Hasinais were dismayed when 
the Spanish abandoned their settlements, presidios, and missions in 
east Texas in 1773 (Bolton 1915: 387, 391). Fortunately, the Spanish 
government permitted Spaniards to reoccupy the region within a year 
(Smith 1995: 73). Although the Hasinais were briefly helped by this 
decision, an epidemic devastated them in 1777. At this time, Bigotes 
along with many other leaders, died. The Hasinais weakened posi-
tion may have precipitated the Lipans' renewed efforts to negotiate an 
alliance (Bolton 1914, 2:230). 
In 1779, severe floods caused the Spanish to relocate their main town 
in the region to Nacogdoches, a village in the heart of the Hasinais' 
territory (Bolton 1915: 418-40). Initially, the Spanish did not provi-
sion the town with trade goods or traders. Predictably, the Hasinais 
cemented another alliance with the Lipans in 1782. To commemorate 
this event, the Apaches traded a thousand horses to the Tonkawas, 
Hasinais, and Bidais for 270 firearms (John 1975: 635-36). 
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Spanish administrators responded by establishing a trading post at 
Nacogdoches in 1783 (Kinnaird 1946, 3:80-85). They also threatened 
to discontinue the distribution of annual gifts if the Hasinais persisted 
in associating with the Lipans (Smith 1995: 81). By 1786, the Hasinais 
officially ended their relationship with the Lipans (Smith 1995: 81). 
Because debt plagued the licensed trader at Nacogdoches, he failed 
to import any supplies for the Hasinais in 1789 or 1790 (Kinnaird 1946, 
3:256, 301-3). In response some Hasinais left the area, and visits to 
the trading post decreased (Smith 1995: 93). Like the Yamparicas, the 
Hasinais transferred their alliance from the Spanish to the Americans 
(Haggard 1945: 46). In 1806, the Americans at Natchitoches estab-
lished an official trading factory. A year later, the settlement's American 
agent hosted the Hasinais. During this event, he noted that the 
boundary between the Spanish and Americans remained vague. Con-
sequently, he determined that all Native nations could trade at 
Natchitoches regardless of their location (Abel 1922: 48-60}. 
Devastated again by a series of epidemics in the early 1800s, the 
Hasinais concentrated into three villages (Smith 1995: 86). As their 
population decreased and the Americans relied more on other com-
munities for trade, the Hasinais became increasingly marginal to the 
region's political economy. 
Locations and Alliances of the Hasinais, 
1764-1821 
Initially, the Hasinais survived the final decade of Spanish rule through 
their coastal connections and their alliance with the Tawakonis. 
Additional aid resulted from the Hasinais' close proximity to the 
Nacogdoches trading post. Concerned about the intentions of the 
Americans and insurgents, Spanish administrators provided more 
funding to Nacogdoches during its final decade of colonial control 
(Magnaghi 1978: 170; 1981: 420}. 
Unfortunately, external circumstances kept the Hasinais from 
strengthening their position in local trade networks. During this pe-
riod, the Tonkawas expanded their territory further south and success-
fully subjugated the Hasinais' coastal allies. No longer connected to the 
Bidais, the Hasinais could not maintain their area ofinfluence. By the 
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final decade of Spain's colonial presence in the region, the Hasinais had 
become completely connected to the fortunes of the Kadohadachos. 
By 1816, at least two thousand Cherokees had emigrated into the 
Kadohadochos' region (Carter 1951, 15:121). The founding of the 
Sulphur Fork Factory trading post by the Americans attracted even 
more migrants into the community. The Kadohadachos soon be-
came outnumbered by the numerous Choctaws, Delawares, Creeks, 
Shawnees, and Cherokees in the region (Fowler 1817). By 1835, the 
Kadohadachos along with the Hasinais had sold their lands to the 
United States and relocated in Oklahoma (Smith 1995: 122). 
Summary of the Historical Experiences 
of the Comanches and the Hasinais 
Hampered by shortsighted policies, Spanish colonists never attained 
control over the distribution of high-demand commodities, such as 
firearms and horses. Instead, the Comanches and Hasinais maintained 
an important role in the exchange of these items. This occurred through 
their development of strategic alliances. In order to understand the 
strategies of these two communities it is necessary 
to view the interaction process as an integrated phenomenon, composed 
not only of the usual mass and distance effects, but also of the elements 
of accessibility and competitiveness in Hows. (Fike and Mulligan 1990: 
527) 
By the late 1700s, the Comanches, initially marginal to these sys-
tems of exchange, became critical to them. Apparently their nomadic 
propensity allowed the Comanches to direct the flow of commodities 
through the region. Since horses served as both a mode of transporta-
tion and a highly valued commodity, these 
new technologies allow the emergence of a space of flows, substituting 
from a space of places, whose meaning is largely determined by their 
position in a network of exchanges. (Castells 1985: 33) 
This fact proved critical to the Comanches' success in the Southern 
Plains trade. No longer did the fixed markets of the Pueblos render 
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the Comanches dependent. Instead, their increased mobility permitted 
them to control the circulation of commodities through the removal 
of competitors, raiding, long-distance alliances, a dispersed pattern of 
settlement, and the ability to control a moveable resource, which they 
could deliver. 
By the 1720s, the Comanches had displaced the Apaches from the 
Canadian and Arkansas Rivers. This was followed by the retreat of 
the Mescaleros from the upper Rio Grande in the 17 40s. Because of 
the Apaches' forced retreat from the periphery of the Pueblos, the 
Comanches managed to monopolize the headwaters of the Canadian 
River, upper Rio Grande, and Arkansas River by the 17 40s. 
From this new location the Comanches successfully controlled trad-
ing routes on the eastern boundaries of the Pueblos. This allowed them 
greater flexibility for regulating the flow of commodities to and from 
the eastern Pueblos. The strategies used by the Comanches to maintain 
control over the distribution patterns of high-demand items alternated 
between peaceful and hostile negotiations. The Spanish exerted very 
little influence in this matter. 
As opportunities increased in east Texas, Comanches began to 
expand into central Texas. Whether this migration precipitated or 
even represented the emergence of a separate political community is 
presently unclear. These recent migrants definitely impacted the cir-
culation patterns of commodities in the area, however. 
Initially, communities associated with the Taovayas blocked the 
Comanches from direct access to commodities originating in the east. 
Wedged between the advancing Comanches and Osages, however, the 
Taovayas began to migrate south. Weakened further by disease and the 
collapse of the Hasinais, the Taovayas became increasingly marginal 
to trading alliances. This in turn allowed the Comanches to continue 
expanding east. By the late 1700s, the Comanches were obtaining 
firearms from the north and east, and horses from the south. 
The Hasinais initially thrived due to France's establishment of fixed 
trading posts in their region. Their reliance on French alliances for 
commodity access eventually proved disastrous, however, particularly 
since events outside their control led to fluctuations in the availabil-
ity of critical commodities. Shifts in the distribution of these items 
reverberated through the exchange networks of the Hasinais. 
90 THREE NATIONS, ONE PLACE 
Tied to an agricultural strategy of subsistence, the Hasinais could 
not seek out new markets or raid for necessary items. In addition, 
the devastating impact of epidemics proved more disastrous for the 
sedentary Hasinais than for their nomadic relatives. 
Between 1812 and 1821, the Comanches intensified their raiding 
activities in central and east Texas. Consequently, many land grants 
around N acogdoches were abandoned during this period (Jackson 
1986: 135). By the end of Spain's colonial reign, the Hasinais had 
become irrelevant to local exchange networks. The Comanches con-
tinued to increase their sphere of influence, however. 
As regional analysis shows, indigenous alliances linked themselves 
to as many colonial sources as possible. In addition, these alliances tried 
to incorporate both nomadic and more sedentary members. Though 
the Spanish demanded an exclusive relationship with their allies, they 
did not have the force to back up the demand, particularly toward a 
nomadic community. The Comanches' nomadic pattern of settlement 
and fluid social organization allowed them to circumvent Spanish pres-
sures. 
Generally, the Hasinais allied with the colonial power that pro-
vided the most trade goods. Until 1763, the Hasinais allied with the 
French and tolerated the Spanish. Alliances in the Southern Plains re-
mained opportunistic and situational. As the Comanches and Hasinais 
illustrate, a community's control over the access and distribution of 
high-demand commodities occurred through strategic political deci-
sions concerning alliances, not shifts in production or the intercession 
of Euroamerican planners. 
6 
SoclAL HISTORY 
Many accounts of colonialism produced in the last thirty years have 
emphasized the shared histories of the colonized and colonizer. If the 
histories of these two populations become divorced and that of the col-
onizers is given primacy as a socially transformative mechanism, then 
the process of colonialism is seen "above all as a coherent imposition, 
rather than a practically mediated relation" (Thomas 1994: 3). When 
this happens, ethnographic representations situated in a larger regional 
or global arena unfold with the neatness of a Cartesian model of society. 
Invariably, this creates a bizarre dualism between local activities and 
regional and global realities. The colonized are perceived as chronically 
static in reaction to the constraints imposed by the colonizers. 
A number of scholars studying colonial encounters in the Southern 
Plains attempted to overcome this shortcoming by focusing instead on 
the ways marginalized communities mediate their own interpretations 
and relations with colonial realities {Anderson 1999; La Vere 1993, 
2000; Foster 1991; Fowler 1982, 1987; Hall 1989, 2000; Hamalainen 
2001). By conceptualizing interactions as a mediated process, these 
scholars illustrate how structures of these encounters were continuously 
constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed. As Fowler's research 
with the Arapahos and Gros Ventres illustrates, 
an approach that emphasizes the powerlessness of Indian people-the 
political economy oflndian-white relationships-and overlooks the ways 
the exploited population interprets and reacts to those relations distorts 
the process by which Native American societies change. (Fowler 1987: 9) 
Through localizing the histories of the Cheyennes and Gros 
Ventres, Fowler explicates the role symbols play in the construc-
tion of a community: "Symbols emerged that worked to revitalize 
or reassert traditional values and relationships, yet at the same time 
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reassured whites" (Fowler 1982: 5). With their meaning often con-
tested, these symbols served as expressive representations of a commu-
nity. They also created a link with the past. This connection, frequently 
conceptualized as an "invented tradition," institutes an illusion of its 
immutability in the contemporary community {Hobsbawm 1983). Be-
cause of the elasticity of the symbols' content, however, their meaning 
is continuously transformed. Consequently, they endure while ener-
gizing a community's internal and external relations. 
Using a "micro-sociological scale," Foster (1991: 19) endeavors to 
illustrate "how individual members of a community construct their 
identities and relations with one another in such a way as to constitute 
a shared social and moral unit." Focusing on the Comanches, Foster 
moves beyond recapitulation of the political and economic dominance 
of Euroamericans. Rather than perceiving Comanches as a reflection 
of colonialism, he illustrates their own strategies of organization and 
maintenance {Foster 1991: 30). This, in turn, permits the recognition 
of "the interactional conventions used by Comanches to order their 
social world" (Foster 1991: 74). 
The approaches of Fowler and Foster are two innovative strategies 
available for elucidating the processual nature of nature of colonial 
encounters. By focusing on the political economy of the Hasinais and 
the Comanches during Spain's occupation of the Southern Plains, this 
chapter attempts to explore this process further. 
The Processual Nature ofFireanns and Horses 
Throughout Spain's colonial presence in the Southern Plains, firearms 
and horses remained a constant element of local interactions. Indige-
nous demand for scarce Euroamerican manufactures such as metals, 
textiles, and weaponry intensified throughout the colonial era. As one 
Spanish missionary visiting Taos in the early 1700s observed: 
Here the governor, alcaldes and lieutenants gather together as many 
horses as they can; here is collected all the ironwork possible, such as 
axes, hoes, wedges, picks, bridles, machetes, belduques [large knives], 
and knives ... for trade and barter with these barbarians in exchange for 
deer and buffalo hides, and for Indian slaves, men and women, small and 
large, a great multitude of both sexes. (Hackettt 1941, 3:486-87) 
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High-demand commodities remained scarce throughout the colo-
nial era, however. Along with the inability of colonists to meet the 
growing demand for manufactured items, these powers also favored 
some indigenous groups over others. As a result of scarcity and colo-
nial policies privileging some local communities over others, some 
indigenous communities "came to be identified, named, and classified 
as welcome participants in the wider systems, where other groups were 
stigmatized, consigned to the dustbin of backwardness" (Cooper and 
Stoler 1989). 
These two factors along with colonial attempts to expand or con-
tract their alliances with local communities are the primary agents con-
tributing to the instability of the Southern Plains political economy. 
Rarely working in concert, colonial administrators failed to develop a 
comprehensive plan to determine which Native communities tone-
gotiate favorable relations of trade. For example, initially the Spanish 
in New Mexico experienced favorable trade accords with the Lipans. 
Within two decades of the Comanches' arrival in the region, the 
Spanish retracted their friendship with the Lipans. Officials in Texas 
waited another two decades before following suit. 
The Spanish ignored their role in the marginalization of the Lipans 
because "the regnant ideology assumes the equality of all participants 
in the market, in the face ofbasic distinctions in political and economic 
power" (Wolf 1982: 189). Typifying this attitude is a report from New 
Mexico's governor in 1778: 
The perfidy of the Lipanes is exposed, and the necessity to divide and con-
found that nation, whose wisdom, rapicity and industry are always dismal 
and indecorous to the progress of the arms of the king and tranquility of 
these possessions. (Wallace and Vigness 1960: 24-25) 
This assumption eased the emergence of a colonial policy that would 
ultimately led to the near extinction of the Lipans. Through the threat 
of force and an increasingly strategic alliance with the Comanches, the 
Spanish began circumventing the Lipans' attempts to acquire firearms. 
In 1784, the colonial policy toward the Lipans had spread east into 
central Texas. In one statement, a colonial official managed not only 
to notify the Comanches about the conditions for successful trading 
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relations but also to verify the diminishing status of the Lipans. During 
that year, one Spanish official warned the Comanches that 
if they want to be my friends, and friends of the Spaniards, I will promise 
not to kill them, and to stop sending my soldiers, those who make war on 
them. And if they want to come to San Antonio to talk to me, I will give 
them my hand in advance, like friends, as also they would be to the other 
nations who are my friends, except the Lipan and Apaches, with whom 
I do not want anyone to be friends, but to make continual war against 
them. (Kavanagh 1996: 99) 
Maintaining this stance required colonial officials to devise a "be-
havioral grammar" that served as a "social idiom standardizing inter-
action'' (Wolf 1966: 20). Consequently, allies such as the Comanches 
and Hasinais were provided with a variety of colonial emblems, includ-
ing flags, banners, and staffs (Ewers 1974; John 1975). In addition, 
Spanish negotiators employed the calumet to incorporate themselves 
into fictive kin networks. De Mezieres went so far as to imbue his 
skin with particular clan tattoos in order to establish a personalized 
relationship with the Hasinais (Mills 1985: 5). 
Closer ties with the Spanish affected the Comanches and Hasinais 
differently. For the Comanches, their ascendancy as favored allies of the 
Spanish and their concomitant ability to participate in the exchange 
of firearms and horses contributed to their increasingly important role 
in the region's political economy. The closer ties between the Spanish 
and the Comanches diminished the importance of the Hasinais in 
exchanges of Euroamerican commodities, however. Though these two 
communities followed differing trajectories, they were both faced with 
political and economic uncertainty. 
The developing colonial trade in horses and firearms was embedded 
in shifts in market demand, resource distribution, and capital invest-
ments. As participants in a larger social arena, neither community had 
the ability to control the availability or allocation of firearms and horses. 
This conundrum, as well as the very nature of these high-demand 
commodities, challenged a local community's patterns of settlement, 
production, and social reproduction. As illustrated by the Comanches 
and Hasinais, this challenge was met in unique ways at the local level. 
In the Comanches' case, mobility increased, bison hunting probably 
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decreased, and more opportunities for exchange developed. Among the 
Hasinais agricultural production intensified, bison hunting increased, 
and opportunities for exchange decreased. 
These changes transformed the internal political economy of each 
community. Specifically, they altered the local allocation of power and 
prestige. In each of these populations, the attainment of power and 
prestige was linked to the degree of control a community or individual 
maintained over the circulation of high-demand commodities. The 
increased availability of firearms among the Hasinais caused the de-
centralization of local structures of power and prestige. During this 
same period, the high exchange and use value of horses was reflected 
in the Comanches' emergence as a major player in the regional political 
economy. 
Values placed on the items offered by the Hasinais and Comanches 
varied, however. In general, horses appear to have been indexed to 
higher-value items and, in that role, became a means for accumu-
lating and transforming other kinds of wealth. Corn, though, func-
tioned as a standard for lower-priced objects (Blakeslee 1975). This 
disparity in product values affected the political and economic roles the 
Comanches and Hasinais filled during Spain's occupation of the South-
ern Plains. The Comanches faced increased competition as suppliers of 
horses, while the Hasinais experienced an accelerated erosion of their 
middleman status. Through shifts in settlement, production, and so-
cial reproduction, these two communities struggled to adapt to those 
changing circumstances. 
Shifts in the Production of the Comanches 
The emergence and expansion of trade fairs along the upper Rio 
Grande provided an ever-growing market for horses (Kavanagh 1996 ). 
By 1787, in addition to seven fairs held at Taos, the Spanish sponsored 
large annual trades at the Pecos and Picuris Pueblos, as well as San 
Antonio (Kessell 1979: 408). Not included in these regulated ex-
changes were those colonial officials did not sanction. 
Along the eastern rivers of Spain's territory in the Southern 
Plains, trading posts operated alongside itinerant and often indepen-
dent traders. As exchange opportunities increased, the Comanches' 
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involvement with the colonial horse trade deepened. Leaders of the 
Hasinais as well as the Spanish became increasingly alarmed at the 
Comanches' growing involvement in the expanding opportunities 
emerging in the area. They were particularly concerned about the 
exchange of horses for weapons. Hugh O'Connor, a Spanish gov-
ernor, noted that "the French continue to trade firearms, powder and 
balls, which they exchange for ... beasts of burden. They do not raise 
horses and mules, hence in order to supply the need, it is necessary 
to obtain them from Indians in trade" (Bolton 1905: 104). Unable 
to stem the flow of firearms or profitably compete with Comanche 
horse traders, Spanish ranchers in east Texas suggested that a brand be 
designated 
with which the people of this jurisdiction could counter mark the horses 
or mule to indicate the ones that are acquired legitimately, and so that 
persons introducing others without the said brand may be punished. It 
would also check the thieving of the Indians for if they found no one to 
buy them they would desist. (Hackett 1941, 3:463) 
By 1786, one of the Comanches' horses commanded a price of 
thirteen knives (Thomas 1932: 306). Even as late as 1824, Comanche 
suppliers received $25 to $30 in goods per horse {James 1953: 150-
151). In return, Euroamericans could sell these horses for one hundred 
dollars in Saint Louis {James 1953: 227). 
Lucrative profits and favorable exchange rates attracted the inter-
ests of numerous Euroamerican traders as well. During this period, 
many traders and settlers emigrated into the region of the Red River 
Valley. One United States agent remarked, "Hordes of hunters and 
licentious traders have entered the Indian villages and camps on the 
Red River above this place [Natchitoches] ... of which the Indians 
have frequently complained" {Carter 1951: 331). Complaints, which 
emanated mostly from the Kadohadachos, resulted from the grow-
ing exchange between the Comanches and Euroamericans. According 
to one Caddoan leader, "The traffic between the Comanches and the 
traders from the interior continues without interruption, and that arms, 
munitions, and other war supplies are being brought in" (Taylor 1957: 
136-37). 
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Supplying the expanding demand for decent horses in a compet-
itive market required the Comanches to engage in more specialized 
production. This allowed some sections of the population to engage 
in raiding, while others maintained local herds and subsistence needs. 
Raiding, perceived as a type of production, resolved "short-term im-
balances in the distribution of goods" (Albers 1993: 108). Through 
this activity, horses were accumulated "without radically disrupting 
the trade of other goods" (Albers 1993: 109). Comanches could raid 
San Antonio, Laredo, Galisteo, and Pecos while peacefully trading at 
Taos, Natchitoches, or the Taovaya settlements. According to Gover-
nor Velecz Cachupin(:) 
Although the Comanche nations carries on ... a trade with us ... as al-
ways, whenever the occasion offers for stealing horses or attacking the 
pueblos of Pecos or Galisteo, they do not fail to take advantage of it. 
(Hackett 1941, 3:328) 
Predictably, raiding intensified as competition over the trade in 
horses increased. During the early 1700s, the favored status of the 
Apaches among settlers in New Mexico correlates with the inten-
sity of the Comanches' raiding. During this era, Comanches tended 
to concentrate their attacks on settlements in New Mexico. Beyond 
supplying horses, these acts of aggression served two purposes. First, 
they forced the Spanish into a trading relation. Second, these actions 
disrupted trade between the Apaches and the settlers. 
At this time, raids were carried out by small, highly mobile groups of 
men (Kessell 1979: 380; Auerbach 1943: 120-21; Loomis and Nasatir 
1967: 363). By the 1750s and 1760s, Comanches focused their attacks 
on settlements in central Texas and the lower Rio Grande region (Allen 
1939; Bolton 1914, 1:278). This increase correlates with the southern 
migration of the Taovayas and the expansion of French and British 
traders. Colonial administrators in the region bitterly complained that 
a peace accord could not occur because 
these nations depreciate friends who furnish them nothing, and consider 
it better to continue war on us, since in exchange for the droves of horses 
which they steal from us they secure what they need from the French, 
and in default of this, from the English, who are their neighbors. (Bolton 
1914, 1:277) 
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As opportunities expanded east, so too did the raiding. By the 
late 1700s and early 1800s, the Hasinais complained of a well-worn 
trail leading from the Comanches to the trading post at Natchitoches 
(Hatcher 1919: 52). Presumably, this resulted from the vacuum caused 
by the retreat of France from Louisiana. According to one of the lead-
ers of the Kadohadochos, "The traffic between the Comanches and the 
foreign traders from the interior continues without interruption, and 
arms, munitions and other war supplies are being brought in" (Hackett 
1941, 3:136-37). 
The organization of raids during this period appears to have be-
come more specialized (Hamalainen2001). By the 1820s, it was noted 
that the Comanches "are becoming quite expert in :firearms ... having 
been furnished by traders from the United States, by way of exchange, 
for horses and mules, which these Indians would from time to time, 
plunder the Spanish settlements" (Kavanagh 1996). One eyewitness 
to a Comanches raid observed that the Comanches 
generally invaded the country in three divisions, of from two to five 
hundred warriors in each. Every year their incursions extend farther 
into the interior .... They are now overrunning the whole department of 
Durango and Chihuahua ... upwards of ten thousand head of horses and 
mules have already been carried off. (Ruxton 1847: 18, 101-2). 
Throughout Spain's presence in the Southern Plains the Comanches 
continued to engage in raiding when the need arose. In addition, the 
Comanches managed to successfully incorporate horses into their com-
munities. 
Whether for use or exchange, maintaining horse herds required 
frequent migrations in order to find sufficient pasturage. By the 1730s, 
the Comanches were "scattered about caring for the many horses which 
they get from New Mexico" (Hackett 1941, 3:348). In 1749, they 
remained "dispersed, with their large droves ofhorses, for which reason 
they could not live together, having to seek sufficient pasturage and 
water for their horses" (Hackett 1941, 3:317). Anthony Glass, a trader 
visiting the Comanches in 1808, noted that "each band contain[ed] 
from one to four thousand souls and twice that number of Horses & 
Mules" (Flores 1985: 81). De Mezieres related that the Comanches 
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"are skillful in the management of the horse, to the raising of which they 
devote themselves" (Bolton 1914, 2:297). Reiterating this sentiment, 
one observer stated: 
In one particular the Comanche is noteworthy. He knows more about 
horses and horse-breeding than any other Indian. He is particularly wed-
ded to and apt to ride a pinto ("painted" or piebald) horse, and never 
keeps any but a pinto stallion. He chooses his ponies well, and shows 
more good sense in breeding than one would give him credit for The 
corollary to this is that the Comanche is far less cruel to his beasts, and 
though he begins to use them as yearlings, the ponies often last through 
many years. (Dodge 1891: 862) 
As one early American trader commented, the Comanches owned 
"great numbers of very fine horses-and equal to any I have ever known" 
{Fowler 1898: 65). Further dispelling any notions about the inferiority 
of the Comanches' horses, one traveler exclaimed in 1821, "They are 
beautiful animals, always in excellent condition and although smaller 
than our American horses, are still very compact, and will bear much 
fatigue" (Kendall 1929: 94). 
Commitment to the maintenance of their horses contributed to the 
Comanches' success at bison hunting. In general, bison hunting re-
quired moments of rapid movement punctuated by prolonged periods 
of rest (Ingold 1980). Their economic focus on horses, concomitant 
with larger herd sizes and the necessity of having more grazing areas, 
resulted in frequent migrations. 
Most of their animals [horses mules] they tie every night with ropes made 
ofbuffalo skins to stake droves down in the grass round about their camp, 
thus they never can remain but a short time in the same place, but must 
move to fresh pasturage. (Sibley, quoted in Flores 1985: 81) 
Potentially, though, if an individual's herd population grew beyond 
the size necessary to supply transport and food, it became a liability in 
the hunting of wild ungulates {Ingold 1980: 57). As Shimkin points 
out {1947: 268): "More horses would have meant closer pursuit of the 
buffalo ... but also less fodder per head, consequently more frequent . ,, 
movmg. 
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Frequent migrations aided the Comanches' efforts to support a sur-
plus of horses. It also required the Comanches to expand their access 
to grasslands. This was complicated by the fact that horses and bison 
were sympatric species, both preferring to feed on perennial warm-
season grasses (Peden 1972: 8). In addition, weather conditions in 
the Southern Plains frequently affected the quality of the grasslands. 
Predictably, in some areas grasslands were overexploited. If overgraz-
ing occurred, warm-season grasses decreased and warm-season forbs 
increased (French 1968: 49). 
A number of travelers through the region noted the degradation of 
the Southern Plains grasslands during the 1800s. As one man stated: 
"The soil is rich and well matted with their [bison's] favorite grass, yet 
it is all {except a very little on the creek bottoms near to timber) eaten 
down like an overtaxed sheep pasture in a dry August" {Wilcox 1911: 
29). 
In order to overcome this problem, a community had to alter 
both the focus and the organization of its subsistence. According 
to Kavanagh {1996: 59), the importance of bison as a basic item of 
the Comanches' political economy lessened with the introduction of 
horses. Though bison continued to be hunted by the Comanches, the 
mobility and technological advantage offered by horses meant that 
fewer people were needed to dispatch or transport the animals. In 
1772, De Mezieres noticed that the Comanches tended to "divide 
themselves into an infinite number of little bands for the purpose of 
seeking better pastures for their horses, and cattle [bison] for their 
own food" {Bolton 1914, 1:175). According to Kavanagh {1996: 59), 
"The horse democratized access to the buffalo, transforming its eco-
nomic role from being the basis of the political economy to being 
primarily an object in the domestic economy." Because of the political 
and economic salience of horses and guns, bison became the primary 
means for obtaining agricultural and manufactured products. Adapt-
ing to the changing function of bison use, economic activities among 
the Comanches became more specialized. 
For example, the role of captives became more demarcated. Not only 
did male captives, who were often of Spanish descent, tend the horses, 
but they also repaired the guns and made the saddles (Burnet 1824: 
163). Through specializing aspects of production, the Comanches 
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successfully participated in the trading economy while maintaining 
a secure source of subsistence. Due to these changes, the Comanches 
retained a sizeable surplus of healthy horses and thus augmented their 
role as major suppliers of this critical resource. 
An added advantage of the transitory nature of the Comanches' 
pattern of settlement related to their proclivity for raiding. Being a 
highly mobile society, the Comanches stymied Spain's efforts to halt 
the practice. Having a dispersed population, along with their access to 
rapid transport, aided the Comanches' efforts to escape Spanish de-
tection and to supply other colonial powers with their ill-gotten gains. 
Basically, the Comanches raided with impunity. Noting these factors, 
one governor of New Mexico reported that after the Comanches 
make their attack it is difficult to overtake them, because they cover a 
great deal of ground, stopping neither by day nor night, until they have 
behind them a hundred or more leagues and reach the place where they 
left their rancheria and women. They flee in scattered groups, so that no 
one can follow their trail. They leave spies behind in the mountains or 
hills to observe whether they are being followed. (Hackett 1941, 3:328) 
The dispersed settlements and migratory patterns of the Comanches 
settlements allowed them to generate enough horses so that they could 
exchange the surplus for firearms and agricultural products. The value 
of horses as an object of use and exchange meant that the Comanches 
participated in regional trade networks to a greater degree than is usual 
for a peripheral community. Enhancing this development involved the 
organizational structure of the Comanches' trading structures. 
Concomitant with the transitory character of the Comanches' set-
tlements was the ephemeral nature of the Comanches' trading parties. 
Organized around a local male leader, these groups maintained a fluid 
membership (Foster 1991: 61). Joshua Gregg, a merchant involved in 
the Santa Fe trade, documented the public function of trading leaders: 
In Comanche trade the main trouble consists in fixing the price of the first 
animal. This being settled by the chiefs, it often happens that mule after 
mule is led up and the price received without further cavil. Each owner 
usually wants a general assortment; therefore the price must consist of 
several items as a blanket, a looking-glass, an awl, a flint, a little tobacco, 
vermilion, beads, etc. (Gregg 1933: 239-40) 
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Though these leaders were involved with the structuring of ex-
changes, the level of control they exerted over their followers ap-
pears negligible. Referred to as "captains," "leaders," or "chiefs" by the 
Spanish, these individuals frustrated colonial efforts to enforce trade 
accords. According to Governor Cachupin, Comanches trading at 
Taos participated in raids at Pecos and Galisteo (Hackett 1941, 3:329). 
In 1750, Governor Cachupin commented on the "warlike cap-
tains ... who, with their rancherfas, prey upon this province and 
Pueblos of Pecos and Galisteo" (Hackett 1941, 3:329). More than 
likely, "warlike captains" easily transformed into peaceful ones when 
useful. The level of deference colonial officials paid to trading lead-
ers suggests the close connection between raiding and trading lead-
ers. In the early 1750s, Governor Cachupin suggested that in order 
for his replacement to retain peaceful trading relations with visiting 
Comanches, he needed to "have the chiefs called and receive them 
with every kindness and affection. Sit down with them and command 
tobacco for them so that they may smoke, as is their custom" (Thomas 
1940: 134). By 1786, the Spanish government financed the giving of 
tobacco and goods to chiefs (Galvez 1951: 50). 
Placating one "chief" did not necessarily incorporate other 
Comanches into Spain's sphere ofinfl.uence. For example, Spanish of-
ficials repeatedly remonstrated with leaders about the raiding actions 
of their followers. Typically, the Comanches in power apologized and 
denied involvement, knowledge, and control over the raiding activities 
of their members. According to Cachupin: 
They excuse themselves by blaming others of their nation, saying that 
among them are warlike captains who commit these outrages and those 
who are well disposed are unable to prevent them. They always say that 
they know nothing about it. As there is no organization or authority 
among these Indians. (Hackett 1941, 3:328-29) 
Comanches used this same strategy ofleadership when dealing with 
officials or traders from other colonial powers. When Anthony Glass 
organized a trading expedition with the Comanches in 1808, he con-
tinuously opined that the Comanches sold him horses that they later 
stole. Glass claimed that the leader "did all they could to recover them 
for me" and "the principal Chief told me he was truly sorry but that 
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there were bad men in all nations" (Flores 1985: 80). At Glass's request, 
one ofleaders returned some of the stolen horses. In return, the trader 
gave the man "a blanket, some powder and lead" (Flores 1985: 80). In 
less than a week, however, another forty one horses were stolen from 
Glass (Flores 1985: 81). 
Experiences of traders negotiating with the Comanches indicate 
that leaders exerted little control over their followers. Kavanagh ( 1996: 
38) differs with this opinion, however. In his analysis, he cites a number 
of examples where leaders used their power over followers both norma-
tively and pragmatically. Each of his examples addresses events critical 
to the political relations between the Comanches and colonial author-
ities. For example, the assassination of Toro Blanco by Ecueracapa 
in 1787 relates more to economic relations with the Spanish than as 
evidence of an individual consolidating his power. Ecueracapa repre-
sented the Cuchanecs, who were in a position to benefit from Spanish 
trade agreements once Toro Blanco was neutralized. 
A similar explanation describes the threat of twelve chiefs to shoot 
an individual who raided horses in Mexico in 1758 (Leeper 1858: 
175). At this juncture, the Jupes resided on a reservation provided 
by the Spanish. During their brief occupation of the reservation (less 
than a year), this division ofComanches wanted to secure stable trade 
relations with the Spanish. Raiding by some members of the Jupes 
could potentially sabotage such an agreement. 
Essentially, the Comanches organized themselves in ways most 
useful to their involvement in a wider arena of exchanges. Leaders 
emerged, but their permanency and authority remained dependent 
on the economic and strategic success of their actions. According to 
Richardson (1933: 16), "Chiefs might come and go, but the bands 
remained, and selected new chiefs to carry on the leadership." An ob-
server in 1818 commented: 
Compulsion is seldom exercised on a refractory culprit; and when imper-
vious circumstances require it be done, it is effected by a convention of 
chiefs whose personal influences become auxiliary to an otherwise impo-
tent authority. (Wallace 1954: 124-25) 
In 1821, a Spanish colonialist wrote that the Comanches were 
"governed by the person most noted for bravery, intrepidity, and 
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ferocity"; however, "they obey him when they wish, without noting 
him" (Hatcher 1919: 55). Politically, the Comanches associated most 
closely with the Spanish. Strategically, the absence of a centralized 
position of power aided the Comanches' independence from Spain's 
control. Because the Native Americans had adopted a diffuse system of 
political control, the Spanish could not coerce a "chief" in order to gain 
the compliance of the leader's followers. A major means for leaders to 
enhance their prominence in the political arena included the ability to 
secure stable sources of highly sought commodities and the astuteness 
to redistribute these items to individuals key to the leader's success. By 
following this agenda, the flow of commodities within the Comanches' 
communities became critical to a person's capacity to remain politically 
important. 
Patterns of Social Reproduction Among 
the Comanches 
As access to guns became tied to the horse trade, the Comanches ex-
perienced an influx of wealth. Although the abundance of horses along 
with their role as a medium of exchange democratized the availability 
of guns, not all Comanches attained equal levels of wealth with its at-
tendant prerogatives of power and prestige. Instead, these prerogatives 
remained under the control of a rather small cadre of men. These men 
served as leaders and controlled far more wealth than their follow-
ers. Leaders were men who successfully negotiated strategic exchanges 
with colonial authorities. 
Spanish administrators abetted this development through their 
practice of bribing the Comanches with gifts. Once identified as lead-
ers by the ·Spanish, colonial officials gave these individual numerous 
trade goods to distribute. Consequently, prominent Comanches ac-
crued more prestige through socially generated levels of generosity 
(Wallace and Hoebel 1952: 131). 
Clinton Smith, a captive of the Comanches in the early 1800s, 
calculated that more than half of the six thousand horses owned by the 
band he was associated with belonged to the "chief" (Smith and Smith 
1927: 50-51). Captain Marcy estimated that successful warriors each 
owned fifty to two hundred horses (Marcy 1937). The owner of a horse 
was indicated by a notch on the animal's ear (Gregg 1933: 433). 
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Apparently the Comanches' accumulation of wealth followed so-
cially generated rules. Although horses were private property owned 
by both women and men, men dominated their use and exchange values 
(Gladwin 1948: 73-94; Wallace and Hoebel 1986: 47,241). Women 
used horses and mules to transport tents, poles, hooks, and other items 
associated with the household (Flores 1985: 81). Men, on the other 
hand, utilized horses as an aid to bison hunting and as a medium of 
exchange {Klein 1993: 142). 
Within the Comanches' communities, horses could be converted 
into forms of nondurable wealth. Like the Cheyennes and Blackfeet, 
bridewealth payments, damage compensation, and political advance-
ment all necessitated the circulation of horses {Lewis 1942; Rister 
1989). Men who controlled a surplus of horses converted these domes-
ticates into Euroamerican commodities or socially sanctioned positions 
of status. Individuals rich in horses supported polygynous households 
and owned captives who acted as herders (Flores 1985: 81; Burnet 
1824: 163; Gregg 1933: 434). 
Unlike more durable objects of wealth, however, horses could eas-
ily be stolen or adversely affected by climatic events. This ephemeral 
quality of horse herds limited the development of a hierarchical politi-
cal system. Numerous descriptions of the Comanches' political system 
mention that leaders lacked control over their followers. 
Shifts in the Production Patterns 
of the Hasinais 
The Hasinais' involvement in various long-distance trade routes led 
them to diversify their economy through greater specialization in dif-
ferent forms of production. During the 1700s, activities such as hunt-
ing, trading, farming, pottery manufacture, livestock management, 
and salt production became full-time specialized occupations {Gregory 
1973: 270). In addition, the incorporation of guns and horses in the 
local economy increased the importance of bison and deer hunting (La 
Vere 1993: 72; Swanton 1942: 265). Early Spanish missionaries noted 
that the Hasinais participated in a continuous round of hunting sev-
eral times a year in late spring after planting and again after harvest in 
late summer (La Vere 1993: 73). In 1650, Spanish settlers mentioned 
that the Hasinais "plant and gather their crops of corn; their lands 
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are fertile, and they utilize wild cows called cibolas" (Castaneda 1936, 
1:205). 
The Hasinais' ability to more easily kill bison permitted them to 
reduce their consumption of agricultural products. Contrary to expec-
tations, though, the communities planted and harvested on substan-
tial tracts of farmland. As a matter of fact, one Spanish administrator 
noted that the Hasinais' commitment to agricultural production hin-
dered their relocation into local missions (Kress and Hatcher 1931: 6 7). 
One possible explanation for the Hasinais' decision to develop the 
agricultural sector of their economy may relate to the population's desire 
to participate in local trade networks. According to Lewis and Clark, 
a similar type of exchange system developed in the upper Missouri 
River region (Thwaites 1904, 2:220). In that region, agricultural com-
munities traded surplus domesticates for bison and Euroamerican 
commodities. The situation in the Hasinais' area differed, however. 
Climatic conditions in east Texas abetted Euroamerican settlers, along 
with numerous indigenous communities, in their efforts to successfully 
participate in farming. As a result, agricultural products swamped the 
market and could not compete with exchanges involving "firearms, 
ammo, and knives" (Niles 1818: 42-43). 
Adding to the difficulties faced by the Hasinais was the increasingly 
marginal role played by their trading partners, the Taovayas. By 1818, 
the Comanches had successfully bypassed the Taovayas and begun to 
trade directly with Euroamerican traders. Wrote Anthony Glass: 
I have come a long journey to see you and have brought with me 
some goods to exchange with you and your brothers-the Hietans 
[Comanches], for horses if you will trade with us on fair and equal terms, 
you will in the future be supplied with goods brought into your towns. 
(Qioted in Flores 1987: 47) 
At this time, the Comanches maintained substantial numbers of 
horses. Glass could not meet the demands of the Taovayas. According 
to Glass, the Taovayas "demanded more for their horses than I could 
afford to give them'' (Flores 1985: 50). A few weeks later, however, 
Glass met with the Comanches and purchased numerous horses at a 
reasonable cost (Flores 1985: 51). 
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Neither the Taovayas nor the Hasinais could halt the west-
ward movement of Euroamerican traders. By the early 1800s, the 
Comanches had become the main source of horses, while the Hasinai 
settlements served as staging areas for provisioning Euroamerican trad-
ing expeditions. 
Settlement Patterns of the Hasinais 
By 1805, at least four communities of Hasinais had disappeared 
as separate entities, and another village had relocated closer to the 
Kadohadachos (La Vere 1993: 180). These changes in settlement pat-
terns seem to be related to a number of events, including, epidemics, 
intensive warfare with the Osages and relocated southeastern popula-
tions, and changes in Euroamerican trading opportunities. By shift-
ing to a more concentrated pattern of settlement, the Hasinais ensured 
their survival against encroaching enemies. The locations of these 
newly constructed settlements were not random. Invariably, the 
Hasinais migrated closer to trading posts and trading routes. Through 
these moves, the Hasinais attempted to regain their middleman posi-
tion in the firearms trade. Strategically, the Hasinais needed not only to 
attract traders but also to halt colonial traders from directly contracting 
with nomadic suppliers. 
Population decline destabilized the Hasinais' ability to participate in 
local trade networks, however. Initially, they forestalled their eventual 
marginality by depending more heavily on their relatives the Taovayas. 
A number of communities associated with the Taovayas migrated to 
the periphery of eastern Caddoan territories during the latter half of the 
1700s. Though this allowed the Hasinais to maintain some involve-
ment in the exchange of commodities, theywere too politically and mil-
itarily weak to control their kin or other traders within their territory. 
Community leaders bitterly complained about the illicit trade oc-
curring between the Comanches and the Taovayas {Niles 1818: 43). 
Although the Spanish granted the Hasinais permission to seize contra-
band traders, these villagers lacked the necessary military and equip-
ment. Unable to insert themselves between colonial and indigenous 
traders belonging to other nations, the Hasinais became increasingly 
marginal to trade networks in the Southern Plains. 
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Shifts in Patterns of Social Reproduction 
Among the Hasinais 
Immediately upon encountering colonial representative of France and 
Spain, the Hasinais endeavored to negotiate alliances with both coun-
tries. Leaders successfully convinced Spanish Franciscans to construct 
missions. Offering little but epidemics, these missions quickly lost 
credibility among the Hasinais. When one Franciscan commented 
that smallpox emanated from God's will, parishioners suggested that 
he either leave or be killed (Hatcher 1927: 295; Gilmore 1973: 58). 
As the initial rarity of Euroamerican commodities gave way to 
their eventual ubiquity in the region, shifts in the Hasinais' social 
organization occurred. Originally the Hasinais incorporated items of 
Euroamerican manufacture into ceremonial realms of activity (Sabo 
1987: 38-39; Perttula 1992: 222). With greater accessibility to these 
foreign articles, however, the Hasinais began to expand their uses into 
other areas of social life. Increased availability of guns and horses trans-
formed earlier patterns of local distribution. This is most clearly seen 
with the emergence of the caddi as a powerful village leader. 
During the first half of the eighteenth century these village leaders 
controlled their settlements' importation and circulation of French and 
Spanish manufactures. Bypassed in these exchanges were the heredi-
tary religious authorities, the xinesis. Prior to their demise, each xinesi 
acted as a spiritual leader for a number of villages (Leutnegger 1979: 
42-53). Atthe time ofinitial Spanish contact, these men extended their 
control over both the sacred and mundane aspects of the Hasinais' so-
ciety. Because of this role, the caddis owed the xinesis their allegiance 
(Wyckoff and Baugh 1980). Contrary to expectations, however, the 
structural position of the xinesis became less elaborate as colonial con-
tact expanded. This occurred in response to colonial manipulations, as 
well as changes in patterns of distribution. 
Early in the eighteenth century, Spanish agents manipulated the 
xinesis' rule of succession. For example, in 1690 a Spanish administra-
tor stated: 
I should like very much, Your Excellency, for something to be given the 
Xinesi, since he is the chief of the province. I have already honored him by 
making him governor and have presented him with the staff of command. 
He is no more than a caddi, and as such, he together with the other eight 
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caddices is subject to a grand Xinesi. But because of the thing given him, 
it is impossible for him not to be recognized as the Xinesi rather than as 
a caddi. This done, all the Caddices will be obliged to recognize him as 
their grand Xinesi. (Wyckoff and Baugh 1980: 223) 
By the early 1700s, the xinesis' power had been supplanted by the 
elevated role of the caddis. 
Spanish actions alone did not cause this shift in Caddoan power 
relations. Instead, these external contingencies acted in concert with 
changes in the types of commodities available to the Hasinais. Firearms 
and horses proved particularly important in this regard. As Richard 
White's Choctaw research illustrates, these two commodities served 
as a democratizing factor within a community (White 1983: 6 7). Both 
of these items permitted individuals to circumvent earlier structural 
constraints against the mass distribution of goods. With a gun and a 
horse, anyone could participate in Euroamerican trade networks. No 
longer beholden to the xinesis for surplus distribution, these individu-
als appear to have allied with particular caddis. According to Domingo 
Ramon's experience in 1716, goods that he gave the caddi were im-
mediately redistributed among the leader's followers until nothing was 
left for the caddi (Woodall 1969: 36). 
With the democratization of product distribution among the 
Hasinais, status privileges and civic positions were no longer coter-
minous with kinship relations. Succession to leadership positions be-
came structured around ambilineal kinship ties (Wyckoff and Baugh 
1980: 225). In addition, the relational differences between matrilateral 
and patrilateral cousins were eliminated as the two were merged into 
one category {Wyckoff and Baugh 1980: 231). Probably these changes 
in kinship relations augmented the decentralization of the Hasinais' 
power structure. 
Though the caddis had been equal in status when the Spanish first 
encountered the Hasinais, by the early 1700s, not all caddis held the 
same amount of power. In fact, the relationship between the caddis 
had become more hierarchical (Foik 1933: 21). Attracting followers 
seems to have become dependent on an individual's ability to negotiate 
stable trade alliances. This trend continued, until by the 1750s, Spanish 
documents note that one caddi acted as the leader for the entire nation 
ofHasinais {Griffith 1954: 64). 
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Shared Histories of the Colonizers and 
the Colonized 
Clearly, a community's patterns of settlement, production, and social 
reproduction are more than static reflections oflocal concerns. Both the 
Comanches and the Hasinais actively participated in their construction 
of new patterns of settlements, production, and social reproduction. 
They structured these changes according to their interpretations of 
colonial processes. The fact that exchange opportunities increased for 
the Comanches while those of the Hasinais diminished led to different 
strategies ofinteractions with colonial authorities. This, in turn, rever-
berated through the social organizations of both communities. In the 
Comanches' case, they migrated more frequently and placed less value 
on bison hunting as opportunities for exchange increased. Among the 
Hasinais, agricultural production intensified, bison hunting increased, 
and opportunities for exchange decreased. 
7 
CONCLUSION 
During the past twenty years, researchers focusing on the Great Plains 
have explored strategies employed by indigenous communities to uti-
lize colonial policies to their own advantages. By applying world sys-
tems perspectives, regional analysis, and/or social history theories, 
scholars successfully illustrated that indigenous communities are best 
understood by studying the political and economic dynamics of the 
region. This approach allows researchers to move beyond the view 
that Native communities were static except for changes caused by the 
creative powers of colonial constraints. 
Thomas's (1994: 3) critique that anthropological studies on indige-
nous populations invariably "seem to do more to recapitulate than sub-
vert the privileged status and presumed dominance of the discourse" has 
diminished in most recent ethnohistorical accounts ofN ative histories. 
Instead, current scholars studying the dynamics of colonial encounters 
no longer perceive indigenous populations as passive recipients of colo-
nial actions. 
Recent historical studies of the Great Plains emphasize the myr-
iad of strategies implemented by nonstate indigenous communities 
to retain sovereignty and maintain control over their relations with 
encroaching colonial nations. Adherents of a world systems perspec-
tive focus on structures that articulate the Spanish colonial govern-
ment with local inhabitants {Baugh 1991; Hall 1987, 1988, 1989, 
1993, 1998, 1999; Klein 1993). Researchers utilizing world systems 
approaches, as well as regional analysis and social history theories, 
also focus on the advantages of a local community's internal organiza-
tional changes in order to counteract an expanding colonial government 
(Perttula 1991, 1992; Hamalainen 1998, 2001; Hickerson 1996, 1997; 
La Vere 1998, 2000). 
In an effort to gain greater insight into the Comanches' ability 
to withstand incorporation into Spain's regional political economy, 
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Hall (1989, 1999, 2000) applied a world systems perspective. As he 
pointed out (1989), Spain's colonial expansion into the Southern Plains 
emanated from events beyond the control of indigenous inhabitants 
in the region. Even so, colonization of the region necessitated that 
the colonists stabilize their relations with indigenous residents. Both 
the French and the Spanish attempted to regulate their encounters 
with Native groups through the establishment of trade, alliances, and 
treaties. Unlike the French, however, the Spanish also established mis-
sions and presidios. Although the function of these institutions was to 
aid Spain's efforts to incorporate Native peoples into the colonial en-
terprise, this strategy failed. 
Researchers studying colonial expansion elsewhere in the United 
States often found that colonial encounters left indigenous communi-
ties "destabilized and marginalized, as their land and surplus labor are 
expropriated and they are insidiously incorporated into the metropoli-
tan political economy as a peripheral enclave proletariat" (Faiman-Silva 
1997: 4). In the Great Plains, however, the Comanches and the 
Hasinais successfully defined the terms of their incorporation into 
the colonial political economy. How these communities managed to 
forestall annihilation or forced incorporation requires a close study of 
the strategies used by the Comanches and the Hasinais to "control, 
shape, and resist the encroaching world-system" (Hall 1999: 10). 
As Hall's research on the Comanches' relations with the Spanish il-
lustrates, Spain's inability to provide the necessary funding or personnel 
to conquer the Comanches contributed to Spain's failure to colonize the 
region. Other equally important factors responsible for Spain's lack of 
success involved the availability of trade goods from other colonial pow-
ers and the political organization of the Comanches. Superior firearms 
offered by the French, British, and later the Americans diminished 
Spain's ability to monopolize the distribution of manufactured items 
critical to Native survival. Ultimately, this meant that Spanish officials 
lacked the requisite items to maintain the loyalty of Native allies. 
Recognizing these problems, colonial officials offered favorable 
trade terms to communities deemed to be of strategic importance to the 
colonial ambitions of the Spanish. Initially, the Lipan Apaches ben-
efited from this approach. Although unable to legally garner firearms 
from the Spanish, they were the first community to receive horses. In 
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addition, Spain supported the Lipans' established role as trading part-
ners of Puebloan communities along the upper Rio Grande. After the 
Comanches migrated into the Southern Plains, the Spanish originally 
acted as a neutral party during the ensuing battles between the Lipans 
and the Comanches over access to Puebloan trade goods. 
Once the Comanches had successfully dislodged the Lipans from 
the Puebloan trading sphere, the Spanish ended their neutral stance 
and supported the Comanches' expansion into other lucrative trad-
ing regions. A number of policies introduced by the Spanish aided 
this endeavor. Specifically, they introduced scheduled markets in the 
Puebloan region as well as in central Texas. In order to maintain a 
modicum of control over their trading relations with the Comanches, 
administrators forbade independent Spanish traders from engaging in 
exchanges with the Comanches without official approval. Documents 
associated with Spain's colonial era in the Southern Plains are replete 
with cases involving colonial citizens ignoring this policy and main-
taining illicit trade relations with the Comanches. 
Spanish officials in Texas also attempted to manage trade networks 
developed by the Taovayas. During the Taovayas' heyday, they had 
access to commodities offered by the Spanish, French, and British, 
and later by American traders. Located along a major route of trade, 
the Taovayas acted as middlemen for their Caddoan relatives to the 
east as well as the Comanches to the west. In order to gain a modicum 
of control over the situation, the Spanish offered to pay artificially high 
prices for goods offered by the Taovayas. In return, the Taovayas agreed 
to trade only with the Spanish and their allies. Without the necessary 
resources to monitor the situation, however, the Spanish could not 
guarantee the Taovayas' compliance. 
After the Comanches expanded east, the Taovayas' importance in 
local trade routes diminished. No longer did the Comanches need to 
rely on the Taovayas for access to commodities offered by colonial 
powers other than the Spanish. Instead, they could meet directly with 
foreign nationals and negotiate their own trade terms. They also in-
creased their sphere of influence by strategically using their alliances 
with the Spanish as well as indigenous communities to develop bands 
that specialized in either raiding or trading (Hamalainen 1998, 2001). 
As a result, a number of bands maintained peaceful trading relations 
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with northern New Mexico and Louisiana, while other bands regularly 
raided Spanish settlers in central and southern New Mexico and Texas 
(Hamalainen 2001: 288). Both Kavanagh's (1996) and Hamalainen's 
( 1998, 2001) research shows that the raiding and trading bands of the 
Comanches worked in concert. For example, items taken by the bands 
specialized in raiding not only were traded to other colonial powers but 
also were used by peaceful trading bands in their exchanges at markets 
in New Mexico as well as with allies in Louisiana. 
Spanish administrators had few options for dealing with this prac-
tice. Unable to muster a strong military force or the necessary firearms 
to pursue the perpetrators of these raids, Spain had a limited ability to 
retaliate against these attacks. Instead, local officials attempted to 
transform the political organization of the Comanches. Because the 
Comanches' "political system offered bands substantial flexibility and 
independence" (Anderson 1999: 237), this policy ultimately failed. 
When colonial officials confronted leaders of bands involved in raid-
ing, these individuals invariably denied responsibility for the actions of 
their followers. Time after time, political leaders noted that members 
of a band retained autonomy from the band's leadership. 
In response to this reality, the Spanish tried to develop a more cen-
tralized political system among the Comanches by offering incentives 
to the community's leadership. This strategy was introduced in 1786, 
when Spanish officials offered military aid, favorable trading terms, 
and gifts to various leaders in order to facilitate the emergence of cen-
tralized authority. In 1786, Ecueracapa became the titular head of the 
Comanches. 
The western Cuchanecs, a peaceful trading group that also was the 
most populous division of the Comanches, backed Ecueracapa's ascen-
dancy to this role. According to New Mexico's governor, by "means 
of his person [Ecueracapa], elevating him above the rest of class, we 
would be able, perhaps to submit subtly all his nation to the domin-
ion of the king without using violent means contrary to his sovereign 
intentions" (Thomas 1932: 302). 
In order for this strategy to succeed, followers of Ecueracapa assas-
sinated Toro Blanco, the main opposition to the scheme. As the leader 
of the eastern Cuchanecs, Toro Blanco and his followers derived colo-
nial resources from foreign nationals. They also relied on raiding to 
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supplement their material wealth. By killing Toro Blanco and dispers-
ing his followers, Ecueracapa managed to negotiate a peace with the 
Spanish. 
In reality, the adoption of a centralized leader by the Comanches 
related to the fact that "indigenous peoples make pragmatic responses" 
to political and economic events (Ferguson and Whitehead 1992: 17). 
Part of the pragmatism was the recognition that the Spanish were too 
weak to defeat the Comanches but powerful enough to provide eco-
nomic benefits. Only with Spain's passage of favorable trading terms, 
bribery of various leaders, and the promise of military aid were the 
Comanches willing to adopt a principal leader. After Ecueracapa's 
reign ended with his death in 1793, various Comanches from the 
western Cuchanecs briefly filled the office (Kavanagh 1996: 143; Sim-
mons 1967: 31). Within less than two decades, the Comanches had 
rid themselves of this externally invented structure. 
Obviously, centralization did little for the political economies of di-
visions and bands residing further away from the Spanish markets. As 
a result, these other political grouping continued to rely on trade items 
from sources besides the Spanish. Had Ecueracapa and his successors 
had real power, they could have kept their brethren from acquiring 
commodities from non-Spanish sources. Clearly, the chronically un-
derfunded Spanish colonies allowed the other bands and divisions in 
the Plains to maintain their independence from agreements made on 
their behalf by the western Cuchanecs and Spanish diplomats. 
By supporting numerous leaders instead of one paramount chief, 
the Comanches not only escaped the coercive force of colonial sanc-
tions but also managed to set the terms of their incorporation into 
Spain's peripheral frontier. Trade frequently acted as the centerpiece 
of Spanish diplomacy. As Dunaway notes, "Trade was essential to the 
diplomatic process ... and no alliances could be secured without the ex-
change of commodities" (1996: 27). The importance of colonial items 
to local economies guaranteed the survival of colonial trade centers in 
the region. Ultimately, the Comanches were a greater threat to Spain's 
continual occupation of the Southern Plains than vice versa. 
Until France's retreat from Louisiana in 1763, the Hasinais profited 
from the ability to negotiate with two competing colonial powers. Be-
cause France did not restrict the trade of firearms to Native peoples, the 
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Hasinais allied more closely with the French. Essentially, the Spanish 
resided in the area at the pleasure of the Hasinais and their French allies. 
One Spanish missionary complained that "the French have complete 
hold upon the Indians and have subjected them entirely to their will 
by means of gifts and flattery" and the French "take their shirts off to 
give them to the Indians" (Smith 1995: 46). 
This situation began to deteriorate later in the 1750s when 
other indigenous populations began to compete for access to French 
commodities. 
Increased competition for trade with Europeans within their region, com-
bined to deprive the Hasinai of their status as a regional trade gateway. 
The loss of their gateway position contributed to the decline and eventual 
demise of the Hasinai Confederacy, and the shift of the highest locus of 
political authority and status from the confederacy level to the local level. 
(Hickerson 1996: 165) 
Because the Hasinais specialized in the production of surplus agri-
cultural products, this disparity in locally generated items for trade 
weakened the ability of the community to compete effectively with the 
Comanches. The nomadic Comanches easily transformed their subsis-
tence economy into one that raised and raided livestock to exchange for 
commodities controlled by colonial traders. Raiding livestock from the 
Spanish for the American market became a major economic endeavor 
for the Comanches. In return, they received firearms with which to 
further expand their sphere of influence. 
Few options were available to the Hasinais attempting to respond 
to this changing political and economic landscape. Lack of reliable 
trade items from various Spanish trading posts and the difficulty of 
obtaining horses left the Hasinais with limited choices. Forming an 
alliance with the Lipan Apaches proved to be one of the few op-
tions available to them. Due to the antipathy of the Spanish and the 
Comanches toward the Lipans, the Hasinais faced immediate retalia-
tion from these nations if an alliance was negotiated with the Lipans. 
In order to either repudiate or mask their relationship with the Lipans, 
the Hasinais killed a number of the diplomats representing the 
Lipans who had attended the ceremony celebrating a treaty with the 
Hasinais. 
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Soon after this debacle, the Hasinais continued to decentralize their 
political organization. After the villages became autonomous, each 
negotiated its own trade arrangements with the Lipans. As was the 
case with the Comanches, no outside government could sanction the 
entire community through the auspices of one leader. 
As the history of the Comanches and Hasinais show, neither com-
munity succumbed to "the seductive lure of manufactured goods and 
powerful backing" or the "unpredictable behavior of the colonizers ... 
and loss of autonomy that comes with cooperation" (Ferguson and 
Whitehead 1992: 17). Rather than becoming marginalized through 
colonial expansion, each of these communities maintained sover-
eignty by applying various strategies to gain greater access to critical 
resources. 
As world systems perspectives illustrate, incorporation into a colo-
nial political economy can be forestalled in a number of circumstances. 
These include the presence of competing colonial governments, 
chronic shortages in funding and personnel among the colonialists, 
decentralized political systems among indigenous communities, and 
militarily prepared local communities. 
Regional analysis shows the importance of strategic alliances with 
both colonial governments and indigenous communities. Ultimately, 
however, the most lucrative strategy involved the ability to bypass 
indigenous middlemen and trade directly with colonial agents. This 
system worked well for the Comanches. It proved disastrous for the 
Taovayas and the Hasinais, however. Policies beyond their control 
meant that neither one of the communities managed to regain its role 
as middleman or gateway community. 
Social history theories offer insights into the reasons a community 
transforms its political and economic organizations. An excellent ex-
ample of this fact emerges through studying changes in the Hasinais' 
political organization. Soon after the arrival of the Spanish, the govern-
ment became more secularized. After the disappearance of the xinesis, 
who acted as both political and religious leaders, the caddis filled the 
vacuum. Initially, the caddis acted as the secular leaders of their vil-
lages. Eventually, however, one caddi became the titular head of the 
entire nation of Hasinais. Unlike the case of the xinesis, the caddis' 
role remained secular in nature (La Vere 2001). Having one leader 
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represent the entire nation worked as long as two competing colonial 
powers remained in the region. After France retreated from the area, 
however, the Hasinais rejected the presence of a central leader. Instead 
they adopted a decentralized government in which each village acted 
independently of a central authority. 
An analysis of global forces offers an external framework for under-
standing regional and local strategies. Without this component, the 
flow of commodities, the development of alliances, the relocation of 
communities, and political change appear to occur in a vacuum. Within 
the parameters of colonial constraints, social change represented strate-
gic actions, not a reactive reflection of externally constructed forces. 
Regional analysis contributes to world systems perspectives through 
its focus on the relationship between a community's economic and po-
litical prominence and the dispersal of high-demand commodities. 
By studying the role alliances played in the circulation of horses and 
firearms, changes in a community's production become more easily 
explained. The Comanches' expansion into new territories can be at-
tributed to the need to raise large herds of horses rather than an inher-
ent need to engage in warfare. The reasons for the intensification of 
agricultural production among the Hasinais become clearer when the 
products are viewed as exchange items for firearms. 
Social history theories inform both world systems perspective and 
regional analysis by providing a microanalysis of local change. Un-
derstanding political organization moves beyond heritage or environ-
mental explanations by discussing the strategic advantages of specific 
organizations in order to gain access to critical resources, negotiate 
with colonial governments, and engage in agreements with other in-
digenous communities. 
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